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While a commitment to individual liberty lies at the core 
of liberalism, it is not entirely clear what this 
commitment entails, as there is much disagreement over the 
concept of liberty itself.  As Abraham Lincoln once 
famously stated, “we all declare for liberty, but in using 
that word we do not all mean the same thing” (Lincoln 2003: 
677).  To put it another way, liberty is a concept of which 
there are many distinct conceptions.  All liberals 
converge, virtually by definition, in endorsing liberty as 
a primary political value (Cranston 1967); however, this 
convergence would be fairly vacuous if it were reached only 
at the level of the concept of liberty, while significant 
divergence at the level of the conception of liberty 
remained.  If the liberal commitment to liberty is to have 
any definite content, then we need to know which conception 
of liberty is the liberal one. 
 In this essay, I will attempt to answer this very 
question.  The problem is that liberals themselves strongly 
disagree about which conception of liberty grounds liberal 
principles. As I will argue, however, none of the 
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conceptions traditionally championed by liberal theorists 
are adequate to the task because they often conflict with 
fundamental liberal commitments and intuitions. The dispute 
over the nature and value of liberty is indeed part of the 
wider dispute between liberals over the the central 
commitments of liberalism itself.  It is my contention, 
however, that all parties of this dispute have failed to 
fully appreciate the respective deficiencies of the 
standard conceptions of liberty in terms of those 
commitments that liberals all share.  Given these 
deficiencies, a better, more adequately liberal, account of 
liberty is needed.  To this end, I will outline and argue 
in favor of a unique alternative conception of liberty -- 
liberty as anti-domination -- on the grounds that it is the 
conception best suited to liberalism.  
 The anti-domination conception of liberty holds, in 
short, that one is free to the extent that one stands in a 
reciprocal relation of power with one's fellow citizens.  
Unlike other conceptions of liberty, freedom as anti-
domination is a status based as opposed to an act based 
conception, and, as I will argue, it is this feature of the 
anti-domination account that makes it well suited to ground 
liberal commitments and values.  Before outlining this 
broader argument in detail, I first want to say something 
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about what I mean by “liberalism” and the method by which 
my argument will proceed.  I will then conclude this 
introductory chapter by giving a brief sketch of my overall 
argument and of each chapter that will follow. 
 
What is Liberalism? 
 
As I mentioned above, all liberals agree that liberty is a 
primary political value, but this does not tell us much 
about liberalism as a political doctrine for two reasons.  
First, as I just noted, liberals disagree about what 
liberty means.  Just as importantly, however, they also 
disagree about the role liberty plays within liberal 
thought.  While all liberals hold that freedom is a primary 
political value, they do not all hold that it is the 
primary political value.    For some liberals, liberty, 
though no doubt significant, plays a subsidiary role to 
more central liberal values, such as equality or social 
justice (see below).  For others, the value of liberty must 
be ranked with, or weighed against, other distinct, perhaps 
even conflicting, liberal values (Berlin 2002).   
 Instead of trying to characterize liberalism in terms 
of one central or defining feature, I think it is best 
described as a family of views that share a variety of 
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commitments while disagreeing about the precise nature and 
role of any one of these commitments.  Internal debates 
amongst liberals aside, I contend that all liberals, or 
perhaps even better all liberalisms, share a series of 
normative and institutional commitments.          
 Normatively, liberalism is committed to what Adam Smith 
called “the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice” 
(Smith 1937: 628).  As such, liberals generally affirm a 
commitment to equality and justice in addition to liberty. 
As with liberty, there is much disagreement amongst 
liberals concerning the proper understanding these concepts 
as well and what a commitment to them requires.  These 
controversies are indeed significant, but it would be a 
mistake to let them completely overshadow the extent to 
which liberals do agree about these norms.  Regarding 
equality, John Gray nicely summarizes the liberal position 
(gendered language aside) as follows: liberalism, according 
to him, is “egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all men 
[and women] the same moral status and denies the relevance 
to legal or political order of differences in moral worth 
among human beings” (Gray 1995: xii).  In short, liberalism 
holds that all people have equal moral worth.  Again, while 
liberals disagree about what people are owed on account of 
their equal moral worth, they all deny that claims to 
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superiority, or pleas for special treatment, on the basis 
of race, gender, class, religion, ethnicity, etc. have 
moral relevance.   
 In turn, the liberal commitment to justice is nicely 
captured by John Rawls's assertion that, “each person 
possesses an inviolability that even the welfare of society 
as a whole cannot override” (Rawls 1971: 3).  To this 
extent, liberalism is “individualist” (Gray 1995: xii); it 
holds, as Martha Nussbaum puts it,  that “the flourishing 
of human beings taken one by one is both analytically and 
normatively prior to the flourishing of the state or nation 
or religious group” (Nussbaum 1997: 62).  This commitment 
is, I think, importantly distinct from the idea that 
liberalism is committed to a kind of social atomism (Taylor 
1985), a charge often leveled by critics of liberalism.
1
  
Still, it is certainly the case that all liberals affirm 
the moral worth of persons as individuals. 
 For now, I will hold off from giving even the broadest 
outline of the liberal commitment to liberty since this 
discussion will dominate much of the subsequent chapters. I 
do want to note, though, that liberals who tend to focus 
more on equality or justice nonetheless still recognize 
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liberty as a fundamental liberal value.  For example, while 
Rawls writes that, “justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions” (Rawls 1971: 3), his First Principle of 
Justice states that, “each person is to have an equal right 
to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a 
similar liberty for others” (Rawls 1971: 60).  Similarly, 
while Ronald Dworkin (1995; 2000; 2007) and Will Kymlicka 
(1988; 2002) both maintain that equality is the most basic 
liberal value, each argues that a commitment to equality 
necessarily entails a commitment to liberty. So again, 
while liberals differ about the precise nature and role of 
liberty within the broader liberal framework, they each 
affirm that liberty has significant value and further that 
any account of liberalism would be incomplete if it lacked 
some account of the importance of liberty. 
 In addition to these three normative commitments, 
liberals also share certain institutional commitments.  The 
first of these is a commitment to democratic governance.  
The liberal sentiment concerning democratic institutions is 
exemplified by John Stuart Mill's unequivocal declaration 
that, “the ideally best form of government is that in which 
the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last 
resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community” 
(Mill 1919: 21).  This conviction is shared by other early 
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originators of the liberal view, such as Locke (1997), and 
by contemporary liberals as well.
2
  It is not just that 
liberals, as a group, also tend to be democrats.  Rather, 
liberals hold that there is a fundamental connection 
between liberal norms and democratic government.
3
 That is, 
the liberal ideals of liberty, equality, and justice can 
only be realized under democratic regimes.  Departures from 
democracy then are in some vital sense also departures from 
these ideals.   
 Again, liberals disagree about why democracy is 
essential insofar as they disagree about how democracy 
links up with these liberal norms, and they further 
disagree about what sorts of institutions and procedures 
are required in order to make a regime sufficiently 
democratic.  Still, it is not hard to see why liberalism 
and democracy are, on a general level, fundamentally 
related.  First, democratic rule, in which each and every 
citizen has an equal say, is the institutional embodiment 
of the liberal norm of equality (Christiano 2004).  In 
contrast, a government in which some citizens were 
permitted to rule over others without their consent would 
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be one that failed to respect the equal moral worth of 
persons. Further, democratic government, at least ideally, 
guarantees that the interests of each are given due 
consideration, helping to ensure that the requirements of 
justice are met (although democracy certainly is not 
sufficient to ensure justice as I will discuss shortly).  
Finally, democracy is often seen as vital to liberty.  As 
we will see, liberals differ on why this is so.  For some, 
democracy helps protect liberty because non-democratic 
governments, as an empirical matter, are more likely to 
infringe on personal liberty than democratic ones.  For 
others, liberty itself consists in some form of political 
participation.  Again, I want to hold off on this 
discussion for now.  My point here is simply to stress that 
liberalism and democracy are necessarily related. Not all 
democrats are liberals, but all non-democrats are non-
liberals. 
 This last point is crucial because, while all liberals 
are democrats of some sort, they do not favor unrestricted 
democracy.   Political power in a liberal regime must, in 
some sense, reside with the people, but this should not be 
taken to mean that the majority should be given free rein 
to coerce those in the minority in order to advance their 
own ends.  An unchecked democracy amounts to little more 
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than tyranny by the majority. As such it hinders, rather 
than advances, the liberal ideals of liberty, equality, and 
justice.  In a purely majoritarian regime, those in the 
minority are not treated as moral equals and their well 
being is likely to be sacrificed for the benefit of the 
majority.  This concern over the prospect of 
majoritarianism gives rise to the second institutional 
commitment: the protection of basic rights.  In a liberal 
regime, power is vested in the people, but there are some 
strict limits on its exercise.  The majority is not legally 
permitted to infringe on the basic rights of citizens even 
if they have a strong and compelling interest in doing so.   
Accordingly, liberals do not simply endorse democracy 
simpliciter, but what is commonly referred to as liberal 
democracy.  
 The protection of basic rights ensures that individuals 
are treated as equals and that they are not rendered 
subordinate to the greater good.  Again, the commitment to 
protecting basic rights is shared by classical and 
contemporary liberals alike.
4
 Not surprisingly, however, 
liberals disagree about what having a right entails and 
what it means to protect or promote it.  Nonetheless, 
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(1999).  For contemporary theorists, see Rawls (1971), Kymlicka (1988), 
Waldron (1993) and Dworkin (2007). 
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liberals generally converge in endorsing certain rights as 
basic.
5
  The first of these are rights ensuring both equal 
protection under the law and an equal right of 
participation in the political process.  The second are 
those rights commonly referred to as basic liberties: a 
right to freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, 
freedom of assembly, and freedom from arbitrary arrests and 
seizures.  Liberals also generally affirm a right to hold 
private property (though, as we will see, there is 
significant disagreement amongst liberals about what this 
right amounts to and its significance). 
 As the above list indicates, there is an intuitive 
connection between rights and liberty.  As we will see, 
however, the precise nature of this relationship is 
difficult to discern, especially if we take one of the 
standard conceptions of liberty as our starting point.  
Indeed, as I will argue, the failure of standard views to 
account for either the significance or inviolability of the 
basic liberties is one of their major deficiencies from the 
liberal point of view. 
 The account of liberalism offered above is just a 
sketch.  There are no doubt other ways of describing 
liberalism's core commitments that may differ from my own.  
                                                 
5
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Nonetheless I think all liberals can identify with the 
description I have offered here.  In this respect, the 
above account outlines a series of minimal conditions for 
liberal views.  Whatever else liberals are committed to, 
they are at least committed to the norms of liberty, 
equality and justice as well the need for democratic 
governing procedures constrained by the protection of basic 
rights. In the proceeding chapters, I will expand upon this 
minimal account of liberalism, but for now I want to move 
from this topic and say something about the method by which 




My argument will proceed, as is common in political and 
moral philosophy, by means of “reflective equilibrium” 
(Rawls 1971: 20ff.).  A reflective equilibrium strategy 
attempts to establish the greatest possible coherence 
between our institutions, or considered judgments, and the 
more general theory that govern them by adjusting both our 
judgments and our theory as necessary. In some respects, my 
project is an exercise what Rawls calls “narrow reflective 
equilibrium” (Rawls 1999: 289); however, I do not mean this 
in the pejorative sense that Rawls does.  My project is 
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narrow in two senses.  First, it is narrow insofar as I am 
only interested in political liberty.  I am not interested 
in all the various ways in which we might characterize 
someone, or even something, as free.  I take it, however, 
that this stipulation is relatively uncontroversial.  To 
demand that a theory of freedom cover all possible meanings 
of the word “free,” is to demand far too much precision in 
ordinary language.  We should not expect, for example, that 
the phrases, “I am free for lunch this afternoon,” “coffee 
is free with your meal,” and “the prisoner was set free as 
of today” all make use of the same singular concept of 
freedom. 
    My project, however, is narrow in another, perhaps more 
controversial, respect.  It is narrow insofar it starts 
from considered judgments that are grounded in the basic 
liberal commitments I have just described.  My goal is to 
construct a theory of liberty that best fits with these 
commitments within a larger theory of liberalism.  To this 
extent, I take these commitments for granted.  Though the 
precise nature and content of these the commitments will 
necessarily be adjusted and revised as this project 
progresses, I will not consider them subject to wholesale 
rejection or test them against alternative basic principles 
from competing conceptions of political morality. To this 
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extent, my discussion will be mostly internal to 
liberalism.  I will not address objections, criticisms, or 
concerns originating from theorists of other competing 
traditions, such as critical theorists, radical democrats, 
realists, or Neo-Marxists. Were I striving for the more 
ambitious achievement of “wide reflective equilibrium” 
(Rawls 1999: 289), it would be necessary to do so, but my 
goal in this essay is to develop a liberal theory of 
liberty, not to defend liberalism against its many critics. 
 It would be wrong, however, to infer from this that my 
project has little or no bearing on liberalism's overall 
appeal as a theory.  In the first place, if liberalism 
lacks internal coherence -- that is, if there is no 
conception of liberty that is not in tension with other 
liberal commitments and intuitions -- then liberalism will 
not be an attractive political ideal from the perspective 
of wide reflective equilibrium.  We have to be able to show 
that liberalism is a workable political doctrine on its own 
terms before we can show that it is superior to alternative 
positions.  Second, while I will not address criticisms of 
liberalism directly, I think that many, though certainly 
not all, of these criticisms are based on a 
misrepresentation of liberalism's central commitments, 
particularly its commitment to liberty. As I hope will 
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become clear later on, the account of freedom I will offer 
under the name of anti-domination is able to dispel some 
common criticisms of liberalism, such as the criticism that 
it is overly atomistic and fails to appreciate the 
importance of communities or groups (Taylor 1985), that its 
core principles do not in fact support a commitment to 
democracy (Sandel 1996), and that its understanding of 
freedom is compatible with some forms of slavery (Pettit 
1999).  To this extent, my account will be appealing to 
non-liberals who might share most of liberalism’s basic 
commitments, but are critical of how liberals typically 
understand them.    
 If successful, my account of liberty would go a long 
way towards establishing the viability of the liberal 
project as whole.  It would show both that liberalism 
constitutes a coherent set of commitments and has more 
appeal than some of its critics have supposed.  I should 
note, however, that even this is likely too ambitious of a 
goal.  I have no pretensions about being able to resolve 
liberal debates concerning the nature of liberty once and 
for all.  What I do hope to show is that the standard 
competing conceptions are deficient in ways their 
proponents have failed to fully appreciate and that freedom 




 The anti-domination conception offers an attractive 
alternative, I will argue, because it best fits with 
liberal commitments and intuitions, but I need to say 
something more about what I mean by “best fits.”  There are 
several ways in which a given conception of liberty can 
fail on the kind of narrow reflective equilibrium standard 
I have described above.  First, a conception of freedom 
would fail to establish reflective equilibrium if it 
plainly contradicted other liberal commitments.  So, for 
example, a conception of liberty that understood freedom as 
submission to a religious authority would obviously be in 
severe tension with the liberal commitments to equality and 
democratic governance.  This is no doubt an extreme case.  
As I will argue, the kind of conceptions that are popular 
in the literature conflict with basic liberal convictions 
in far more subtle ways, but these conceptions are 
nonetheless deficient to the extent that they do conflict 
with these other commitments.  Second, a conception fails 
to achieve genuine reflective equilibrium if it is merely 
an ad hoc construct that reflects liberal principles, but 
fails to offer an independent account of liberty on its 
own.  So, for example, an account of liberty which declared 
that one is free only to the extent that one is a citizen 
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in a liberal democracy, but failed to say anything about 
why living in a liberal democracy was essential to liberty, 
would be a purely ad hoc conception of this sort.  Such a 
conception fails to achieve reflective equilibrium because 
it is insufficiently reflective; it simply takes certain 
commitments and intuitions at face value without figuring 
out how they hang together or even if they are consistent.  
Were this all that were required in order to achieve 
reflective equilibrium, it would be a remarkably weak 
standard, as virtually any set of commitments could meet 
it.  Reflective equilibrium would therefore serve as a poor 
means of evaluating the merits of competing theories. 
 So much for how a given conception might fail to 
establish reflective equilibrium; I now want to say 
something about what constitutes conditions for success.  
Success on a reflective equilibrium approach is a matter of 
degree.  That is, a given conception of liberty might be 
said to succeed in either the weak or strong sense.  In the 
weak sense, a conception of liberty succeeds if it is 
merely consistent with other liberal commitments, but does 
not necessarily have any stronger relationship to them.  
For example, suppose one championed something like a 
Buddhist conception of freedom, in which freedom was 
understood as being free from desire or achieving a state 
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of inner peace.  Such a conception is probably consistent 
with the liberal norms of equality and justice as well as 
the institutional commitments to democracy and basic 
rights, but there is no essential connection between the 
Buddhist conception of freedom and these other core 
commitments (indeed, one of the supposed appeals of the 
this kind of conception is that it can be achieved under 
almost any conditions).  Accordingly, conceptions like this 
only weakly contribute to reflective equilibrium because, 
while they fit within broader liberal scheme, they do not 
inform it; they tell us nothing about the nature of other 
liberal commitments or how they hang together.    
 There is another respect in which a conception might 
succeed, but only in the weaker sense.  This occurs when a 
conception does establish a stronger connection between 
liberty and other liberal commitments, but only on the 
basis of certain potentially contingent assumptions.  In A 
Theory of Justice, for example, Rawls argues against 
utilitarianism in favor of justice as fairness on this 
basis.  Because utilitarianism does not strictly rule out 
slavery or other policies that infringe on basic liberties, 
the utilitarian is forced to argue that it will never turn 
out, as an empirical matter, that such policies will 
increase overall net utility.  In contrast, justice as 
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fairness does not rely on such assumptions and its 
application is therefore not limited by these empirical 
assumptions.
6
   
 In contrast, a conception of liberty achieves 
reflective equilibrium in the strong sense if it both 
reveals the connection between liberty and other liberal 
commitments and is not overly reliant on certain empirical 
assumptions.  This is not to say that it makes no empirical 
assumptions or that its application is unaffected by the 
relevant facts, whatever they may be.  It is unlikely that 
a theory of liberty which was completely free standing from 
any set of empirical questions would have much practical 
application.  But a conception is stronger to the extent 
that its fit with other commitments and intuitions is less 
dependent on contestable assumptions.  It is stronger 
because, as Rawls puts it, “it ensures this fit over a 
wider range of possible cases” (Rawls 1971: 160). 
 There are good reasons to prefer a conception of 
liberty that contributes to reflective equilibrium in the 
strong rather than weak sense.  Determining which 
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by contrast, embeds the ideals of justice, as ordinarily understood, 
more directly into its first principles.  This conception relies less 
on general facts in reaching a match with our judgments of justice.  It 




conception of liberty was the liberal one would not have 
much value if nothing hinged on it.  Many conceptions of 
liberty are consistent with liberalism, but this does not 
tell us much about liberalism itself.  Again, liberalism 
bares more than just a nominal relationship to liberty.  
That is, liberty is not just one value among many that 
liberals happen to endorse; it is a central and, at least 
in part, defining component of liberalism.  It is part of 
what makes liberalism unique as a political philosophy, 
and, if liberty is to play this role, then it must be able 
to contribute to reflective equilibrium in the stronger 
sense.   
 Some might object, though, that the desire for this 
kind of reflective equilibrium is fundamentally misguided.  
It might turn out, as a conceptual matter, that our most 
cherished political values are in conflict.  Isaiah Berlin, 
whose views on liberty I will discuss at length, held this 
view (Berlin 2002).  According to him, sometimes the 
demands of liberty, equality, and justice will pull us in 
opposing directions, and there is no way of resolving these 
conflicts that does not result in us having to sacrifice 
one value in favor another.  To fail to recognize this is 
to naively deny the inherently tragic character of human 
life.  Perhaps, but until we have tried and failed to 
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reconcile our most basic moral and political commitments, 
we should not assume that this is the case (Dworkin, 2001: 
90).  After all, if we could show that, contra Berlin, 
these values can be reconciled, then we will have made 
considerable progress towards resolving what at first 
seemed like interminable political conflicts.  Maybe no 
such account is ultimately available -- I will try to offer 
one in the following pages -- but resignation to this fact 
should be a position of last resort.  
 
Outline of the Argument 
 
The remarks above set the stage for how my argument will 
proceed.  I will start by examining the standard accounts 
of liberty found within the literature.  I will argue that 
some of these accounts fail in terms of reflective 
equilibrium whereas the others succeed only in the weaker 
sense.  So, for example, against some conceptions, I will 
argue that they conflict, quite explicitly, with other 
fundamental liberal values such as equality and justice or 
the commitments to democracy and basic rights.  Others, I 
will argue, offer conceptions that are consistent with 
these values, but are constructed in a mostly ad hoc 
fashion. Not all of the potential candidates fail in this 
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manner, but when they do not, I will argue that they only 
succeed in the weak sense.  In other words, they either 
establish mere consistency, or they rely on certain 
questionable assumptions. 
 Having done this, I will then offer my own conception 
of liberty as anti-domination.  I will argue that this 
conception succeeds in the strong sense.  Indeed, I will 
try to make the strongest possible case for this view that 
I can.  On this strongest possible account, liberty as 
anti-domination is held as the central, rather than merely 
a central, liberal value, and other liberal values, such as 
equality, justice, democracy, and basic rights, are 
valuable precisely because they promote freedom as anti-
domination.  The success of my account, however, does not 
hinge on whether I am entirely successful in demonstrating 
that the strongest case holds (an admittedly ambitious 
task).  Rather, my goal is to show that the anti-domination 
account is more successful than other alternatives.  If it 
turns out that liberalism cannot be grounded in a 
commitment to liberty as anti-domination alone, and must 
also be grounded in a commitment to either equality or 
justice, this will not count against the anti-domination 
view provided that it does a better job of grounding 
liberal principles than competing conceptions -- in other 
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words, that it does more to establish the overall coherency 
of the liberal project than these other accounts. 
 A more detailed sketch of my argument goes as follows: 
I will begin, in Chapter 1, with Isaiah Berlin's famous 
distinction between “negative” and “positive” liberty 
(Berlin 2002).  I will argue that Berlin is wrong in 
thinking that the negative conception is the properly 
liberal one, in particular because it cannot account for 
either the various ways in which one can be rendered unfree 
or the significance of the basic liberties.  I will also 
argue, however, that the positive conception does not offer 
a viable alternative.  While Berlin is wrong about the 
fitness of the negative view, he is right in thinking that 
the positive view is ultimately antithetical to liberalism 
because it justifies coercion in the name of liberty.  
Further, recent attempts to make the positive account more 
congenial to liberalism fail.  Having rejected both 
negative and positive liberty, in Chapter 2, I will turn to 
what I will call “aggregate conceptions” of liberty, or, in 
other words, conceptions which try to combine elements of 
both negative and positive accounts.  Such conceptions, I 
will argue, face the following dilemma: either they 
ultimately collapse into a positive account, or they are ad 
hoc in the manner described above. 
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  Because neither negative nor positive liberty, nor 
some combination thereof, present viable candidates, in 
Chapter 3, I will consider Philip Pettit's recent account 
of freedom as “non-domination” (Pettit 1999).  Pettit’s 
non-domination view at least at first appears to be unique 
because he presents it as a status based conception of 
liberty as opposed to an act based conception.  One's 
freedom, on his view, is supposedly determined by the 
position one occupies in relation to others rather than 
what one does or can do. Accordingly, as we will see, the 
paradigmatic case of unfreedom on Pettit’s account is 
slavery. Despite its initial appeal, however, I will argue 
that Pettit's view fails to offer a genuine third 
alternative.  Like many aggregate accounts, Pettit's view 
ultimately reduces to a positive conception of liberty and 
accordingly inherits all its flaws.  It is also, once its 
implications are fully drawn out, incompatible with the 
commitments to democracy and basic rights.  After rejecting 
the non-domination account, In Chapter 4, I will revisit 
the negative conception of liberty.  Specifically, I will 
focus on Ian Carter (2008) and Mathew Kramer's (2008) 
argument that a properly formulated account of the negative 
view -- what Carter calls “pure negative liberty” -- is 
better suited to capture the harms of domination.  While 
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theirs is superior to other negative accounts of liberty, I 
will argue that it too is incompatible with the liberal 
commitments to democracy and basic rights.  
 Finally, in Chapters 5 and 6, I will present my own 
account of freedom as anti-domination.  As the name 
suggests, my account is based, in part, on Pettit's.  
Unlike Pettit's account, however, freedom as anti-
domination, as I will argue, is a true status based account 
of liberty and therefore conceptually distinct from both 
negative and positive conceptions.  Just to recall, freedom 
as anti-domination holds that one is free insofar as one 
stands in a reciprocal relation of power to others.  In 
Chapter 5, I will argue that anti-domination is a coherent 
and practically viable alternative conception of liberty, 
one which better conforms to liberal commitments and 
intuitions.  In the final chapter, Chapter 6, I will show 
how freedom as anti-domination can be usefully applied to 
some current political controversies.  Specifically, I will 
address the issues of pornography censorship, same-sex 
marriage, and affirmative action. 
 Admittedly, the account of anti-domination I will be 
able to offer here will only constitute a rough sketch. 
While I will try to anticipate various criticisms and 
extrapolate on key points as I go, there is much that I 
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will regrettably have to leave uncovered.  Still, I hope to 
show that the anti-domination view represents an original 
third conception of liberty, one deserving of serious 
consideration.    





NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY 
 
Conceptions of Liberty 
 
In this first chapter, I will examine several distinct 
conceptions of liberty, focusing specifically on Isaiah 
Berlin's famous distinction between negative and positive 
liberty.  Berlin's treatment of this topic serves as a 
useful departure, not only because it has proved so 
influential, but also because he tries to make the case 
that the negative conception is the liberal one.  After 
outlining Berlin's position in detail, I will argue that we 
should reject this conclusion.  The negative conception is 
ultimately tension with fundamental liberal intuitions and 
accordingly cannot serve as the normative foundation for 
liberal institutions.  I will also argue, however, that the 
positive conception fairs no better on this score, and that 
proponents of that view are unable to effectively respond 
to Berlin's central criticism of it.   
In political and moral philosophy, there are various 
distinct articulations of the concept of liberty as well as 
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various ways of distinguishing between them.
1
  Many such 
articulations make a distinction specifically between two 
kinds of liberty.  For example, there is the traditional 
distinction between freedom from, which conceives of 
freedom primarily in terms of the absence of external 
impediments, and freedom to, which conceives of freedom 
primarily in terms of the presence of enabling conditions.  
Similarly, Benjamin Constant distinguishes between the 
“liberty of the ancients,” which consists in active 
participation in public life, and the “liberty of the 
moderns,” which consists in the protection of the private 
sphere from external interference (Constant 1988: 309).   
 The most famous contemporary treatment of this topic, 
though, is Isaiah Berlin‟s distinction between negative and 
positive liberty (2002).  According to Berlin, negative 
liberty involves the absence of interference whereas 
positive liberty involves the achievement of self-mastery.  
To be sure, Berlin's own view draws from the to/from 
distinction as well Constant‟s ancient/modern distinction, 
and we might be tempted to think of negative liberty as 
equivalent to freedom from/modern liberty and positive 
                                                          
1 Throughout, I will assume there is no distinction between “liberty” 
and “freedom” and use these terms interchangeably. 
28 
 
liberty as equivalent to freedom to/ancient liberty. As we 
shall soon see, however, this is not entirely correct. In 
particular, Berlin's conception of positive liberty is a 
bit more robust than either freedom-to or what Constant‟s 
liberty of the ancients.     
According to Berlin, a person‟s negative liberty 
consists in the extent to which he or she can perform any 
given action unimpeded.  As Berlin puts it, “if I am 
prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I 
am to that degree unfree” (Berlin 2002: 169).  On the 
negative account, it does not matter if an agent desires to 
perform a particular action or if she should perform a 
particular action.  The negative view remains non-committal 
regarding the evaluative worth of the action in question, 
either by the agent‟s own lights or by some more objective 
measure.  As Jeremy Bentham, one famous proponent of the 
negative view, asks rhetorically, “the liberty of doing 
evil, is it not liberty?” (Bentham 1962: 301) Berlin 
likewise points out that it would be rather paradoxical if 
a slave could become more free, at least in the political 
sense, simply by conditioning himself to desire only those 
courses of action that his status affords (Berlin 2002: 
31).  In addition to Bentham, who defines liberty as “the 
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absence of restraint” (Bentham 1968: 310), the negative 
tradition also includes Thomas Hobbes, who similarly 
characterizes liberty strictly as “the absence of external 
impediments” (Hobbes 1998: 86), as well as Berlin himself. 
In contrast, acting freely on the positive view 
requires not only the absence of external interference, but 
also that one‟s actions originate from oneself.  That is, 
that one acts on the basis of one‟s own desires or in 
accordance with one‟s own designs. As Berlin puts it, to be 
free in the positive sense is to “be one‟s own master” 
(Berlin 2002: 178).  In order to possess positive liberty 
then, I must be the one who determines my own goals and 
pursuits and not find myself dependent upon, or at the 
mercy of, various alien influences. The positive view thus 
greatly expands the potential sources of unfreedom.  On the 
positive account, I can be rendered unfree not only by 
physical interference, but also by intimidation, 
manipulation, lack of resources, lack of knowledge, my own 
immaturity, or by my own weakness of will.  In this 
respect, Berlin's conception of positive liberty goes quite 
a bit further than liberty understood as freedom to.  On 
Berlin's account, I am free in the positive sense not just 
to the extent that I am rendered capable of performing 
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certain actions, but to the extent that I am properly in 
command of myself.   
For Berlin the central distinguishing feature of the 
two views is that negative freedom is concerned with “the 
area within which the subject” is free to act whereas 
positive freedom is concerned with the “what, or who” that 
determines what someone can do or become (Berlin 2002: 
169). Unlike the negative view, which is not concerned with 
the character of the agent, but only with the extent to 
which he or she encounters interference, the positive view 
requires that an agent‟s actions originate from his or her 
“real” or “true” self (Berlin 2002: 180).   
This appeal to the real or true self can be understood 
in a variety of ways. In one sense, it can be understood as 
the distinction between the lower, or “empirical self,” 
which is comprised of our base instincts, impulses, and 
desires, and the higher, or metaphysical self, which is 
comprised of our most fundamental and essential capacities, 
such as our ability to reason and reflect self-critically 
(Berlin 2002: 179ff).  We are acting freely, on the 
positive account, when our actions are determined by our 
higher as opposed to our lower selves. This is the 
understanding of freedom endorsed by rationalists such as 
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Kant and Spinoza.  It is also the one advanced by the 
British Hegelian, T. H. Green, who characterizes freedom 
“as expressing the condition of a man who is inwardly 
„master of himself‟” (Green 1900: 322) and as the power of 
one to “become all that he has it in him to be” (Green 
1900: 324). 
In another sense, the real or true self can be 
expanded to encompass not only oneself as a particular 
individual agent, but some more inclusive whole, such as a 
social group, culture, or the state. On this understanding, 
I am not free to the extent that I am doing what I want to 
do, but to the extent that my actions conform with, or are 
constitutive of, the collective will of this larger body. 
This is Constant‟s “freedom of the ancients,” or freedom as 
participation in public life, and it is the understanding 
freedom employed by Rousseau when he declares that it is 
the general as opposed to the particular will that 
expresses one‟s true freedom (Rousseau 1968: 64).  On this 
version of positive liberty, freedom requires some form of 
collective action.  This view is exemplified by Hannah 
Arendt who makes an explicit contrast between negative 
liberty, or what she calls “mere liberation,” and true 
freedom which can only be attained through civic engagement 
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(Arendt 1968: 148).  It is also the view expounded by John 
Dewey who describes “liberty” as, “that secure release and 
fulfillment of personal potentialities which takes place 
only in rich and manifold association with others” (Dewey 
1954: 150).  
 There may indeed be significant overlap between these 
two ways of conceiving the self under a positive conception 
of liberty.  Exercising our essential human capacities, 
such as reason and self-reflection, may require that we 
engage with others and recognize the constitutive role 
these larger groups play in our own identities, though  
positive views no doubt differ as to exactly how our 
identity and its constitutive features are to be 
understood.   
Nevertheless, all variants of positive views share a 
certain salient feature: they all require, in the addition 
to the absence of interference, some form of active 
participation on the part of the agent.  So, for Green, I 
am only free to the extent that I actually achieve self-
realization, and for Arendt, I am free only to the extent 
that I am actively engaged in some form of public life.  
Following Charles Taylor, we can classify negative views as 
employing an “opportunity concept” of liberty and positive 
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views as employing an “exercise concept” (Taylor 1985).  
This distinction perhaps better captures the distinctively 
negative and positive aspects of each conception, since it 
highlights the fact that freedom is enhanced on the 
negative view through the removal of external obstacles 
whereas it is enhanced on the positive view through the 
promotion of certain behaviors. 
 This is what motivates Berlin‟s concern that positive 
views result in the troubling paradox that physical 
coercion can render one more free rather than less free.  
Once we understand freedom as an exercise rather than an 
opportunity concept, and once we recognize the relevant 
source of our freedom as our true or higher self rather 
than our empirical self, we introduce the possibility that 
the use of force may serve as means to promote freedom 
rather than hinder it: 
Once I take this view, I am in position to ignore 
the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, 
oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, 
of their „real‟ selves, in the secure knowledge 
that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, 
performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, 
self-fulfillment) must be identical with his 
freedom – the free choice of his „true‟, albeit 




In short, one can, to use Rousseau‟s unfortunate phrase, be 
“forced to be free” (Rousseau 1968: 64), or, as Berlin puts 
it, on the positive view, “liberty so far from being 
incompatible with authority, becomes virtually identical 
with it” (Berlin 2002: 194). 
 This is why Berlin identifies the negative conception 
as the properly liberal one. In so far as liberalism seeks 
to limit the legitimate use of state force through the 
promotion of rights and democratic procedures, it employs 
an opportunity rather than exercise concept of liberty.  
Accordingly, freedom, on the liberal view, must be 
understood as, “the opportunity to act, not the action 
itself” (Berlin 2002: 35).  Berlin‟s view seems to accord 
with accounts of liberty found within the classical liberal 
tradition.  For example, according to Mill‟s “harm 
principle,” “the only freedom which deserves the name is 
that of pursuing our own good in our own way” (Mill 1956: 
16), and, as Locke insists in The Second Treatise, all 
people are naturally in “a state of perfect freedom to 
order their actions and dispose of their possessions and 
persons as they think fit” (Locke 1997: 4).  Indeed, the 
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negative conception seems to play a significant role in the 




The Problem with Negative Liberty 
 
Were Berlin‟s assessment correct, we could join him in 
endorsing the negative conception as the liberal one and 
let the matter rest.  Unfortunately, while Berlin 
rightfully identifies the problem with positive views from 
a liberal perspective, it is not clear that the negative 
view fairs better in light of the criticisms posed by 
positive theorists.  As Berlin himself notes, and as I will 
examine in further detail later, neither Mill nor Locke 
endorses a strictly negative view, and the negative view 
may not map as cleanly onto accounts of freedom found in 
classical liberalism as Berlin might have supposed (Gray 
1980).  Whereas Berlin seems to attribute these 
incongruities to a confusion on the part of classical 
liberals, I think they point to a deep fundamental tension 
between negative liberty and core liberal commitments. In 
                                                          
2
 For a discussion of the negative concept of liberty in the history of 




fact, it is debatable whether Berlin himself consistently 
endorses a purely negative conception of liberty, a point I 
will explore further in chapter 2. 
 As an exercise concept, positive liberty sometimes 
requires the employment of physical interference as a means 
to enhance liberty.  The negative conception, however, 
firmly rules out this possibility by regarding any and all 
instances of physical interference as impediments to 
freedom, and this is why Berlin finds it preferable from a 
liberal perspective. This exclusive focus on physical 
interference, however, severely limits the scope of the 
negative account.  The problem is that there are powerful 
means by which one might reduce the freedom others without 
employing physical interference at all. 
John Christman (1991) offers the compelling example 
(hardly all that farfetched) of a culture that instills in 
women the conviction that they should be subordinate to men 
-- that they should not desire any independence of their 
own, and that they should defer to their male partners on 
all major decisions. Such a culture need not employ 
physically coercive methods in order to preserve this power 
dynamic. Provided that women are raised without the 
resources or opportunity to question their inferior status, 
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they will likely accept their position as legitimate.  But 
it hardly seems right to say that their freedom remains 
undiminished simply because their subordination is achieved 
without the employment of physical force.  If anything, 
this lack of need for directly coercive measures points to 
the devastating efficiency of these oppressive techniques 
(see Foucault 1980: essay 5). 
The negative conception ultimately cannot recognize 
the myriad ways in which someone may find him or herself at 
the mercy of another -- through manipulation or 
intimidation for example -- without necessarily being 
subjected to physical interference. Even threats of 
physical violence may not limit freedom on the negative 
account, since, if the threat is effective in getting its 
victim to comply with whatever is being demanded, then no 
actual interference will result.  When, for example, the 
highwayman threatens you with the choice between your money 
or your life, you will not incur any real sanction provided 
that you comply.  Unless we make certain assumptions about 
what choices agents can reasonably consider viable -- the 
kind of assumptions prohibited by negative views -- then, 
rather counter intuitively, we cannot consider threats as 
coercive (Benn and Weinstein 1971). 
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Similarly, Philip Pettit has recently argued that 
negative conceptions cannot capture what he calls instances 
of “domination” (Pettit 1999).  Consider the case of the 
lucky slave under the rule of a benevolent master. So long 
as the slave maintains the master‟s favor, he or she will 
encounter little actual interference.  But we could hardly 
count the slave as free on this score, since his or her 
freedom is entirely dependent on the whim of the master.  
Were the master‟s disposition to change, the slave would no 
longer enjoy this lack of interference.  Even when the 
master‟s hand is stayed, the slave lives under the ever 
present threat of this prospect, and this dependency 
renders the slave unfree in a significant respect.  
Negative accounts, however, cannot account for the freedom 
reducing effects of this dependency, since it does not 
always manifest itself in the form of actual interference.  
The result is that some instances of slavery are compatible 
with negative liberty.  This, however, is a troubling 
result for the negative view since, if anyone is to count 
as unfree, surely it's the slave (this after all is the 
defining feature of slavery), and a lucky slave is still 
nevertheless a slave in some essential sense.  I intend to 
explore Pettit's criticism of negative liberty and his own 
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conception of liberty as non-domination at greater length 
in later chapters, but for now I simply want to highlight 
that the negative view, at least as Berlin presents it, 
fails to properly recognize that the predicament of the 
lucky slave entails substantial unfreedom.     
The problem is that these other, non-interference 
based, sources of unfreedom are likely to be every bit as 
prevalent, and therefore every bit as freedom limiting, as 
actual interference.  According to Iris Marion Young 
(1990), for example, there are at least “five faces of 
oppression,” of which physical violence is only one (the 
others being “exploitation,” “marginalization,” 
“powerlessness,” and “cultural imperialism”). In this 
respect, the negative conception is overly narrow.  It may 
rule out interference in the name of liberty, but it does 
so at the expense of disregarding entirely other 
significant impediments to individual freedom. 
 There is a second problem, however, that plagues 
negative accounts regarding the relative worth of various 
freedoms. On the negative view, all acts of interference 
are of a par since judgments concerning the value of 
various actions are excluded in determining the extent of 
one‟s liberty.  This commitment, however, generates rather 
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counter intuitive results when comparing the respective 
degree of liberty enjoyed by citizens of different 
political regimes. Consider Charles Taylor‟s famous traffic 
light example. Traffic lights, since they impede movement, 
count as restrictions of freedom on the negative conception 
strictly speaking.  Impositions on freedom of religious 
worship, however, appear to result in a less severe 
restriction of freedom, as one is likely to encounter more 
interference from traffic lights on a day-to-day basis than 
one would if religious worship were prohibited, an 
imposition that for many would at worst result in actual 
interference only one day a week or perhaps none at all 
(Taylor 1985: 218ff).   
This, however, forces the proponent of the negative 
liberty to concede that a state that restricts religious 
worship, but has relatively lax traffic laws, is more free 
than one that protects freedom of religion but imposes many 
traffic laws. This is a rather tough bullet to bite, 
though.  Traffic lights are a fairly trivial, even 
welcomed, restriction of movement, whereas prohibitions of 
religious worship of any kind constitute a fairly egregious 
violation of individual liberty. Even if we hold that 
traffic lights are coercive in some sense, it is hard to 
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maintain that they are equivalent to restrictions on 
religious freedom or other basic liberties.  From a liberal 
perspective, it is hard to deny the intuition highlighted 
in Taylor‟s traffic light example.  Within the liberal 
tradition, certain basic liberties – such as freedom of 
speech, religion, and thought for example
3
 – are regarded as 
more essential than others despite the fact that these 
basic liberties seem to provide less in terms of overall 
negative liberty.  The negative account, however, offers no 
means by which we might rank the relative value of distinct 
liberties. 
 What makes the negative account so attractive to 
Berlin – namely its exclusive focus on physical 
interference – is what also makes it overly limited from a 
liberal perspective.  Ultimately, this strict focus on 
physical interference renders the negative conception both 
too narrow and too broad.  It is too narrow in the sense 
that it cannot account for sources of unfreedom other than 
interference, and it is too broad in the sense that it 
regards any act of interference as equally freedom 
limiting.  The negative conception indeed avoids the more 
                                                          
3 There is certainly much room for disagreement amongst liberals about 
which liberties should be considered basic, but for a representative 
list, see Rawls, 1971: 61. 
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troubling dimensions of positive accounts, but it does so 
at too high a price.   
 I should note that, more recently, some advocates of 
the negative approach have offered versions of it designed 
to respond to many of the above objections.  In particular, 
Hillel Steiner (1994), Ian Carter (1999) and Mathew Kramer 
(2003) have gone substantially farther than Berlin in 
systematically drawing out the full implications of the 
negative view.  I put aside their respective positions for 
now, however, because I intend to address them at length in 
chapter 4.  What I hope to show in that chapter is that 
some of the of above objections do still in fact apply to 
these more nuanced approaches, but I think we can better 
appreciate the supposed merits of the Steiner/Carter/Kramer 
approach by contrasting it with Pettit's non-domination 
view, which I intend to explore (and ultimately reject) in 
chapter 3.  For now, I just want to emphasize that the 
cruder version of the negative view, at least, is deeply 
problematic. 






The Problem with Positive Liberty 
 
Despite Berlin‟s objections, we might wonder whether or not 
the positive conception provides a better alternative.  
Taylor and Christman both endorse positive views for this 
reason, and, while Young resists characterizing her view as 
a formal account of freedom in general, she at least 
implicitly seems to advocate in favor of a kind of positive 
conception.
4
 Because positive views countenance a broader 
array of potential barriers to freedom, and because they 
regard certain physical restraints as more significant than 
others, they might prove satisfactory where negative views 
are lacking.  What I will show, however, is that it is 
precisely these features of positive conceptions that 
generate the anti-liberal paradox at the heart of positive 
accounts. 
                                                          
4 Of these three, only Christman explicitly considers his view 
“liberal.”  Taylor and Young object to what they think is an overly 
atomistic understanding of the self that they believe is central to 
liberal views.  Contrary to Taylor and Young, I do not think that 
social atomism is essential to liberalism (Bird, 1999), but this 
objection aside, I think that the liberal worries I raise against 
positive views are consistent with both Taylor and Young‟s own 
commitments.  That is, regardless of how they want to label their own 
views, both Taylor and Young share certain commitments with liberalism 
that are inconsistent with the positive conceptions of liberty they 
want to endorse.  
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 As opposed to negative views, positive conceptions 
allow for the possibility of internal, in addition to 
external, barriers to freedom thus allowing for sources of 
unfreedom other than physical interference (Taylor 1985). 
An agent might be able to pursue certain courses of action 
entirely unimpeded, yet he or she may still fail to act out 
of fear, ignorance, lack of ability, or mere lack of will.  
On the positive view, these internal obstacles -- internal 
in the sense that they do not stem from physical 
interference by others -- necessarily count as restrictions 
of freedom because they often prevent self-realization, or 
self-mastery, every bit as much as external obstacles, and 
sometimes even more so.  According to Taylor: 
[…] the fact that I am doing what I want, in the sense of 
following my strongest desire, is not sufficient to 
establish that I am free. On the contrary, we have to 
make discriminations among motivations, and accept that 
acting out of some motivations, for example irrational 
fear or spite, or this too great need for comfort, is not 
freedom, is even a negation of freedom. (Taylor 1985: 
222) 
 
 If internal obstacles hinder freedom, it follows that 
rather invasive instances of physical interference can 
promote individual liberty. To illustrate this, consider 
the following example.  Say that Alf truly desires to join 
the army in order to, in short, “be all that he can be.”  
Yet Alf also dreads the rigorous physical and mental 
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demands of army service.  He indeed possesses a “great need 
for comfort,” and, while he regrets his weaknesses of will 
and wishes he could abandon his cushy civilian life and 
enlist, he just cannot bring himself to do it.  So an army 
recruitment officer, let's call him Sgt. Green, decides to 
help Alf by forcibly conscripting him into service.  After 
doing so, Sgt. Green then routinely forces Alf, through 
threat of severe sanction, to engage in grueling army 
training exercises, often against Alf‟s expressed 
objections.  On the positive view, Green‟s use of physical 
coercion actually increases Alf‟s freedom, since it 
conforms to his fundamental desires.  Green forces Alf to 
perform the actions he most desires to do and thereby helps 
him overcome, or master, his strong, and ultimately 
hindering, base desire for comfort.  In short, while Green 
no doubt engages in interference, he helps Alf to exercise 
his freedom. 
 This would still be the case even if Alf did not 
acknowledge any strong or fundamental desire on his part to 
join the army.  Since positive freedom requires acting on 
the basis of our “true,” “real,” “higher,” or “more 
fundamental” wants or desires, it is always possible that 
we are mistaken about what we do in fact desire.  Were this 
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not the case, we could not make sense of the claim that 
some of our desires are more significant, or somehow more 
fundamental, than others, because there would no criterion 
by which we could be right or wrong about which desires are 
more central to who we are.  All desires would just be 
brute and of a par, but then there would be no sense in 
which acting on the basis of one desire would be preferable 
to acting on the basis of another.  As Taylor stresses: 
The whole notion of our identity, whereby we recognize 
that some goals, desires, allegiances are central to what 
we are, while are not or less so, can make sense only 
against a background of desires and feelings which are 
not brute, but what I shall call import-attributing [….] 
Thus we have to see our emotional life as made up largely 
of import attributing desires and feelings, that is, 
desires and feelings which we can experience mistakenly. 
(Taylor 1985: 224) 
 
So, to return to the example above, even if it never 
occurred to Alf to join the army, Sgt. Green may 
nevertheless further Alf's liberty by conscripting him 
anyway. If Green can identify a fundamental value that Alf, 
for whatever reason, fails to appreciate, then Green can 
coerce Alf in order to “help” him achieve this goal. 
Whereas the negative view requires neutrality concerning 
such value judgments – on the negative conception, the 
value or disvalue of performing an action in no way effects 
47 
 
whether an agent is free to perform it – the positive view 
necessitates that we take these evaluations into account. 
 This raises the question of how such evaluative 
judgments are to be made.  Taylor seems to imply that there 
is in fact an objective moral criterion by which we can 
establish our most central desires. Consider the following 
example given by Taylor: 
How can we exclude in principle that there may be […] 
other false appreciations that the agent does not detect?  
That he may be profoundly in error, that is, have a very 
distorted sense of his fundamental purposes? […] I should 
nominate Charles Manson and Andreas Baader for this 
category, among others. I pick them out as people with a 
strong sense of some purposes and goals as incomparably 
more fundamental than others, or at least with a 
propensity to act the [sic] having such a sense so as to 
take in even themselves a good part of the time, but 
whose sense of fundamental purpose was shot through with 
confusion and error. (Taylor 1985: 227) 
 
Taylor takes it as intuitive that neither Manson nor Baader 
were acting on the basis of their own most fundamental 
desires. Presumably, this assessment does not involve some 
psychological fact about either Manson or Baader, since 
then it would be an empirical question as to whether their 
actions conformed to their ultimate purposes. Instead, 
Taylor implies that Manson and Baader were necessarily not 
acting on the basis of their ultimate, most fundamental 
purposes, presumably because what they did was so 
objectively heinous.   
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 On at least some positive views then, we are acting 
freely only to the extent that our actions conform to some 
objective moral value or standard.  To return to our 
example again, Green now can coerce Alf without knowing 
anything about Alf in particular if he is correct in 
thinking that military experience is objectively valuable.  
Green can rightfully ignore any or all of Alf‟s professed 
objections, or any facts about his history or past actions.  
To be sure, there will be much disagreement about what the 
appropriate moral values or standards are, and Green will 
not be promoting Alf‟s liberty if he is in fact mistaken 
about the value of military service.  The agapic pacifist, 
for example, would regard the promotion of peace as the 
relevant moral value and would thus find it necessary to 
forcibly prevent a newly assertive and self-confident Alf 
from joining the army against his wishes in order to help 
him realize his true moral project.  The important point to 
note is that, in either case, Green or the agapic pacifist 
will only be decreasing Alf‟s liberty when they interfere 
on the basis of an incorrect evaluative assessment and not 
to the extent that they employ physical force. 
 We can see why Berlin would find such examples 
troubling.    We might of course think that forced 
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conscription is in some cases necessary, and we might even 
think that such conscription benefits the person on whom it 
is imposed.  It might make this person more disciplined, 
more productive, better socialized, and even ultimately 
happier, but it achieves these goals, however worthy, at 
the expense of the person‟s liberty.  State conscription 
might in some cases constitute a justified use of coercion, 
but it is nevertheless still coercion and therefore 
intuitively seems to result in a reduction of individual 
liberty.  To hold otherwise, would allow for the 
possibility that a fairly pervasive state -- one that say 
required prolonged military service from all its citizens 
in times of war and peace in order to “better” its 
citizenry -- would be entirely in line with the promotion 
of liberty.  In summary, because they allow for internal in 
addition to external barriers to freedom, and because they 
countenance the relevance of value judgments, positive 
views can be used to justify expansive state coercion.  
 It might be objected, though, that examples like the 
one outlined above move too quickly.  While positive views 
might permit coercion in the name of liberty in certain 
cases, they perhaps do not justify such pervasive coercion.  
One might assert, for example, that the positive view need 
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not necessarily devolve into a defense of despotism 
provided that we hold that it is the individual him or 
herself who is in the best position to identify and realize 
his or her own purposes. The instances in which government 
interference will actually improve one‟s efforts towards 
self-realization will thus be relatively rare.   Taylor, 
for example, holds, “that each person‟s form of self-
realization is original to him/her, and can therefore only 
be worked out independently” (Taylor 1985: 212), and Joseph 
Raz similarly insists: 
The fact that the state considers anything to be valuable 
or valueless is no reason for anything.  Only its being 
valuable or valueless is a reason.  If it is likely that 
government will not judge such matters correctly then it 
has no authority to judge them at all. (Raz 1986: 412) 
 
On such an approach, positive liberty is not necessarily in 
conflict with liberalism.  In fact, precisely because the 
liberal state is minimally invasive, it might be best 
suited to promote one‟s positive liberty.   
 This is an important objection because Berlin‟s case 
against positive liberty is based almost entirely on his 
conviction that positive views ultimately justify sweeping 
state interference.  If, however, there are positive 
conceptions that are more liberal-friendly, so to speak, 
then the force of his argument is weakened considerably at 
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least against some views. As positive views, they may still 
permit some degree of interference in the name of liberty, 
but if these instances were reduced to cases of soft 
paternalism (such as seat belt or helmet laws, compulsory 
education for children, and mild public censorship) rather 
than outright tyranny, it is not intuitively obvious that 
these views run contrary to the fundamental commitments of 
liberalism.  After all, liberals frequently advocate in 
favor of such policies.
5
 
 Berlin seems to rest his case against positive 
conceptions on the conviction that, whatever their 
intrinsic merits, positive views have historically been 
susceptible to distortion by those who want to employ them 
as justifications for tyranny and oppression: 
[…] the perversion of the notion of positive liberty into 
its opposite – the apotheosis of authority – did occur, 
and has for a long while been on the most familiar and 
depressing phenomena of our time. For whatever reason or 
cause, the notion of „negative‟ liberty […], however 
disastrous the consequences of its unbridled forms, has 
not historically been twisted by its theorists as often 
or as effectively into anything so darkly metaphysical or 
socially sinister or remote from its original meaning as 
its „positive‟ counterpart. (Berlin 2002: 39) 
 
                                                          
5 See for example Mill‟s famous discussion of preventing people from 
walking on unsafe bridges (1999: 146).  I discuss this example further 
in Chapter 2.  cf. Feinberg (1989: 12ff.)  
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Berlin thus advances a kind of slippery slope argument 
against positive conceptions of liberty. We should adopt 
the negative conception in favor of the positive one, he 
reasons, because even those versions of positive liberty 
which contain no overtly despotic commitments will 
inevitably be employed to advance such aims. 
 We should be cautious, however, before declaring this 
objection decisive, as appeals to slippery slopes are often 
fallacious. The worry of course with slippery slopes is 
that they imply a series of causal connections without 
providing sufficient evidence that these connections do in 
fact hold.  Such appeals, of course, need not always be 
fallacious.  It is an empirical question whether or not 
positive conceptions have been employed effectively, or 
have in any way contributed to, the enactment of highly 
coercive policies or the rise of tyrannical political 
regimes. Berlin, writing just after the fall of National 
Socialism and just at the rise of communism, both of which 
he thought endorsed implicitly positive conceptions, felt 
justified in stipulating this empirical connection (Berlin 
2002: 194; 198).  But surely it would require a great deal 
more empirical research and argumentation to show 
definitively that all positive conceptions of liberty 
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inevitably, or even likely, contribute to the realization 
of despotic rule. In fact there might not be such a strong 
connection between positive liberty and tyranny if it turns 
out that, as an empirical matter, an invasive state is not 
so good at promoting one‟s true aims or purposes. Of 
course, as Taylor notes, there will be exceptions, such as 
Manson and Baader, that warrant state intervention, but 
these cases will be rare and rather uncontroversial. On the 
whole, Taylor, Raz and others might argue, the positive 
view will recommend against interference.   
 There are a couple of problems, however, with this 
defense of the positive conception.  In the first place, it 
is not clear that these cases will be all that rare.  The 
case of Alf, outlined above, hardly seems that implausible, 
and we can imagine multiple other cases in which we can 
identify, and help better realize, someone‟s authentic 
desires through interference.  If we know, for example, 
that someone has failed to go college, get married, or take 
up mountain climbing merely out of fear, ignorance, or 
laziness, why shouldn‟t we coerce him or her into doing so 
on the positive view?  Again, it will be an empirical 
question as to whether such interference will be effective 
-- perhaps we will not be very good at identifying people‟s 
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ultimate purposes, or perhaps they will resent our 
interference and thus come to reject these purposes rather 
than identify with them -- but neither Taylor nor Raz offer 
much evidence to indicate that the positive view will come 
out against interference in most cases, and it seems 
plausible that the evidence will suggest otherwise. 
 There is, however, a deeper conceptual problem with 
this position.  The positive view can offer, at best, a 
prudential argument against the use of interference.  That 
is, it can offer no reason why coercion is morally wrong, 
only why it might not be effective. This, however, runs 
against the intuition that certain coercive acts are 
morally heinous regardless of their outcomes. For example, 
in a footnote, Taylor asks us to consider, “the unease we 
feel at the reconditioning of the hero of Anthony Burgess‟ 
A Clockwork Orange” (Taylor 1985: 226).6  It seems clear 
that Alex‟s treatment in that novel warrants, at the very 
least, “unease,” but it is hard to see how the positive 
view can sustain this conviction.  The implication is that 
such coercive techniques violate the dignity of those who 
are subjected to them, but in what sense can we say that 
                                                          
6 This treatment is vividly depicted in Stanley Kubrick‟s film version, 
in which Alex‟s eyes are forced open as he watches various film clips 
intended to “cure” him of his anti-social behavior. 
55 
 
their dignity has been violated on the positive view?  We 
cannot say what seems intuitively obvious: “because it 
impinges on their liberty in a fairly dramatic way,” 
because, if the treatment is effective in getting the 
person to realize his or her own “true” desires, however 
understood, then it constitutes an advance of their liberty 
on the positive account. Of course we might say that such 
treatment is unlikely to be very effective, that it is 
likely to do more harm to anyone subjected to it than it is 
to help further their liberty (indeed, Alex‟s treatment 
proves ineffective in a variety of ways), but we will never 
be able to definitively rule out this possibility.   
 Further, suppose the state were to become exceptionally 
good at identifying and promoting people‟s own true desires 
or purposes.  Say that advances in neuroscience and 
behavioral psychology allowed states to develop physically 
invasive techniques to achieve this end.  Would this now 
make such use of force acceptable?  If anything, we are 
intuitively inclined to think that the invasiveness of 
these techniques would make their use more objectionable 
from the standpoint of liberty not less so. The forms of 
social engineering employed in A Clockwork Orange or Brave 
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New World are not deplorable because of their 
ineffectiveness, but because of their degradingness. 
 On the positive account, though, it will always be an 
open question whether physical interference, even in its 
extreme forms, will promote or hinder liberty.  One could 
not object to a proposed coercive state policy by 
asserting, “you cannot do this to me.  This exceeds the 
limits of the state‟s power,” as this objection could never 
count as decisive on the positive account. The best one 
could do is question the efficacy of any particular policy 
proposal.  
 To put this point another way, even when the positive 
conception does recommend against interference, it can only 
give what Stephen Darwall calls “a reason of the wrong 
kind” (Darwall 2006: 13ff).  On the positive view, when 
someone objects to what he or she perceives as coercive 
interference, we, as alleged aggressors acting on the basis 
of the positive conception, may very well acquiesce to his 
or her demands if we conclude that such interference is 
unlikely to be effective.  But in such cases, while we will 
be acting in accordance with his or her demands, we will 
not be acting because of them, as these objections have no 
normative weight of their own.  Accordingly, on this 
57 
 
conception, the liberal commitment to individual liberty 
loses much of its force as it can no longer serve as a 
decisive objection to coercive impositions.  In short, the 
problem is not that positive views always require pervasive 
interference; it is that they do not properly prohibit it.   
 It should now be clear that the positive conception is 
not much better than the negative one at explaining the 
priority of the basic liberties, such as freedom of speech, 
religion, thought, assembly and so on.  Formal rights that 
protect such liberties can serve, at best, a purely 
instrumental role on the positive account. Suppose, for 
example, we could positively verify that someone‟s 
religious beliefs -- beliefs that were instilled in him or 
her as a child -- served to repress his or her true desires 
and stifle his or her real potential. In cases such as 
these, the positive view might require prohibitions against 
religious worship.
7
  Again, the crucial point is that the 
positive view robs basic rights of their proper moral 
force.  They can never function as strict prohibitions 
against government interference, or as “trumps,” as Ronald 
Dworkin (2007) puts it. 
                                                          
7 Gaus (2003a) and Carter (1999: Chapter 3) both offer versions of this 
argument against the positive view. 
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 It should also be clear that the positive conception is 
no better at recognizing the manifold sources of 
oppression.  Dominated groups who suffer from 
marginalization, exploitation, or cultural imperialism will 
never be able to assert to their oppressors, “stop, you 
cannot do this to us,” as the positive account deprives 
them of this appeal.  Even when their objections are 
heeded, this will not because they have objected.  
Consequently, the positive conception effectively renders 
them powerless.  At best their objections can count as 
evidence that the interference being imposed upon them 
might not successfully achieve the desired end.  
Accordingly, the positive conception provides no better 
recourse against these sorts of harms than the negative 
one, and, even worse, it can sometimes serve to justify 
them. 
 As I will argue in subsequent chapters, a chief virtue 
of the conception of freedom as anti-domination that I hope 
to develop is that, unlike negative and positive 
conceptions, it is able to account for both the 
significance of basic liberties and the harms of various 
forms of oppression not limited to physical interference. 
Before moving on, however, it is worth noting two other 
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strategies for liberalizing the positive conception: the 
pluralism approach and the content neutral approach.  I 
want to briefly address both these strategies here.  While 
I think that both mitigate, to some extent, the 
disturbingly anti-liberal features of positive views, 
neither is able to avoid the implication that, in some 
cases,  physical coercion may increase individual liberty, 
and hence they are both vulnerable to the sorts of 
objections outlined above. 
 
The Pluralism Approach 
  
In his essay, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” Berlin endorses 
value pluralism, the view that there exist multiple 
distinct and incommensurable goods which cannot be mutually 
realized in a single life.  We should therefore, he 
concludes, endorse a negative conception of liberty, which 
leaves individuals free to choose amongst these set of 
goods, rather than a positive conception which would force 
us, presumably without warrant, to privilege one good over 
all other equally valuable, but ultimately incommensurable, 
goods.  Value pluralism thus entails negative liberty 
(Berlin 2002: 212ff).  
 One can certainly take issue with this inference, but 
I am not interested here in whether or not Berlin is right 
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in thinking that a commitment to value pluralism somehow 
entails a commitment to negative liberty.
8
  What is 
interesting for our purposes is that Joseph Raz (1986) 
argues conversely that positive liberty entails value 
pluralism.  On Raz‟s view, in order to act autonomously, an 
agent must have at his or her disposal a variety of “good” 
options to choose from.  An agent who could only choose one 
form of a good life would not be acting autonomously -- 
i.e. would not be exercising his or her true freedom -- 
because this choice would lack any real meaning in the 
absence of other worthy options.  In other words, my choice 
to participate in this or that form of life is autonomous 
only if it is accompanied by a rejection of other 
worthwhile alternatives. Because my autonomy requires that 
these options be made available to me, positive liberty 
would prohibit the state restricting my options in the name 
of liberty: 
Autonomy means that a good life is a life which is a free 
creation.  Value-Pluralism means that there will be a 
multiplicity to choose from, and favourable conditions of 
choice.  The resulting doctrine of freedom provides and 
protects those options and conditions. (Raz 1986: 412) 
 
                                                          
8 There are probably, in fact, good reasons to think that Berlin is 
indeed wrong about this.  See Talisse, 2004 
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This commitment to value pluralism does hedge against one 
disturbing feature of totalitarian or oppressive regimes: 
their tendency to promote homogeneity.  If access to a 
multiplicity of worthwhile options is itself a good, then a 
political regime that restricts their access will be 
undesirable for this reason.   There are two problems 
with this argument, however.  First, a state that fails to 
promote, or at least make available, various conceptions of 
the good life will be undesirable on this score independent 
of its tendency to suppress freedom.  We can easily imagine 
a rather invasive state that recognizes and promotes value 
pluralism.  This state might very well reject the project 
of imposing one ultimate standard of value at the expense 
of all others, while at the same time regard it necessary 
to prevent its citizens from pursuing bad options and even 
to “encourage” them (perhaps with force) to pursue various 
good ones.  As Raz concedes, “some options one is better 
off not having” (Raz 1986: 410). Second, once we understand 
autonomy as the pursuit of our own good, we must recognize, 
as Taylor points out, the significance of internal, in 
addition to external, barriers. The state can physically 
interfere, in a rather invasive manner, to remove these 
internal barriers to autonomy without privileging any one 
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good over any other, thereby violating the principle of 
value pluralism.   
 Raz‟s responses to these worries are rather 
unsatisfactory.  First, he asserts that not all state 
efforts to promote autonomy necessarily involve coercion.  
The state could promote some behaviors by conferring honors 
and rewards and discourage others through taxation and 
other sanctions (Raz 1986: 161). In the first place, we 
have to wonder why these actions do not constitute coercion 
given that the imposition of taxes and the distribution of 
rewards will certainly require the use of state power (cf. 
Nozick, 1974).  While Raz might be correct in assuming 
there is a difference between these milder uses of force 
and more draconian ones, he offers no criterion for 
distinguishing between the two, and we are left to wonder, 
if these uses of force do not constitute coercion, then why 
not more extreme ones as well? Further, while it might be 
true that the state need not employ more invasive measures 
to promote autonomy, Raz provides no reason why it should 
not.  Again, the appeal to liberty, when invoked to oppose 
physical coercion, loses much of its force on this view. Of 
course one could adopt a positive conception of liberty 
without necessarily endorsing an invasive sate; not even 
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Berlin, would dispute this much.  But one could not object 
to such a state under this conception of liberty. As long 
as the state's employment of interference is consistent 
with value pluralism, Raz's view leaves those who suffer 
such impositions with no recourse. 
 Nevertheless, Raz also contends that even well 
intentioned coercion will almost always reduce autonomy 
because coercion is often global and indiscriminate.  That 
is, when employed, it will often restrict one‟s access to 
good options as well as bad ones.  So, Raz insists, “there 
is no practical way of ensuring that the coercion will 
restrict the victims‟ choice of repugnant options but will 
not interfere with their other choices” (Raz 1986: 419).  
Placing someone in prison will diminish her good options as 
well as her bad ones.  But notice again that this is just 
another prudential consideration.  Should the state develop 
more discriminate, yet nevertheless invasive, techniques 
(and I must confess that I am less skeptical than Raz that 
such techniques do not already exist) would coercion 
suddenly become more acceptable?  We should hope not, but 
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Raz‟s approach cannot sustain this conviction despite its 







The Content Neutral Approach 
 
Recall that, in contrast to negative conceptions, most 
positive conceptions hold that evaluative considerations 
are relevant when determining the extent of an agent‟s 
freedom.  If I am acting on the basis of poor or misguided 
values, then I am not acting freely on the positive 
account, since my actions do not conform to my true or 
fundamental purposes objectively understood.  John 
                                                          
9 I should note one puzzling feature of Raz‟s view.  At times, Raz 
asserts that any form of coercion necessarily diminishes autonomy. “All 
coercion invades autonomy by subjecting the will of the coerced” (1986: 
155).  Insofar as we understand coerced as the opposite of autonomous, 
this claim is tautological and hence trivial.  Negative and positive 
theorists do not disagree that coercion is freedom limiting.  They 
disagree over what constitutes coercion.  Insofar as Raz is operating 
under a positive understanding of freedom, this assertion does not 
alleviate the worry that certain invasive actions might nevertheless 
promote liberty.  Raz could mean, however, that coercive acts necessary 
limit autonomy because they impair one‟s negative freedom.  If so, he 
would be employing the distinctly negative understanding of coercion as 
physical interference.  At times, Raz suggests that is how he 
understands coercion.  Negative liberty could be understood, on his 
view, as, in part, constitutive of autonomy (although this is hard to 
square with his insistence that the removal of bad options from one‟s 
range of choices does not diminish one‟s autonomy).  I confess I am not 
sure exactly how to best interpret Raz on this point.  If he means the 
former, then I think I have adequately addressed his view here.  If he 
means the latter, then I hope to address this position in more detail 
later (in chapters 2 and 4) when discussing Matthew Kramer‟s (2003) 
position.   
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Christman (1991), however, argues that this is not an 
essential feature of positive views. There is an important 
difference, he contends, between the agent who 
“deliberately” acts immorally and the one who “acts 
mindlessly, obediently carrying out the commands of a 
manipulative master. Certainly the first agent is enjoying 
something the second person lacks: the capacity for self-
generation and self-government” (Christman 1991: 358). 
 On Christman‟s view, it is not the content of the 
action that is relevant, but its origin. We cannot say 
definitively, for example, that neither Manson nor Baader 
acted freely on the basis of what they did.  It matters 
whether their actions stemmed from their own authentic 
desires or if they were in fact the products of insanity 
and delusion, regardless of how deplorable we might find 
their actions to be.  This still leaves the difficult 
question of how to discern what constitutes an authentic 
desire versus an inauthentic one, and Christman develops a 
lengthy set of criteria for determining when preferences 
are formed autonomously that I won‟t go into here.  The 
important point, though, is that if this can be done 
successfully, it would establish what Christman 
characterizes as an “internalist,” “subjectivist,” and 
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hence “content neutral” understanding of positive freedom 
(Christman 1991: 359). 
 Christman believes this view is attractive because it 
avoids the more troubling implications of positive views in 
general.  As Christman stresses, “insofar as positive 
liberty requires an external value condition (in its demand 
for rationality), it is not in conflict with the severest 
form of tyranny – interference with a person based on her 
mistaken values in the supposed name of freedom itself” 
(Chrsitman 1991: 356), but once we abandon the commitment 
to evaluative standards, we can hold that it is 
impermissible for the state to coerce citizens – in the 
name of liberty – by appeal to their higher selves or more 
worthy ends, while still endorsing a positive conception of 
liberty.  The result is what Christman regards as a liberal 
understanding of positive freedom. 
 Again, like Raz‟s value pluralism approach, Christman‟s 
content neutral approach does resist the homogenizing 
tendency of most oppressive and tyrannical regimes.  Any 
state committed to a positive conception of liberty that is 
content neutral will likely have to tolerate a diversity of 
conceptions of the good.  It is not clear, though, that the 
content neutral approach does in fact prohibit pervasive 
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government interference in the name of liberty because, 
while it abandons the commitment to evaluative standards, 
it nevertheless retains the commitment to internal sources 
of restraint.  So, even if we hold, as Christman advocates, 
that value judgments are irrelevant when determining the 
extent of one‟s freedom, we could still justify the use of 
physical interference in order to remove internal obstacles 
to freedom.  The example of Alf discussed above illustrates 
this point. Even on the content neutral approach, we could 
conscript Alf on the grounds that it accords with his own 
authentic desire, not because we judge that military 
service has any value in and of itself.  
 The problem, as Ian Carter (1999) points out, is that, 
while Christman‟s version of positive liberty is content 
neutral in the sense that is disregards value judgments, it 
is not content neutral in another significant respect.  The 
content of an action is still relevant on Christman‟s 
account insofar it pertains to the authenticity of the 
action, if not its objective value (Carter 1999: 155).  
Determining whether or not a given course of action is 
freely chosen still depends on whether the action conforms 
to the agent‟s authentic desires, and this requires that we 
know something about the content of the action in question. 
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Christman is therefore mistaken in claiming that the 
content neutral approach is concerned with the origins of 
actions rather than their content.  More accurately we 
should say that Christman‟s approach is concerned with 
certain kinds of content, albeit non-evaluative ones. 
 Once we make measurements of freedom content dependent, 
however, we introduce the possibility of freedom promoting 
interference (Carter 1999: 119ff.).  Accordingly, 
Christman‟s supposedly more liberal-friendly positive 
conception of liberty is still consistent with some pretty 
disturbing policies.  Imagine, for example, that a 
religious sect wants to forcibly “rehabilitate” homosexuals 
in order to change their sexual preference and behavior.  
They need not claim that homosexuality is a sin and 
therefore inconsistent with acting freely.  Instead they 
could assert that homosexuals have been manipulated and 
corrupted by modern society‟s overly permissive and lax 
attitudes towards sexual behavior. Rehabilitating them, so 
to speak, just brings their actions in accordance with 
their authentic desires, which are now liberated from 
society‟s distorting influence. Again, much will depend on 
how we determine what constitutes an authentic versus an 
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inauthentic desire, but, once determined, we can justify 
the use of force in the name of liberty. 
 
Two Concepts or One? 
 
Before moving on, I want to address the worry that the 
preceding discussion rests on a fundamental confusion.  In 
a well known paper, Gerald MacCallum, Jr. (1967), argues 
that there are not two distinct conception of liberty, but 
rather one conception with three variable components.  
Freedom always involves the following “triadic relation”: x 
is free from y to do or become z. The variable x “ranges 
over” agents, y covers “preventing conditions,” and z 
covers enabling conditions (McCallum 1967: 314). When 
determining the extent of an agents freedom, we may focus, 
as negative views do, on y, or we may focus, as positive 
views do, on x or z.  But in either case we are employing 
one and the same conception of freedom, just with different 
points of emphasis.  
 In a similar vein, John Gray (1980) argues that any 
viable conception of negative liberty must take into 
account some theory about what it is to be a rational 
agent, and consequently Berlin‟s distinction between 
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negative views that focus on the area of control versus 
positive views that focus on the agent of control cannot be 
sustained.
10
  Following MacCallum, Eric Nelson (2005) has 
more recently argued that the distinction between 
opportunity and exercise conceptions is spurious.  On 
Nelson‟s view, it is not the case that negative liberty 
involves the absence of barriers to action whereas positive 
liberty involves the performance of the action itself. Both 
negative and positive liberty, he contends, hold that 
freedom involves the removal of obstacles; they just 
disagree about what constitutes an obstacle, with negative 
liberty focusing exclusively on external obstacles and 
positive liberty allowing for the possibility of internal 
ones. 
 The worry of course is that these objections 
potentially render Berlin‟s insistence that there are two 
distinct, and hence incompatible, conceptions of freedom 
suspect (Shapiro 2005: 152ff). But while MacCallum‟s 
analysis is perhaps illuminating, it does not dissolve the 
central problem discussed at length in this chapter, namely 
                                                          
10Gray, however, does not agree with MacCallum that liberty can be 
understood as one conception with three variables, and he thinks we can 
meaningful talk about distinct negative and positive conceptions of 
liberty provided that we replace Berlin‟s understanding of liberty as 
non-interference with liberty as the “non-availability of options” 
(Gray, 1980).   
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the problem of which conception is normatively superior on 
the liberal view.  As Christman warns, we should be careful 
not to confuse a “normative” problem for a “conceptual” one 
(Christman 2005: 79).  In outlining these two conceptions 
of freedom, Berlin is not claiming that either conception 
is, by itself, conceptually complete or exhaustive, and he 
recognizes that we may employ the concept of liberty in a 
variety of different contexts with a variety of different 
meanings.  But, politically, we are not concerned with the 
concept of freedom simpliciter, but as it particularly 
relates to the state.  That is, we want to know what the 
state should take itself to be preserving, promoting or at 
least not infringing upon, in its commitment to individual 
liberty, and this is a normative question rather than a 
purely conceptual one. Gray likewise points out that 
MacCallum‟s formula just moves this normative question to a 
different level.  Whatever we input for MacCallum‟s 
variables is bound to be as normatively controversial as 
the concept of liberty itself (Gray 1980: 511).   
 This is not to say that MacCallum‟s formula is not 
useful.  It may very well help in clarifying the exact cite 
of controversy between varying conceptions of liberty, and 
it may even ultimately reveal that there are far more than 
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just two possible conceptions of liberty depending of the 
number of different ways of construing each variable.
11
  In 
this respect, MacCallum‟s triadic formula may elucidate the 
dispute at hand.  It does not, however, dispense with it. 
 There is one significant respect, however, in which 
MacCallum‟s approach is overly limited. As Gray points out, 
there is no room in MacCallum‟s formula for conceptions of 
liberty which equate being free with occupying a certain 
kind of status (Gray 1980: 511). As I will argue in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5, there is an important distinction 
between act based conceptions of freedom and status based 
conceptions. MacCallum‟s formula works well for act based 
conceptions, but it cannot cover status based ones. Since I 
hope to show that the properly liberal understanding of 
liberty is a status based conception, I think MacCallum‟s 
formula, however useful, cannot fully capture the liberal 
understanding of freedom.  
                                                          
11 For example, if we think there are two different possible inputs for 
each variable, then we have eight possible conceptions of freedom and 






AGGREGATE CONCEPTIONS OF LIBERTY 
 
Aggregating Negative and Positive Liberty 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that both negative and 
positive conceptions of liberty are deeply problematic on 
liberal grounds and that neither conception is sufficient 
to capture basic liberal intuitions about the value of 
liberty. It is not surprising then that we often find 
simultaneous appeals to both conceptions in the work of 
liberal theorists.  As was noted earlier, the negative 
conception no doubt played a significant role in the 
development of liberal thought.  It should also be noted, 
however, that few if any prominent proponents of the 
liberal view adhere to a strictly negative conception of 
liberty.   While Mill, for example, does assert in On 
Liberty that, “the only freedom which deserves the name is 
that of pursuing our own good in our own way” (Mill 1999: 
55), he later, in a famous example, also insists that we 
may obstruct someone from crossing an unsafe bridge 
“without any real infringement on his liberty; for liberty 
consists in doing what one desires” (Mill 1999: 146).  If 
74 
 
liberty consists in “doing what one desires,” however, then 
the conception of liberty at work is a positive one. 
 Likewise, Locke seemingly evokes the negative account 
of liberty when he declares that, “[to possess] liberty is 
to be free from restraint and violence from others” (Locke 
1997: 32), yet, in a similar vein as Mill, he 
simultaneously asserts, “that ill deserves the name of 
confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and 
precipices” (Locke 1997: 32).   Locke, in fact, goes even 
further to suggest that the law is somehow constitutive of 
freedom: “where there is no law,” he insists, “there is no 
freedom” (Locke 1997: 32) despite the fact that the law 
imposes rather significant restraints on the actions of 
those who are subject to it.  Such considerations lead 
Locke to distinguish between “liberty” from he calls mere 
“license” (Locke 1997: 5).  But if “license” is best 
understood as unrestricted action – and this seems like a 
reasonable interpretation of Locke's view on the matter – 
then liberty must entail something more than this 
Many contemporary liberals have followed suit.  Ronald 
Dworkin, for example, insists that, while liberals are no 
doubt committed to protecting some degree of negative 
liberty, particularly those liberties guaranteed through 
basic rights, they are not committed to valuing negative 
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liberty as such.  On the liberal view, he maintains, one is 
at liberty to express oneself in the form of political 
protest or practice one’s own chosen religion.  One is not, 
however, at liberty to, for example, kill one’s critics 
(Dworkin 2001: 88).  Laws against killing one's critics 
therefore do not lessen one's liberty on the liberal view, 
according to Dworkin, though they clearly do entail a 
degree of state interference.  Likewise, Will Kymlicka 
(2002) and Jeremy Waldron (1988) both argue that liberalism 
does not entail a commitment to the value of liberty in 
general, but to certain specific liberties of special 
normative significance.   
Indeed, Berlin’s categorization of the negative view 
as the liberal one is especially suspect considering that 
neither of the two theorists we identified as exemplifying 
the negative conception, Hobbes and Bentham, are 
particularly good representatives of liberalism (Larmore 
2001: 233).  With Hobbes, this is fairly evident, given 
that he is the most famous modern proponent of despotism.
1
 
Bentham, on the other hand, admittedly belongs to the 
liberal tradition, but he is somewhat of an outlier in it.  
                                                 
1 On a rather broad understanding of liberalism, we might, as Gaus and 
Courtland (2007) argue, label Hobbes a liberal because he believes that 
any restrictions on liberty require justification; however, even on 
this broader understanding, he must be considered a liberal in the 
“qualified” sense, they admit, because he thinks that extensive 
restrictions can in fact be justified.    
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While he does argue that governments should operate under 
the general presumption that more liberty is better than 
less, he is famously hostile to the notion of fundamental 
or basic rights, describing “natural rights” artfully as 
“nonsense upon stilts” (Bentham 1973: 269).  Accordingly, 
he asserts that states can permissibly infringe upon these 
so-called basic liberties when doing so is necessary to 
promote the greater happiness of the general population 
(Bentham 1973: chapter 20).  So, even if Bentham is 
properly considered a member of the liberal tradition 
broadly construed, he is hardly the most representative 
proponent of it.           
 The problem then is this: insofar as liberalism is 
committed to limiting the scope of state power, the 
negative view seems most appropriate. Few if any liberals, 
however, regard any and all instances of state interference 
as freedom inhibiting.  Some exercises of state power – 
such as traffic laws, laws against murder, and guard rails 
on bridges - are welcomed restrictions on certain 
behaviors.  Liberals are thus lead to conclude that these 
restrictions do not really curtail liberty.  Some liberals, 
though certainly not all, go even further to insist that 
taxes, wealth redistribution, and economic regulations also 





  Other exercises of state power, 
however, (such as prohibitions on speech, religion, or 
assembly) constitute egregious violations of individual 
liberty on any liberal view.  These restrictions are 
significant in a way that others are not.  But, as we saw 
in the preceding chapter, making such discriminations 
requires recourse to the positive conception of liberty and 
the seemingly illiberal commitments that go with it. 
 We might conclude then that the liberal view is 
committed to neither a purely negative nor positive account 
of liberty, but incorporates elements of both.  This, 
however, ignores the deep and, as Berlin stresses, 
“irreconcilable” differences between them as normative 
principles (Berlin 2002: 12). Of course we could always 
adjust our conception of liberty to fit the political 
principles, policies, and institutions we want to endorse 
on a liberal account, borrowing from both the negative and 
positive conceptions where appropriate, but this would 
render the liberal commitment to individual liberty 
entirely ad-hoc.  If liberalism is committed to liberty, 
then we need to know what sorts of principles, institutions 
and policies this commitment demands and not the other way 
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around. If we are to judge which policies and institutions 
promote freedom and which hinder it, we need to have a 
conception of freedom that can make such discriminations.  
We cannot simply adjust our understanding of freedom so 
that it is consistent with the policies and institutions we 
want to endorse if freedom is supposed to serve as the 
normative justification for promoting these policies and 
institutions and not others.  In short, ad-hoc conceptions 
of freedom are as easy to formulate as they are useless. 
 This is not to say that an investigation into the 
normatively best conception of liberty cannot proceed by 
means of a strategy of reflective equilibrium.  After all, 
my own strategy, thus far, has proceeded in just this 
fashion (in chapter 1, we rejected both negative and 
positive conceptions precisely because they could cannot 
sustain basic liberal intuitions about the nature of 
liberty).  Any successful reflective equilibrium strategy, 
however, has to achieve coherence at the conceptual level 
in order to establish a genuine equilibrium between our 
concepts and our intuitions or considered judgments.  When 
considering various objections, such a strategy cannot 
simply employ whichever concept seems best able to preserve 
these intuitions and judgments without also giving equal 
consideration to the way in which these concepts hang 
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together.  If Berlin is right, however, in thinking that 
the negative and positive conception are normatively at 
odds with each other, then a reflective equilibrium 
strategy that makes use of both conceptions, but does not 
address this fundamental tension, fails to achieve 
coherence at the conceptual level and hence fails to 
achieve genuine reflective equilibrium.   
   If the liberal understanding of liberty is to employ 
elements of both negative and positive conceptions, it 
cannot proceed in such an ad-hoc fashion.  We need some 
systematic way of aggregating both views.  In this chapter, 
I will explore and ultimately reject three such strategies.  
The first introduces evaluative considerations at the level 
of overall freedom rather than at the level of the freedom 
to perform individual actions.  The second insists that 
liberalism is not committed to preserving liberty as such 
but to preserving certain basic liberties because they are 
necessitated by the liberal commitment to equality.  And 
the third insists that not all instances of state 
interference constitute a reduction in liberty because they 
are done with the consent of citizens of a liberal 
democracy. I will argue that none of these strategies is 
successful as they either ultimately reduce to positive 
conceptions of liberty, or, like positive conceptions, they 
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are consistent with extreme and pervasive state 
interference.  As such they are vulnerable to the very same 
objections leveled against positive views in general that 
were explored in the preceding chapter. 
 
The Overall Freedom Approach 
 
One possible strategy for explaining the priority of the 
basic liberties is to argue that a certain set of specific 
liberties generates the greatest total extent of liberty 
for all.  One can plausibly interpret Rawls as offering 
this kind of argument in A Theory of Justice.
3
  In outlining 
his first principle of justice, the liberty principle, 
Rawls seems to endorse the negative view in stating that, 
“people are at liberty to do something when they are free 
from constraints either to do it or not to do it and when 
their doing it or not doing it is protected from 
interference by others” (Rawls 1971: 202).  According to 
the first principle of justice then, “each person is to 
have an equal right to the most extensive liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others” (Rawls 1971: 
60). For Rawls, the first principle has lexical priority 
                                                 
3
Admittedly, it is unclear whether this is the argument Rawls is 
advancing or if he thinks that the first principle applies only to the 
basic liberties from the beginning.  I address this latter possibility 
a little later on.   
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over the second -- which concerns the just distribution of 
resources -- meaning, as he later asserts, that “liberty 
can be restricted only for the sake of itself” (Rawls 1971: 
244).   
To this end, Rawls makes a distinction between liberty 
itself and the “worth” of liberty (Rawls 1971: 204). While 
liberty is simply lack of interference, the worth of 
liberty consists in the material resources one possesses in 
order to make use of one’s overall liberty and the 
contribution these liberties make to the achievement of 
one’s ends.  A more equal distribution of the “worth” of 
liberty at the expense of an unequal distribution of 
liberty itself is not permitted under the first principle; 
however, liberty can be restricted in certain cases if it 
promotes greater liberty for everyone in general. Hence 
some liberties can be privileged over others, not because 
they are more important on some evaluative measure, but 
because they foster the most extensive distribution of 
equal liberty for all.  Thus Rawls concludes, “while it is 
by and large true that a greater liberty is preferable, 
this holds primarily for the system of liberty as a whole, 
and not for each particular liberty” (Rawls 1971: 203). 
 As H.L.A. Hart (1973) points out, however, this 
distinction between liberty and the worth of liberty cannot 
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be sustained.  We cannot, Hart maintains, explain the 
benefit incurred by restricting various liberties without 
appeal to the worth of these liberties on some other 
independent scale.  Consider the example Rawls gives in 
support of the first principle: 
 
To illustrate by an obvious example, certain rules of 
order are necessary for intelligent and profitable 
discussion.  Without the acceptance of reasonable 
procedures of inquiry and debate, freedom of speech loses 
its value.  It is essential to distinguish between rules 
of order and rules restricting content of speech.  While 
rules of order limit our freedom, since we cannot speak 
when we please, they are required to gain the benefits of 
this liberty. (Rawls 1971: 203) 
 
While Rawls insists that liberty can be restricted only for 
the sake of itself, here, when explaining the rationale for 
rules of order in public debate, Rawls appeals, not to the 
greater overall negative liberty these restrictions would 
promote, but to the value these restrictions would help 
realize.  As Hart emphasizes, “plainly what such rules of 
debate help to secure is not greater or more extensive 
liberty, but a liberty that is more valuable for any 
rational person than the activity forbidden by the rules” 
(Hart 1973: 543).  Indeed, Taylor’s traffic light example 
is so damaging to the negative view precisely because the 
basic liberties do not seem to generate the greatest 
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overall liberty in comparison to what seem like more 
trivial ones.   
 In order to explain which liberties are more basic, 
Rawls cannot rely on liberty itself, but must appeal 
instead to some more substantive and independent standard.  
According to Hart, possible criteria could include either 
“utilitarian considerations” or “some conception of what 
all individuals are entitled to have as a matter of human 
dignity or moral right” (Hart 1973: 545).  Rawls rejects 
the first because it warrants an unequal distribution of 
liberty in some cases.  Further, a utilitarian approach is 
likely to yield, at best, an instrumental justification for 
securing individual liberty and would thus be subject to a 
familiar objection that we have explored elsewhere.   
 The second option, however, risks reducing Rawls’s 
view into a straightforwardly positive conception of 
liberty. Again, as Hart puts it, the liberties Rawls 
identifies are not more valuable because they yield greater 
overall liberty, but because they yield liberties that are 
“more valuable for any rational person” (543; emphasis 
added). Establishing the more fundamental liberties thus 
requires recourse to some ideal account of the rational 
agent.  If liberty can be restricted in order to promote 
the value of liberty as determined by the desires of ideal 
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rational agents, then people can be forced to be free 
against their own professed wishes and in opposition to 
their actual desires.  Understood this way, the restriction 
of liberty for the sake of itself takes on a rather 
sinister meaning that Rawls does not intend. 
 Nonetheless, this does appear to be the strategy that 
Rawls ultimately adopts. In response to Hart, Rawls claims 
that the first principle is not committed to the priority 
of liberty as such, but to certain basic liberties (Rawls 
1995: 107).  The question, though, of course, is how to 
determine which ones are basic. To this end, Rawls suggests 
that some liberties are more fundamental than others 
because possessing them is necessary in order to fully 
realize what he identifies as our two most fundamental 
moral powers or capacities: our capacity to be “reasonable” 
and our capacity to be “rational” (Rawls 1995: 293).  Our 
capacity to be reasonable is our ability to cooperate with 
others on the basis of fair principles of justice.  Our 
capacity to be rational is our ability to choose, and act 
on the basis of, our own conception of the good. 
 Without going into detail about how these two powers 
require the protection of certain basic liberties and in 
particular which ones, it should already be clear that the 
conception of liberty at work here is an exercise concept 
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rather than an opportunity concept. Samuel Freeman even 
explicitly describes it as such: “what makes a liberty 
basic for Rawls is that is it is an essential social 
condition for the adequate development and full exercise of 
the two powers of moral personality over a complete life” 
(Freeman 2007: 53). If basic liberties are necessary so 
that, as citizens, we can effectively identify, and act on 
the basis of, our own conception of the good, then 
interference designed to help us act on the basis, or 
designed to help us better identify our own wants and 
interests, need not be considered freedom limiting.  
 Of course what Rawls might mean is not that the 
exercise of our moral powers itself constitutes liberty, 
but that a certain degree of negative liberty is necessary 
to achieve this end.  This interpretation, though, renders 
the first principle of justice far too weak. Whenever 
government interference could assist in helping citizens 
better realize their moral powers, the state would be 
justified in disregarding the first principle.  Rawls then 
cannot adopt a purely instrumental defense of the value of 
basic liberties while preserving the lexical priority of 
the first principle.  It is hard to see then how Rawls can 
maintain the priority of liberty as a first principle of 
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justice without abandoning his initial commitment to the 
negative conception in favor of the positive one. 
Maximizing overall liberty itself will thus not 
justify privileging certain basic liberties over others 
unless this overall measure is, at least in part, 
evaluative.  As we have seen, negative freedom, as 
understood by Berlin, is supposed to disregard the relative 
value of performing any given action in determining whether 
or not an agent is free to pursue it.  Such value judgments 
are the purview of positive conceptions.  On the negative 
account, I am at liberty to kill my critics provided that 
no one can stop me regardless of whether it is morally 
acceptable for me to do so.  To the extent that the state 
prevents me from doing so, it thereby decreases my liberty, 
even though we might agree that it is good that the state 
imposes this prohibition.  
 Surprisingly, however, Berlin suggests that, while 
value judgments are irrelevant when determining whether or 
not an agent is free to perform this or that particular 
action, they are relevant when determining an agent’s 
overall level of freedom.  Towards the end of “Two 
Concepts,” he asserts that freedom is “measured” by “the 
number and importance of the paths” open to a person 
(Berlin 2002: 211; emphasis added).  Earlier in the essay, 
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in a footnote, Berlin outlines five relevant considerations 
when determining the extent of an agent’s overall freedom 
on the negative view.  Two of these conditions require that 
we assess, not just the availability, but the worth of 
those courses of action open to the agent.  These include, 
“how important in my plan of life, given my character and 
circumstances, these possibilities are when compared with 
each other,” and “what value not merely the agent, but the 
general sentiment of the society in which he lives, puts on 
the various possibilities” (Berlin 2002: 177n1).  G. A. 
Cohen echoes this same sentiment: 
While I think the negative account could do perfectly 
well without mentioning desire in the case of freedom to 
perform particular actions, desire might not be so easily 
dispensed with from an account of the total freedom of a 
person. (Cohen 1981: 45) 
 
Cohen, however, provides no details as to what such an 
account might look like.  More recently, Matthew Kramer has 
developed this view at greater length.  Unlike Berlin, 
Kramer is optimistic that we can precisely measure the 
degree of an agent’s freedom, but like Berlin he also 
insists that, “whereas the existence of any particular 
freedom or unfreedom is strictly a matter of fact, the 
extent of anyone’s overall liberty is a partly evaluative 
phenomenon” (Kramer 2003: 9). 
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 The introduction of evaluative considerations at the 
level of overall freedom is motivated by concerns we 
explored in the previous chapter.  Recall that one problem 
with the negative view is that it is overly broad in that 
it counts any and all instances of physical interference as 
equally freedom limiting.  A government that prohibits 
freedom of religion or freedom of speech but has relatively 
lax traffic laws, or takes no measures to prevent citizens 
from walking on unsafe poorly constructed bridges, will be 
more free than one that does permit freedom of speech and 
religion, but also seeks to protect citizens by imposing 
traffic laws and erecting guard rails. Just as we are wary 
of positive conceptions because they enable dictatorships 
to claim that they are promoting freedom rather than 
hindering it, we should also be wary of any negative 
conception that allows oppressive regimes to excuse their 
prohibitions against faith and expression by pointing out 
all the unsafe bridges one is free to cross or all the 
intersections one is free to recklessly plow through.  
Further, we also noted that the negative view cannot 
account for the freedom limiting power of threats without 
taking into account the worth of available options.  Again, 
the negative conception is severely lacking if it allows an 
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oppressive regime to plea, “you can do or say anything you 
like provided you are willing to accept the consequences.”   
 Appealing to evaluative standards at the level of 
overall liberty is meant to alleviate these worries.  
Citizens living under a regime with few or no traffic or 
safety regulations may still be counted as less free than 
those living under regime with many such regulations if 
these citizens also lack the more significant liberties 
protected by the right to free speech or religion that 
citizens in a liberal democracy typically enjoy.  The 
appeal to evaluative standards also avoids the implication 
that one might be considered free to do a whole host of 
things in an oppressive regime provided that one is also 
willing to accept the rather drastic consequences because 
the threats that accompany these options will consequently 
decrease their worth and thus greatly diminish their 
contribution to one’s overall liberty. 
 This strategy, however, avoids the inherent problems 
of the positive conception at the level of individual 
actions only to reintroduce them at the level of overall 
freedom.  Consider how any such account may go.  The number 
of individual acts an agent is free or unfree to perform in 
the negative sense will be only one determining factor in 
his or her overall freedom (and advocates of the overall 
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freedom approach differ as to how precise these 
calculations can be made). The assigned importance or value 
of each action will also count as a “multiplier,” to borrow 
Kramer’s (2003) phrase, thereby giving certain actions 
greater weight depending on their added significance.   
 But what constitutes for this added significance?  It 
cannot be that the freedom to perform these actions somehow 
entails or requires less interference, since then it would 
not be the worth or value of these liberties that would 
account for their greater contribution to overall freedom, 
but the scope of unimpeded action that they would permit 
(this was Rawls’s failed strategy). But how does the worth 
of performing activities contribute to an agent’s freedom? 
One possibility is that the more valuable courses of action 
are simply those that the agent happens, as a matter of 
fact, to want to perform, so the liberty to perform them 
will be more highly prized by the agent simply because it 
ensures that these courses of action will always remain 
available.  Both Cohen and Berlin seem to suggest this 
possibility in the passages quoted above. 
  This strategy, however, generates serious problems.  
One problem is that a contented slave on this account will 
not be appreciably less free than a free citizen, since the 
slave will have at his or her disposal the ability to 
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perform those actions he or she deems valuable. We will 
have to say something similar about the housewife who has 
been conditioned into valuing her subordinate status and 
her exclusively domestic role above all alternatives.  Even 
if we maintain that the slave or the housewife is still 
nevertheless less free because there are still a 
significant number of actions he or she is unable to 
perform (even though the value, and hence multiplier, of 
these freedoms is relatively low), there is still no 
guarantee that this approach will warrant protecting the 
basic liberties, like freedom of speech and religion, over 
supposedly more trivial ones, since there is no guarantee 
that someone will, as a matter of fact, necessarily value 
speech or religion more than the thrill of speeding down 
the highway or walking over a treacherous bridge. Of 
course, when assessing overall liberty, we could appeal, 
not to what people actually profess to desire, but to the 
desires of their true, essential, or ideal selves, but such 
an appeal would reduce this approach to a thoroughly 
positive conception of liberty. This problem is compounded 
if we contend, as Berlin also suggests, that overall 
freedom is determined in part by what one’s culture or 
society deems as valuable, since then the state can coerce 
people against their own objections and still claim to be 
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promoting their overall freedom on some other evaluative 
standard.   
 Another problem with this approach is that, if certain 
specific freedoms are of particular value, thereby making 
them more significant in terms of one's overall liberty, 
then what's to say that other freedoms are not of 
particular disvalue, thereby making their overall 
contribution to effectively negative.  We can certainly 
imagine that some freedoms might have such disvalue (G. 
Dworkin 1988: Chapter 5).
4
 Perhaps the availability of some 
options only serves as a distraction from one's more worthy 
pursuits, or perhaps having them only causes one to have 
anxiety over the proper course of action, or perhaps having 
too many options simply makes it far too difficult to 
properly weigh the pros and cons of each option.  Even 
worse, some options might present one with unwanted 
temptation.  Certainly, the drug addict, for example, might 
find it easier to overcome the urge to use if this option 
was not even available.  Indeed, Raz seems right, at least 
on some level, in asserting that “some options one is 
better off not having” (Raz 1986: 410). 
 Consistency then would seem to demand that, on any 
partly evaluative overall freedom approach, we countenance 
                                                 
4 Ronald Dworkin (2000) also suggests this possibility. 
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the disvalue of some freedoms in addition to the higher 
value of others, hence giving such freedoms a negative 
multiplier effect.
5
  If we adopt this approach, though, then 
plainly the state can exercise interference while 
simultaneously increasing overall liberty, as the 
elimination of some of an agent's liberties, those with a 
negative multiplier effect, will actually increase an 
agent's overall liberty. 
  At bottom, the central problem with this strategy is 
that it conflates the instrumental value of freedom with 
freedom itself.
6
  Certainly, the freedom to pursue various 
desirable courses of action is itself valuable because it 
makes these pursuits possible. The freedom to perform them 
might therefore be more valuable to me than other freedoms, 
but this greater value does not thereby also, by the same 
degree, make me more free.   
 To be sure, more can be said about the overall freedom 
approach, and we will have an opportunity to revisit it, 
particularly Kramer's version, in chapter 4.  I will have 
                                                 
5 Hillel Steiner also points out that the evaluative approach 
potentially results in the rather paradoxical implication that one 
could be rendered less free by having more options at one’s disposal, 
if these options are of considerable disvalue (Steiner, 1994: 81).  
Kramer, however, insists that the lowest multiplier any individual 
freedom can have is 1.  It cannot be 0 or negative (2002: 443ff), and, 
if correct, this stipulation avoids the objection outlined here as 
well. Again, I explore Kramer's in detail in chapter 4.  




to put aside further discussion until then, but what I hope 
to show in that chapter is that the above objections are 
ultimately unavoidable. 
 
The Equality Approach 
 
Another possible strategy, one endorsed by Ronald Dworkin 
and Will Kymlicka, is to derive the basic liberties from 
the liberal commitment to equality.  On this view, equality 
is the central liberal value, and liberty is valuable only 
insofar as it promotes or preserves equality.  I will 
examine two distinct version of the equality approach.  The 
first holds that equality of resources both entails a 
presumption in favor of maximizing overall liberty and, 
simultaneously, offers a justification for privileging 
certain basic liberties.  The second argues that, in order 
for each citizen to have the opportunity to lead a good 
life, they must be afforded certain basic liberties. 
 
Equality of Resources 
 
Like Rawls, Dworkin at least purports to endorse the 
negative conception of liberty, “I mean by liberty what is 
sometimes called negative liberty – freedom from legal 
constraint – not freedom or power more generally” (Dworkin 
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2000: 120).  Elsewhere, however, as we’ve already noted, 
Dworkin insists that certain legal prohibitions do not 
really count as restrictions on liberty at all.  For 
example, Dworkin contends that laws preventing me from 
killing my critics do not infringe on my liberty, and, like 
Taylor, Dworkin insists that mundane traffic laws also do 
not compromise liberty in any relevant sense (Dworkin 2007: 
271).   
 The problem, according to Dworkin, is that, if we 
recognize any legal prohibition as a violation of 
individual liberty, then the liberal commitment to freedom 
will inevitably conflict with another central liberal 
value, namely equality.  Insofar as the negative conception 
regards any and all laws as coercive, laws promoting 
equality will necessarily inhibit liberty. Dworkin, 
however, cites the examples above as evidence that the 
strict and uncompromising version of the negative view is 
“absurd” (Dworkin 2007: 271). Following Locke, Dworkin 
distinguishes between “liberty,” which consists of the 
morally significant freedoms embodied in the fundamental 
rights of each citizen, and mere “license,” which consist 
of simply doing whatever one wishes (Dworkin 2007: 269). 
 The question though is how to distinguish between 
liberty and license without recourse to a positive view, 
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and Dworkin is explicit that his view is not a positive 
one.  Since equality is the core liberal value according to 
Dworkin, the solution is to identify those liberties 
necessary for promoting or recognizing equality.  So 
liberalism is indeed committed to protecting certain 
fundamental negative liberties, but not liberty as such: 
Individual rights to distinct liberties must be 
recognized only when the fundamental right to treatment 
as an equal can be shown to require these rights [….] the 
right to distinct liberties does not conflict with any 
supposed right to equality, but on the contrary follows 
from a conception of equality conceded to be more 
fundamental. (Dworkin 2007: 274)  
 
According to Dworkin, the “right to equal treatment” 
entails a general presumption in favor of liberty.  It will 
prohibit, for example, paternalistic policies that favor 
certain forms of life over others.  As Dworkin stresses:  
Constraints cannot be defended, for example, directly on 
the ground that contribute to a culturally sophisticated 
community […] because that argument would violate the 
canon of the liberal conception of equality that 
prohibits certain forms of life are inherently more 
valuable than others. (ibid) 
 
The right to equal treatment, however, will not bar all 
instances of state interference.  Laws designed to promote 
general welfare, like traffic laws and laws against murder, 
will not reduce liberty in any significant way, because 
such regulations and prohibitions do not privilege any form 
of life over any other, or so Dworkin contends.  They 
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therefore do not violate equal treatment.  In addition, the 
norm of equal treatment will sometimes require state 
interference.  Wealth redistribution, through progressive 
taxation and social welfare programs, will sometimes be 
necessary in order to ensure equality.  It is mistake then, 
on Dworkin’s view, to think that liberalism entails any 
strong commitment to property rights (Dworkin 2007: 277 – 
78).  Other basic rights, however, will be essential under 
his view.  The right to freedom of speech or religion will 
be necessary, for example, in order to ensure that everyone 
is free to express and abide by the values he or she holds 
central.  Infringement on these liberties will entail 
privileging certain forms of life by declaring some views 
or values as somehow less worthy than others. 
 The problem with this argument is that, while 
perfectionist policies designed to promote certain values, 
cultures, or life styles might be one possible 
justification for limiting the basic liberties, they 
certainly are not the only one.  Security, for example, 
might provide a rather powerful rationale for limiting 
freedom of speech or religion, as presumably this is also 
the rationale behind traffic laws and laws against murder.  
The state might declare that certain displays of public 
expression are not necessarily corrupt in any moral sense, 
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but dangerous, perhaps because they might lead to political 
instability.  Likewise, the state might ban certain forms 
of religious worship, not because the government has 
declared there is but one true religion, but because 
religious pluralism might also contribute to political 
instability or social unrest.  One could argue, for 
example, that, if some citizens identify more with their 
religious community then their country and are beholden to 
it more so than the state, then this potentially undermines 
social cohesion and state authority.  Religious citizens 
might choose to obey their religious authorities rather 
than the state authority where they conflict, and citizens 
of different religions might find themselves in conflict 
with each other.  A state could protect against these ills 
by banning religious worship all together without 
privileging any one religion over any other. Indeed, it 
seems as if the more egalitarian Hobbesian could 
consistently commit him or herself to the norm of equality 
without thereby also being committed to the normative 
priority of the basic liberties. 
 Further, restrictions on liberty could be justified on 
utilitarian grounds.  One could hold that strict government 
regulation is necessary in order to ensure the satisfaction 
of people’s preferences, and this regulation need not 
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privilege one conception of the good life over any other.  
Dworkin’s response to this line of justification is that 
any utilitarian argument will justify inequalities, 
especially since some people desire, not only the 
betterment of their own welfare, but the betterment of 
their welfare in comparison to others. Racial supremacists, 
for example, do not just want live well but to live better 
than people of any racial background they deem inferior 
(Dworkin 2007: 275ff). But even if this were true of the 
utilitarian position in general, the egalitarian can avoid 
this implication simply by stipulating the appropriate 
egalitarian restraints on any distribution of overall 
utility or welfare.  Rawls’s “difference principle” is one 
example of a distribution scheme that places restrictions 
on policies intended to maximize overall welfare on 
egalitarian grounds. It is important to note, however, that 
the difference principle in and of itself does not entail 
any commitment to liberty.  Recall that the protection of 
liberty, embodied by Rawls’s first principle, has 
fundamental value only because actors in the original 
position would give it lexical priority over the difference 
principle.  Without the first principle, there is nothing 
in the difference principle itself that would ensure that 
citizens have a right to basic liberty. 
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 Equality, on some conceptions at least, does not 
necessarily generate a strong a commitment to liberty.  As 
the argument above suggests, for example, equality 
understood as equality of welfare is compatible with far 
reaching restrictions on freedom.  More recently, however, 
Dworkin (2000) has argued that not all conceptions of 
equality are necessarily liberal ones, and he has offered 
his version of the properly liberal conception of equality, 
what he calls “equality of resources.”  Equality of welfare 
requires that each citizen enjoy the same level of 
happiness, preference satisfaction, well-being, or however 
welfare is to be defined.  Equality of resources, on the 
other hand, requires that each citizen be given an equal 
distribution of economic and social resources as determined 
by the “value of the resources each person has as the cost 
to others of that person’s having them” (Dworkin 2000: 
131).   
 Crucially, Dworkin argues that in order to promote 
equality of resources we also must promote liberty.  So, it 
is possible that, while some conceptions of equality are 
compatible with severe restrictions on liberty, the liberal 
conception prohibits this.  Dworkin’s articulation of this 
position is complex, and I will only be able to briefly 
summarize it here. 
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 Dworkin illustrates the ideal equal distribution of 
resources by imagining a hypothetical auction.  Initially, 
all resources -- and resources should not be understood in 
the solely material sense as should become clear shortly -- 
are unowned and are to be distributed by means of an 
auction in which each citizen has equal initial bidding 
units.  This auction is to continue until the resulting 
distribution passes what Dworkin calls the “envy test” 
(Dworkin 2000: 67ff). The envy test is met when no citizen 
prefers the resources of any other citizen to his or her 
own. A real world distribution is just to the extent that 
it approximates this ideal distribution.   
 This auction procedure, Dworkin contends, will require 
a strong presumption in favor of greater overall liberty 
because, unless citizens know what they will be able to do 
with these resources once they have acquired them, they 
will not be able to effectively assess their value. 
Restrictions of any sort will artificially deflate the 
value of these resources, since their relative worth will 
be diminished from the point of view of those citizen who 
want to use them for this now prohibited purpose. To take 
Dworkin’s example, clay would be worth far less in an 
auction amongst sculptors if they did not know whether they 
would be permitted to use it to produce controversial works 
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of art once they had purchased it (Dworkin 2000: 152). In 
order to effectively bid on resources at the auction stage, 
citizens will need the greatest possible flexibility 
regarding how their resources might be used post-auction. 
So, Dworkin concludes, the auction will permit only limited 
restrictions on post-auction liberty: 
  
This principle establishes a strong presumption in favor 
of freedom of choice.  It insists that an ideal 
distribution is possible only when people are legally 
free to act as they wish except so far as constraints on 
their freedom are necessary to protect security of person 
and property, or to correct imperfections in markets. 
(Dworkin 2000: 148) 
  
This strategy has the further advantage, Dworkin contends, 
of prohibiting certain groups of citizens from imposing 
moral norms on others.  On Dworkin’s account, we are to 
think of resources expansively.  In addition to economic 
goods, “Social circumstances” are to be considered a kind 
of resource (Dworkin 2000: 154).  Accordingly, while some 
citizens might want to promote certain moral values (for 
example, by restricting the benefit of marriage to only 
heterosexual couples), they will be unable to do so in an 
auction in which each citizen is afforded equal initial 
bidding resources.  Insofar as other citizens also have 
interests in being able to marry whomever they choose, they 
will be able to block any other group of citizens from 
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bidding for the exclusive right to this social privilege 
(Dworkin 2000: 155).  Equality of resources, understood as 
an ideal distribution, thus preserves the liberal 
commitment to neutrality and entails a significant degree 
of economic and social liberty. 
 Dworkin’s argument hinges on his contention that any 
auction designed to equally distribute resources would 
require a baseline presumption in favor of liberty and 
would either prohibit upfront, or make effectively 
impossible, post-auction restrictions on liberty.  It is 
not clear though that any such auction would have to 
proceed in this way.  Consider Dworkin’s contention that 
maximum flexibility is necessary in order for bidders to 
assess the worth of the resources being auctioned.  It 
should be noted that certain restrictions might also be 
necessary in order to assess the real value of any 
resource.  This is because the value of my resources will 
depend not only on what I do with them, but also on what 
others do with theirs.   
To take a simple economic example, if I were to bid on 
a piece of property, say with the intention of building a 
vacation resort, I would of course need to know that this 
project would be permitted once I acquired the property.  
But it would be equally important for me to know what 
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others are not permitted to do with their surrounding 
properties.  The value of my resort would be considerably 
diminished, for example, were someone else to build a toxic 
waste disposal plant nearby.  In order for me to 
effectively assess the value of my property then, I need to 
know what prohibitions will be placed not only on me but 
others as well.  This applies equally to social resources. 
Say I wanted to bid on access to the social resource of the 
institution of marriage.  Suppose I would also value this 
resource considerably less if I knew that other people who 
did not share my same conception of marriage would also be 
granted access to this same privilege.  I would consider 
their participation as devaluing this social resource.  
Accordingly, I could not effectively evaluate how much this 
resource is worth to me at auction unless I knew that these 
restrictions were in place. 
Why then couldn’t an auctioneer decide that it is 
necessary to stipulate such restrictions as the auction’s 
baseline? While this would disadvantage bidders in some 
respect -- because now the value of some resources will be 
less than what they would be under a more flexible baseline 
-- it would have the advantage of making their investment 
less vulnerable to the decisions of others.  In short, it 
would provide more security for one’s investments at the 
105 
 
expense of one's liberty to use these investments however 
one pleases.   
Dworkin, however, rules out this possibility.  An 
auctioneer cannot, he maintains, adopt the more restrictive 
strategy because then the auction will not be maximally 
sensitive to people’s actual desires.  These baseline 
restrictions will arbitrarily prevent some people from 
pursuing their desired life projects.  But Dworkin 
stresses, “an auction is fairer -- that it provides a more 
genuinely equal distribution -- when it offers more 
discriminating choices and is thus more sensitive to the 
discrete plans and preferences people in fact have” 
(Dworkin 2000: 151).  In other words, an auction is unfair 
if it effectively prohibits any activity in which citizens 
might wish to engage.  
The problem now, however, is that it seems as if, 
rather than yielding a commitment to liberty, the equality 
of resources position presupposes it.  Equality is to be 
understood, on this view, as the ability of citizens to 
pursue their own projects on equal terms, an ideal that 
closely resembles Mill’s understanding of liberty as the 
freedom to pursue our own good in our own way provided that 
we do not interfere in the freedom of others. But if the 
equal resources view already has imbedded within it a 
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commitment to individual liberty, then Dworkin’s attempt to 
derive the normative value of liberty from it is obviously 
circular.  
 What’s worse is that once we look closely at the 
theory of liberty presupposed by the equal resource view, 
it begins to look like a positive account.  It would indeed 
be disturbing if Dworkin’s hypothetical auction were 
sensitive only to people’s empirical desires, since then 
the contented slave and the subordinate housewife will meet 
the envy test once they have acquired a rather meager share 
of economic and social resources.  Were this the case, 
severe inequalities would be fully compatible with an ideal 
distribution of resources, and equality of resources would 
not necessarily entail a strong presumption in favor of 
greater negative liberty in every instance. Fully aware of 
this problem, Dworkin contends that the equal resource view 
will also require that one’s desires be relevantly 
“authentic” (Dworkin 2000: 158).  Dworkin does not 
elaborate much on how we might distinguish between 
authentic versus inauthentic desires, but he does give a 
broad outline of what authenticity requires: “participants 
to the auction would want both an opportunity to form and 
reflect on their own convictions, attachments, and 
projects, and an opportunity to influence the corresponding 
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opinion of others” (Dworkin 2000: 160).  This is how 
Dworkin justifies giving priority to certain basic 
liberties over others, as these liberties will be necessary 
to protect autonomy.  So, in addition to a general 
presumption in favor of greater overall liberty, the equal 
resource view requires “affording special protection to 
freedom of religious commitment, freedom of expression, 
access to the widest available literature and forms of art, 
freedom of personal, social, and intimate association, and 
also […] freedom from surveillance” (Dworkin 2000: 160). 
 If freedom requires authenticity, however, then the 
equality of resource view endorses an exercise as opposed 
to an opportunity concept of liberty.  Liberty, on this 
view, does not consist in being free from restraint, but in 
acting on the basis of one’s own most authentic desires.  
Again, this justifies pervasive physical interference in 
the name of liberty.  Returning to Dworkin's auction 
mechanism, suppose that a group of citizens now wishes to 
restrict the right of marriage to heterosexual couples, not 
because they would value this intuition less were it 
available to non-heterosexual couples, but because they 
think that any society which permitted such marriages would 
be violating basic human nature.  Accordingly, such a 
society would be morally corrupt in such a way that none of 
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its members would be capable of forming authentic desires 
regarding a significant aspect of human life.  Pre-auction 
baseline restrictions such as these might be necessary in 
order to ensure that people’s desires are properly 
authentic.  Once we permit this kind of justification, we 
cannot rule out prima-facie that even those acts of 
interference that violate the basic liberties will not be 
necessary to promote autonomy.  For example, what is to 
prevent a group of citizens from claiming that any society 
that fails to adopt the true religious view is hopelessly 
susceptible to deception and manipulation?  Dworkin’s 
appeal to authenticity in order to establish the priority 
of the basic liberties suffers from the very same problems 
as positive theories of liberty in general. 
 Dworkin would likely argue that the liberal commitment 
to neutrality would prohibit these sorts of justifications, 
and I should note that my presentation of Dworkin’s 
position is somewhat stronger than his own. Dworkin’s own 
method is not so vigorously foundationalist as to suggest 
that all liberal values simply fall out of a commitment to 
equality.  His goal is rather to show that equality is 
compatible with, and mutually supportive of, other liberal 
values such as liberty and neutrality.  But I think this 
reveals the deficiency of Dworkin’s approach.  We need to 
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know why liberalism requires neutrality regarding the 
justification of coercive policies, not just that it does 
so.  In other words, we need to be able to explain why such 
coercion is incompatible with liberty rather than simply 
assert that it is.  As it stands, Dworkin’s approach risks 
devolving into a purely ad-hoc defense of liberty. 
 Nonetheless, Dworkin's conviction that liberty and 
equality do not ultimately conflict provides a valuable 
insight.  One of the virtues of the conception of freedom 
as anti-domination that I will develop in chapters 5 and 6, 
is that it can account for the intimate relationship 
between liberty and equality.  Like Dworkin, I think it is 
a mistake to view these ideals as essentially in conflict.  
Unlike Dworkin, however, I hope to show why liberal freedom 
requires an additional commitment to equality.  If 
successful, this project will have the further advantage of 
making liberal values more coherent.       
 
Equality of the Good Life 
 
Another version of the equality approach does not rely on a 
commitment to pluralism at the level of the good life, but 
instead tries to advance an appropriately liberal 
conception of what the good life entails, a conception 
which in turn requires that citizens be given equal 
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liberty.  Unfortunately, as I will show, this kind of 
strategy is also inadequate because it faces the following 
dilemma: either it too reduces to positive account of 
liberty, or it provides, at best, an instrumental account 
of the value of liberty. 
 In other works, Dworkin has advocated just this kind 
of approach. On Dworkin’s liberal account of the good life, 
the good life consists in realizing one’s own goals without 
interference or imposition from others, what he calls the 
“challenge model” of the good life (Dworkin 1995: 249).  On 
the challenge model, the good life consists in “the 
inherent value of a skillful performance of living” 
(Dworkin 1995: 241). Living well on this model will require 
that people have access to basic material goods -- that 
they not suffer from economic hardship that would prevent 
from skillfully pursuing their life goals -- and that they 
be given the freedom to pursue these goals in their own 
way.   
 Dworkin’s case for the challenge model rests on two 
rather controversial assumptions.  First, Dworkin contends 
that few if any people would reject the basic premise of 
the challenge model.  Any more specific account of the good 
life implicitly relies on the challenge model to explain 
what makes this particular life a good one.  So, suppose, 
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for example, that one believed that the good life consists 
in becoming a model fire fighter. What makes becoming a 
model fire a good life, Dworkin would insist, is the 
challenge this feat involves.  Becoming a model fire 
fighter requires overcoming great difficulty as well as 
tremendous skill and tenacity.  If it did not, then we 
would not value it, and Dworkin asserts that this holds 
universally for any conception of the good life.  Second, 
Dworkin assumes that, on the challenge model, ethical 
values are “indexed” rather than “transcendent” (Dworkin 
1995: 249ff).  That is, living well requires responding 
appropriately to the particular circumstances in which one 
finds oneself rather than in realizing some transcendental 
ethical ideal.  Both these convictions are essential 
because they permit Dworkin to maintain that, while 
liberalism is predicated on a particular conception of the 
good life, this conception is sufficiently uncontroversial 
to not run afoul of the liberal commitment to neutrality.  
Neither conviction strikes me as all that plausible, but 
for the purposes of my argument here, I will assume that 
both hold true.
7
   
                                                 
7The first conviction hardly seems as intuitive as Dworkin suggests.  
Suppose, for example, that Tiger Woods was, from an early age, groomed 
to be a world class golfer (and this may very well be true of Tiger 
Woods).  On the challenge model, his life would be deficient in a 
significant respect because he lacked the opportunity to pursue his 
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On the challenge model, our lives cannot be made 
better by government interference because, even if such 
interference helps us achieve our ends in the long run, it 
still prevents us from fully engaging in the pursuit of 
these ends.  Dworkin insists, “a challenge cannot be made 
more interesting, or in any other way a more valuable 
challenge to face, when it has been narrowed, simplified, 
and bowdlerized by others in advance” (Dworkin 1995: 271). 
Dworkin’s argument is no longer that interference is 
prohibited because equality demands that people be free to 
pursue a plurality of possible goods, but rather because it 
is the pursuit itself which constitutes the good life on 
the liberal view. Since all citizens have an equal right to 
                                                                                                                                                 
life project in his own way.  The nature and conditions of his life’s 
pursuit were set in advance for him.  But is it really obvious that 
Tiger Woods has therefore not led a good life? Perhaps we might all 
agree that his life would have been better had he been able to choose 
it for himself, but would it really have been better had he failed to 
become a world class golfer in the absence of this conditioning?  To 
suggest that it would I think runs counter to most people’s basic 
intuitions.  The second conviction does not seem all that intuitive 
either.  Suppose that I think that the good life consists in living 
according to God’s will.  This constitutes a transcendent ethical 
value.  Of course, God’s will could be sensitive to various specific 
circumstances, so I will have to respond to these circumstances 
appropriately in order to live rightly, but the point is I will not be 
living rightly, no matter how skillfully I pursue my various projects, 
if these projects do not conform to God’s will.  The challenge model 
therefore does not seem to require that all relevant ethical values be 
indexed rather than transcendent.  These objections are important 
because, if successful, they undermine Dworkin’s conviction that living 
a good life requires possessing a good degree of individual liberty, as 
interference might make people’s lives better either by helping them 
achieve their ends or preventing them from pursuing less worthy ones.  
I do not develop this point in detail here, however, because I think 
Dworkin’s view is deficient even independent of these concerns.   
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this pursuit, they should all be granted certain liberties 
by their fellow citizens.   
Dworkin’s challenge model also gives us reason to 
prioritize the basic liberties he contends.  In order to 
for me to discover and pursue my own projects, I will need 
to be able to form and express my own values, and I will 
also need access to a wide array of information.  So the 
basic liberties of freedom of religion, speech, press, 
conscience, etc., will warrant special protection.  More 
trivial liberties, like being able to drive through 
intersections, murder my critics, and cross unsafe bridges, 
will not be necessary for this pursuit.  In fact 
limitations on these liberties might be necessary in order 
to ensure that people are able to pursue their life’s 
projects safely and effectively. 
If successful, the challenge model provides both a 
justification for promoting liberty in general and for 
privileging certain basic liberties in particular. The 
question is does it avoid the insidious implications of the 
other strategies we have examined. I do not think it does. 
Consider the various ways in which one can fail to live a 
good life on Dworkin’s account: 
Of course ethical integrity may fail for many reasons.  
It fails when people live mechanically, with no sense of 
having and responding to ethical convictions at all.  It 
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fails when people set their convictions aside and serve 
their volitional interests with a vague but persistent 
sense that they are not living as they should. It fails 
when people believe, rightly or wrongly, that the correct 
normative parameters have not been met for them, when 
they have less resources than justice permits, for 
example.  And it fails conspicuously when people are made 
to live in a way they regret, and never endorse, by the 
fiat of other people. (Dworkin 1995: 167)  
 
If one can fail to live a good life for all the reasons 
cited above, then plainly internal obstacles are every bit 
as significant as external ones.  Here again, Dworkin’s 
view begins to resemble other positive conceptions of 
liberty understood as individual autonomy.  A drug addict, 
for example, might give in to her “volitional interests” at 
the expense of her or more authentic life plans.  Or take 
the example of Alf from the previous chapter, who gives 
into his sense of fear and laziness rather than realizing 
of his dream of a life of military service. Or, again, 
consider the person who represses his own most true desires 
because of his conservative religious upbringing.  Wouldn’t 
Dworkin’s view recommend limiting his freedom of religion 
in this case? Rather than prohibiting interference, 
Dworkin’s challenge model requires it in cases in which 
such interference is necessary in order to remove internal 
obstacles to freedom.  
 Dworkin’s response would likely be that such 
interference could never be helpful since, he insists, 
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external influence cannot make one’s life better on the 
challenge model.  But this seems inconsistent.  The 
challenge model does require, on his view, that people be 
given access to basic economic resources because lack of 
these resources prevent people from skillfully executing 
their plans.  Why then can something like a “lack of 
ethical conviction” not be alleviated in the same way? 
Certainly we would not want to say that providing people 
with basic material and economic goods should be prohibited 
on the liberal view because such assistance could not 
possibly make their lives more challenging.  But why can we 
not say the same thing about forcing the drug addict into 
treatment, conscripting the reluctant soldier into service, 
or removing the repressed church goer from the influence of 
oppressive religious institutions?  Dworkin seems to rule 
out such possibilities arbitrarily.  If liberty consists in 
overcoming obstacles and adversity, as it does on the 
challenge model, then Taylor is right: we must properly 
recognize the freedom limiting effects of internal 
obstacles as well as external ones, and, once we do so, we 
cannot escape the implication that interference can enhance 
liberty in some cases.  
 Fully formulated, the challenge model reduces to a 
positive conception of liberty.  If certain liberties are 
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important to realizing the good life while others are not, 
then we might say that liberty consists, not in being free 
from possible restraints, but in skillfully executing one’s 
life project.  This clearly invokes an exercise concept of 
liberty.  Accordingly, it inherits all the problems germane 
to positive views which we explored in detail in the 
preceding chapter.  Of course, Dworkin might avoid this 
implication by denying that liberty is itself a skillful 
mastery in the execution of one’s affairs and instead hold 
that some degree of negative liberty, while distinct from 
living the good life itself, is necessary to achieving it. 
One cannot complete one's life projects without some degree 
of negative liberty. On this approach, however, the value 
of negative liberty is once again merely instrumental. As 
the quote from Dworkin above illustrates, we can imagine 
some cases in which negative liberty might not help one 
realize the good life.  As such, the challenge model is not 
necessarily inconsistent with pervasive physical 
interference on the part of the state. 
 Will Kymlicka employs a similar equality based 
strategy.  Like Dwornkin, Kymlicka argues that all citizens 
must be afforded a certain degree of negative liberty if 
each is to have the equal opportunity to lead a good life.  
Again, for Kymlicka, liberalism is thus not committed to 
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the advancement of liberty as such, but to protecting 
certain essential liberties.  As he puts it, “in making 
liberty claims […] we are entitled, not to the greatest 
equal amount of this single commodity of freedom, but to 
equal consideration for the interest that make particular 
liberties important” (Kymlicka 2002: 148).   
Kymlicka’s account differs from Dworkin’s in certain 
respects, but it encounters the very same problems.  In 
order to live a good life, Kymlicka contends, we must be 
able to endorse, and then act upon, what we identify as our 
own fundamental values and interests.  This in turn 
requires both that we be granted access to basic resources 
and be afforded basic liberties: 
According to liberalism, since our most essential 
interest is in getting these beliefs right, and acting on 
them, government treats people as equals, with equal 
concern and respect, by providing for each individual the 
liberties and resources needed to examine and act on 
these beliefs. (Kymlicka 1988: 184)  
  
 Again, the basic liberties will be paramount on this 
account.  In order to critically assess my basic values and 
interests, I will need access to information, the freedom 
to express myself, and the freedom to practice my chosen 
religion.  But if identifying these basic values and 
interest correctly is what’s essential for living a good 
life, then it seems as if coercion would be necessary in 
118 
 
cases in which I have misidentified them.  Like Dworkin, 
Kymlicka flatly denies this possibility.  Even if, he 
contends, the state could better identify my own interests 
or sense of the good, it does not help for the state to 
force me into acting on this basis.  This is because my 
life only goes well to the extent that I “endorse” the 
values that I live by.  State coercion done for the sake of 
furthering my interests “won’t work because a valuable life 
has to be lead from the inside” (Kymlicka 1988: 183; 
emphasis added).  
 If a good life must be lead from the “inside,” 
however, then again internal barriers will hinder its 
realization every bit as much as external ones.  We only 
need to rehearse the familiar examples: the drug addict, 
the reluctant soldier, the repressed religious observer, 
and the oppressed housewife, will all fail to lead a 
valuable life from the inside because of internal 
impediments, impediments that could be alleviated by 
applying external force.  Again, like Dworkin, Kymlicka 
identifies lack of resources and external interference as 
unjust insofar as they prevent one from leading the good 
life.  It would be inconsistent then not to acknowledge the 
significance of internal barriers as well, especially given 
that they might be every bit as prevalent as external ones. 
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 Accordingly, Kymlicka’s view is vulnerable to the same 
dilemma as Dworkin's.  Either he is identifying freedom 
itself with acting on the basis of one’s must fundamental 
interests (in which case he is endorsing a fully fledged 
positive account), or he must afford negative liberty at 
best an instrumental value.  This latter interpretation 
might best represent Kymlicka’s view.  External 
interference is unlikely to effectively promote one’s 
fundamental interests even when a third party has correctly 
identified these interests.  But as we saw last chapter, 
this purely prudential consideration against imposing 
interference renders the liberal commitment to liberty 
rather thin.  If the state were able to develop coercive 
techniques that were effective in getting citizens to 
endorse the “right” values and interests, then the 
commitment to liberty dissolves.  And this is assuming that 
such techniques do not exist already. 
 Ultimately, the norm of equality does not seem to be 
able to sustain the broader liberal commitments held by 
Dworkin and Kymlicka. Their approach either implicitly 
relies on an anti-liberal positive conception or renders 
the commitment to liberty too weak.  The liberal 
understanding of freedom cannot simply be derived from the 
liberal commitment to equality. Rather, this commitment to 
120 
 
equality depends upon on an already established commitment 
to liberty.  As Jeremy Waldron puts it, “equality of 
respect […] cannot be understood […] except by reference to 
a conviction about the importance of liberty (for 
everyone)” (Waldron 1988: 130).     
 
The Democratic Consent Approach 
 
Waldron accordingly rejects the Dworkin/Kymlicka approach 
and offers the final strategy we will consider for 
aggregating negative and positive views. Like many 
liberals, Waldron is skeptical of positive conceptions 
because of their anti-liberal implications (Waldron 1988: 
132), yet he also thinks that the rather flat-footed 
negative conception, which regards all acts of interference 
as freedom limiting, is too extreme.  Like Dworkin and 
Kymlicka, Waldron denies that any law must be regarded as 
an impediment to freedom.  “The question,” he insists, “has 
to be whether liberty – in any sense in which liberty is 
thought to be important – is attacked or undermined 
whenever a rule of social conduct is enforced” (Waldron 
1988: 133). 
 On Waldron’s account, there are cases in which the 
enforcement of a law or social rule does not constitute a 
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limitation on individual freedom, namely when it is 
enforced with the individual’s consent. Accordingly, he 
asserts: 
If the rule is one that the citizen has agreed to, surely 
little that is important in relation to liberty is lost 
if it is subsequently enforced against him.  If we take 
this agreement seriously, we may see that as something 
more like the consummation of his freedom than a 
violation of it. (Waldron 1988: 133)  
 
Impositions that one consents to do not count as coercive, 
hence, Waldron insists, the importance of democratic 
procedures and institutions for the liberal conception of 
freedom.  Provided that laws are enacted via the 
appropriate procedures and thus pass democratic muster, 
they do not really inhibit liberty despite the fact that 
they impose restraints.  Waldron essentially agrees with 
Locke, contra Hobbes and Bentham, that laws do not hinder 
liberty by default.  In fact, they may promote it by 
allowing individual citizens to pursue collective endeavors 
that they could not achieve on their own. 
Waldron explicitly casts his account as an aggregate 
conception, incorporating both a negative and positive 
element (Waldron 1988: 135).  In keeping with the negative 
view, he denies that the individual encompasses some larger 
constitutive hole.  He does not regard freedom as the 
expression of a collective will through some larger, more 
122 
 
comprehensive body, such as the state or society.  
Nevertheless, he does think that part of what it means to 
be free, on the liberal view, is that one enters into an 
agreement with others concerning how they wish to be ruled.  
His view thus also retains a distinctly positive element. 
The citizen of a sufficiently democratic order is not 
constrained by its dictates, not because these dictates 
conform to the general will, but because “it is possible 
for an individual to choose to live under a social order, 
to agree abide by its restraints, and therefore to use his 
powers as a free agent to commit himself for the future.” 
Accordingly, he continues, “the enforcement of such an 
order does not necessarily mean that freedom as a value is 
being violated” (Waldron 1988: 134). 
 Waldron’s view certainly has intuitive appeal.  
Suppose we are playing baseball and a runner is called out 
at a close play at the plate.  It would sound bizarre to 
charge the catcher with obstructing the base runner’s 
liberty, or for that matter the umpire for call the runner 
out.  Baseball can only be played if the participants agree 
to abide by certain rules.  So we need not view all rules 
as “necessarily” violating the value of freedom since these 
rules might enjoy the consent of those subject to them.  
The same might be said of laws enacted by states.  These 
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laws might just so happen to conform to the demands of its 
citizens.   
 The problem is that it is unlikely that any actual 
laws passed by any real world liberal democratic states 
will enjoy this kind of universal consent, no matter how 
robust the democratic procedures in place are.  Of course 
that’s not entirely correct, because we could imagine a 
democratic procedure that is so robust that it stipulates 
universal consent as a necessary condition for the 
enactment of any given law.
8
 Still, few if any real world 
democracies employ such a rigorous standard.  It is 
unlikely that most traffic laws would even pass this test, 
let alone more controversial egalitarian policies such as 
progressive taxation or social welfare policies.  The 
requirement that laws enjoy actual universal consent I 
think would be too extreme for Waldron.  But even if it 
weren’t, this view would still encounter another familiar 
problem.  If actual consent is sufficient to render 
interference non-coercive, then we have to consider the 
limitations imposed on the contented slave or the 
subordinated house wife as similarly non-coercive.  
Accordingly, the appeal to actual consent is both too 
                                                 
8See Robert Paul Wolf (1998: 34ff.) for an example of how such a 
government might work. 
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strong, in that no actual liberal democracy could ever live 
up to it, and too weak, in that it will permit certain acts 
that we intuitively want to label as coercive. 
 Alternatively, Waldron could argue that what is 
required is not actual consent, but ideal consent.  A law 
need not be considered coercive if it enjoys the consent of 
agents participating in some idealized decision procedure, 
such as under Rawls’s veil of ignorance for example.  Not 
only would this strategy have the advantage of explaining 
why certain laws are non-coercive even when they do not 
enjoy actual consent, but it would have the further 
advantage of explaining why some laws are impermissible 
even when they do enjoy actual consent. The slave or 
housewife should not be subject to an oppressive social 
order because they would never agree to this order under 
ideal conditions.  Of course this strategy has the severe 
disadvantage of employing a now fully positive conception 
of liberty.  If freedom concerns, not actual agents, but 
ideal ones, then citizens can be forced to act on the basis 
of the desires of their ideal selves in accordance with 
their liberty.  In the end, Waldron’s approach, like other 





Towards a Third Conception of Liberty 
 
The aggregate strategies discussed above are all 
insufficient on liberal grounds. Their implicit reliance on 
positive conceptions entails implications that liberals 
cannot accept.  While each of the theorists discussed in 
this chapter attempts to show that not all interference 
need be seen as equally freedom limiting, all would reject 
the inference that pervasive state interference is 
compatible with the promotion of individual liberty.  None 
of the accounts they develop, however, are able to rule out 
this possibility, and as such, they offer a defense of 
liberty that is too weak to sustain fundamental liberal 
principles.      
 In chapter 1, I argued that neither negative nor 
positive conceptions are sufficient on the liberal view.  
In this chapter, I argued that, despite their initial 
appeal, aggregate conceptions prove equally inadequate. 
Liberalism it seems is not committed to negative liberty, 
positive liberty or some combination thereof. If the 
liberal commitment to liberty is to be salvaged then, a 
third conception will be necessary.  I turn my attention 
toward one potential candidate, Philip Pettit’s non-





FREEDOM AS NON-DOMINATION 
 
Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty 
 
I've argued in the preceding two Chapters that negative and 
positive conceptions of liberty prove inadequate resources 
for developing a liberal account of freedom. The problem is 
that many liberal theorists have remained committed to a 
negative conception of liberty while responding to the hard 
cases for the negative conception by evoking an anti-
liberal positive conception.  Responding to these hard 
cases requires moving beyond Berlin’s negative/positive 
distinction, but liberals have thus far not done so. While 
some liberals, such as Rawls (1971), Dworkin (2000) and 
even Berlin (2002) himself, purport to endorse negative 
conceptions of liberty, they each implicitly rely on 
positive ones, either rendering their respective accounts 
inconsistent or threatening to undermine the fundamental 
liberal principles they hope defend.  Others, such as 
Jeremy Waldron (1987), explicitly endorse an aggregate view 
of liberty, but fail to show that such a view can 
consistently support liberal principles. 
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 At the same time, the concept of liberty has received 
renewed attention within the republican tradition, 
particularly in the recent work of Philip Pettit.
1
  Freedom, 
on Pettit’s view, consists neither in enjoying non-
interference nor in achieving self-mastery, but in  non-
domination (Pettit 1999).  An agent suffers domination, 
according to Pettit, to the extent that he or she is 
exposed to the arbitrary will of another (Pettit 1999: 
52ff). The master/slave relationship is thus the 
paradigmatic case of domination (Pettit 1999: 22ff).  The 
slave is always at the master’s mercy even when the master 
chooses not to directly interfere in the slave's affairs. 
It is, according to Pettit, the slave's status as a slave 
that renders him or her unfree, not the extent to which he 
or she is subject to interference. Suffering domination 
then is not equivalent to suffering interference, and 
furthermore being free from domination is not equivalent to 
achieving self-mastery in the stronger positive sense.  One 
can be free of domination, but still fail to accomplish 
one's own most authentic or otherwise fundamental goals.   
                                                 
1
 Quentin Skinner (1998; 2002) also defends a conception of liberty as 
non-domination, and his and Pettit's account mutually inform one 
another.  Skinner, however, prefers to call his view a “neo-Roman” 
rather than “republican” (Skinner, 2008: 84).  James Bohman (2005) and 
Henry Richardson (2003) have also developed their own accounts of 
freedom as non-domination.  I will discuss Skinner’s view later in this 




If Pettit is correct in identifying domination as a unique 
kind of harm, then freedom as non-domination potentially 
represents a genuine third conception of liberty. 
 Indeed, as I hope to demonstrate in this Chapter, 
Pettit’s formulation of freedom as non-domination, if 
successful, promises to avoid the central problems we have 
explored at length in the preceding Chapters.  
Unfortunately, while promising in significant respects, 
Pettit’s version of freedom as non-domination fails to 
provide the genuine third alternative promised.  
Unfortunately, Pettit's view is ultimately vulnerable to 
the very same objections as aggregate views.  As I will 
argue, there are several features of Pettit's account that, 
despite his objections, are distinctly positive in nature.  
Accordingly, freedom as non-domination risks collapsing 
into a variant of positive liberty. 
 In what follows, I will first outline Pettit's 
conception of freedom as non-domination.  I will then 
outline four problems with Pettit's view that expose its 
positive features. 
 
A Republican or Liberal Conception? 
 
Before proceeding, I want to address a potential confusion.  
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It might seem surprising that our search for a distinctly 
liberal understanding of freedom should turn towards the 
work of Philip Pettit, given that Pettit himself 
understands freedom as non-domination as a uniquely 
republican conception of freedom as opposed to a liberal 
one.  In fact, on Pettit's view, republicanism is distinct 




 There are good reasons, however, to think that Pettit's 
classification is misguided, some of which we have already 
explored.  In the first place, Pettit identifies negative 
liberty as the liberal conception (Pettit 1999: 9).  But, 
as we saw in the preceding Chapter, few liberals, either 
historical or contemporary, endorse a strictly negative 
conception of liberty, even though some purport to do so.  
Even if Pettit is right to follow Berlin in pointing out a 
historical connection between liberalism and negative 
liberty, it would be wrong to conclude that negative 
liberty serves as the exclusive basis for the liberal 
conception of freedom, as the previous two Chapters have 
shown. Like Berlin, Pettit singles out Hobbes and Bentham 
as the modern originators of the negative view (Pettit 
                                                 
2
 For a detailed discussion of the difference between republicanism and 




1999: 45ff) despite the fact that neither are liberals in 
the traditional sense (Larmore 2001: 233).  Further, Pettit 
construes republicanism fairly broadly to include even 
Locke (Pettit 1999: 40), who is a liberal if anyone is.  
Ultimately, Pettit's republican freedom, at least as he 
initially presents it, fits better with liberalism than a 
strictly negative conception (Larmore 2001: 233ff).  
Indeed, I hope to demonstrate in Chapter 5 that freedom as 
anti-domination, which is itself drawn from Pettit's 
republican account, is the most promising liberal 
conception of freedom. 
 It is also worth noting that, in addition to being more 
congenial to liberalism than he seems to suggest, Pettit's 
republican account of liberty also seems to be in tension 
with most traditional accounts of republicanism. On those 
accounts, republicanism endorses a positive variant of 
liberty wherein true liberty, as distinct from mere non-
interference, is achieved through some form of collective 
self-rule.  As we have already seen, Rousseau, perhaps the 
most prominent republican theorist of the modern era, 
equates freedom with obedience to the “general will” 
(Rousseau 1968: 64).  Pettit views Rousseau as more of an 
outlier in the republican tradition than his prominent 
reputation would seem to suggest (Pettit, 1999: 19), but I 
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am not sure that this is an accurate characterization.  For 
example, Hannah Arendt (1968), another prominent twentieth-
century republican, also understands freedom as realizable 
only through active civic engagement, as was noted in 
Chapter 1.  Further, more contemporary republicans, such as 
Michael Sandel, share this commitment to the central 
importance of civic participation and the positive 
conception of liberty that seems to go along with it.  
Indeed, on Sandel's view, it is precisely this positive 
understanding of liberty that distinguishes republicanism 
from liberalism: 
 
Central to republican theory is the idea that 
liberty depends on sharing in self-government […] 
It means deliberating with fellow citizens about 
the common good and helping shape the destiny of 
the political community […] To share in self-rule 
therefore requires that citizens possess, or come 
to acquire, certain qualities of character or 
civic virtue.  But this means that republican 
politics cannot be neutral towards the values and 
ends its citizens espouse.  The republican 
conception of freedom, unlike the liberal 
conception, requires a formative politics, a 
politics that cultivates in citizens the qualities 
of character that self-government requires. 
(Sandel 1996: 5 – 6) 
 
Pettit, however, insists that the republicanism of 
Rousseau, Arendt, and Sandel, is but one strand of 
republican thought, namely the “communitarian” or 
“populist” strand, and further that this version has 
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overshadowed the other strand of republicanism which is 
concerned with preventing domination rather than fostering 
self-mastery through civic participation (Pettit 1999: 8).
3
   
 The version of republicanism that Pettit has in mind, 
however, seems much closer to liberalism than its 
communitarian variant (Ferejohn 2001: 83).
4
  While 
communitarian republicanism differs sharply from most 
versions of liberalism in its endorsement of both moral 
perfectionism and collectivism, Pettit's preferred 
republicanism joins with liberalism in both insisting on 
state neutrality regarding the good life (Pettit 1999: 56) 
and in prioritizing individual liberty over the formation 
of a collective will (Pettit 1999: 302), or at least so he 
contends.  I introduce this last qualification because, as 
I intend to argue, Pettit's republicanism is much closer to 
the communitarian strand than he initially lets on, hence 
its implicitly positive features.   
 My objection to Pettit's republican label thus does 
not amount to a mere quibbling over the use of terms.  
Ultimately, I think Pettit's efforts to sharply distinguish 
his own view from that of liberalism risks undermining his 
                                                 
3
 For Pettit's detailed critique of Sandel's republicanism, see Pettit 
1998. 
4
 Larmore (2004) and McMahon (2005) also note the similarities between 




entire project.  In trying to move beyond Berlin's 
distinction between negative and positive liberty, Pettit 
runs afoul of Berlin's central worry; he ends up endorsing 
what amounts to an anti-liberal rather than simply a non-
liberal conception of liberty. What's more, if the analysis 
in the preceding two Chapters is correct, then such an 
attempt is superfluous, since the liberal conception of 
liberty is already distinct from either negative or 
positive conceptions. Instead of trying to locate a non-
liberal conception of liberty within the republican 
tradition, I think the better strategy is to develop a 
unique third conception that better coheres with standard 
liberal commitments.  This is what I hope to do with 




Pettit has offered various articulations of freedom as non-
domination.  In its earliest formulation, I enjoy freedom 
as non-domination, “to the degree that no human being has 
the power to interferer with me” (Pettit 1996: 578).  More 
recently, Pettit proposes a modified view: I suffer 
domination to the extent that another has “the capacity to 
interfere on an arbitrary basis” in my affairs (Pettit 
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1999: 52; emphasis added).  Non-domination accordingly 
consists in the absence of the possibility of such 
arbitrary interference.    In his most recent, Pettit has 
offered another distinct, though on his view compatible, 
articulation of non-domination as, “the absence of alien or 
alienating control on the part of other persons” (Pettit 
2008: 102).  And Quentin Skinner offers a similar 
formulation of what he calls the “neo-Roman” account of 
liberty, wherein to be free is “not to be subject to the 
power of anyone else” (Skinner 2002: 249). 
 I will explore a more detailed account of non-
domination shortly, but for now it is important to note 
that, under any formulation, the relationship between slave 
and master is paradigmatically a relationship of domination 
(Pettit, 1999: 22; Skinner 1998: 38ff). The relation of 
slave to master is one of utter and total dependence.  The 
master can, at any moment, interfere in the slave's affairs 
with complete impunity.  It is not the case, however, that 
the slave's liberty is only diminished upon the 
actualization of such interference. Crucially, for both 
Pettit and Skinner, the slave remains unfree in a 
significant respect even when conditions resulting in 
actual interference on the part of the master fail to 
materialize.  Thus, even the lucky slave under the rule of 
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a  benevolent master is still unfree despite the fact that 
he or she might be fortunate enough to enjoy a high degree 
of non-interference.  To put it another way, it is the mere 
possibility of interference that renders one unfree, rather 
than actual interference itself.    
  This is the intuition that the negative conception of 
liberty cannot capture.  As Pettit puts it succinctly, “I 
suffer domination to the extent that I have a master; I 
enjoy non-interference to the extent that the master fails 
to interfere” (Pettit 1999: 22 - 23). 
Domination and interference are thus distinct kinds of 
harm.  As the example of the lucky slave reveals, actual 
interference is not a necessary condition for domination, 
nor, as we will see shortly, is it a sufficient condition 
on Pettit's view.  There are conditions under which I may 
be subject to interference, but do not thereby suffer 
domination.  That is, there can be cases of non-dominating 
interference.   
 Essentially, it is the slave's status as slave that 
renders him or her unfree in terms of non-domination.  As 
Pettit emphasizes, “the condition of liberty is explicated 
as the status of someone who, unlike the slave, is not 
subject to the arbitrary power of another; that is someone 
who is not dominated by anyone else” (Pettit 1999: 31). 
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Unlike negative conceptions of liberty, which focus on the 
range of choices available to an agent, liberty as non-
domination is concerned with the standing an agent occupies 
(Pettit 2007: 715). As Pettit frequently stresses, freedom 
as non-domination, “goes with being able to look the other 
in the eye” (Pettit 1999: 71). Accordingly, liberty as non-
domination is conceptually distinct from liberty as non-
interference, and, on Pettit's view, it is superior to 
liberty as non-interference in that it alone is able 
account for the intuitive and essential connection between 
being enslaved and being unfree. 
 At the same time, being free from domination is not 
equivalent to achieving full-blown self-mastery in the 
stronger positive sense.  One may lack the wisdom, courage, 
or tenacity to effectively pursue his or her own 
authentically-chosen ends yet not occupy a subservient 
status in relation to his or her fellow citizens (Pettit 
1996: 578). Like its negative counterpart, the positive 
conception is concerned mainly with the range of options an 
agent has at his or her disposal; only, on the positive 
conception, it is the origin rather than the availability 
of these options that is significant in terms of one's 
freedom (Berlin 2002).  Self-mastery, in the positive 
sense, signifies not so much a social status, but a state 
137 
 
of accomplishment regarding one's most fundamental 
projects.  It too is thus conceptually distinct from 
freedom as non-domination.  Further, insofar as the 
positive conception sometimes justifies subordinating 
people in the name of freedom –- for example, in cases when 
doing so is necessary in order to instill within them the 
wisdom, courage, or tenacity required for them to achieve 
their true purpose -- it may itself constitute a form of 
domination. 
 The conception of liberty put forth by Pettit and 
Skinner under the banner of non-domination thus has 
significant intuitive appeal. Surely if anyone is to count 
as unfree, it is someone who suffers enslavement.  The fact 
that certain forms of slavery and complete subordination 
are compatible with both negative and positive conceptions 
of liberty only highlights their respective deficiencies.  
It is one thing, however, to recognize that, whatever it 
means for one to enjoy freedom, it must mean at the very 
least that he or she is not relegated to a status of 
servitude; but it is another to formulate a coherent 
conception of freedom that underwrites this intuition.  
Unless this project can be executed successfully, freedom 
as non-domination will not provide a very useful third 
alternative whatever its initial intuitive attractiveness. 
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 Because Pettit has offered the most systematic 
treatment of freedom as non-domination, I will focus 
primarily on his various formulations of it.  In his 
earliest formulation, Pettit equates non-domination with 
anti-power (Pettit 1996).  That is, one enjoys non-
domination to the extent that one is able to effectively 
resist the uninvited incursions of others. Again, it is 
important to stress that, on this account of freedom, one 
need not suffer any actual interference in order to suffer 
domination. All that is needed to produce a relationship of 
domination is a significant discrepancy in the powers 
possessed by the respective parties. Provided that I have 
no recourse against arbitrary interference from others, I 
am unfree even if they choose not to exercise their power 
advantage.  Since reciprocity fails to obtain in these 
cases, I am at still at the mercy of others even if I am 
fortunate enough to avoid their sanction. Conversely, if I 
do possess a means of recourse, I enjoy non-domination 
because now my ability to avoid interference does not 
depend exclusively upon the good will of others.  In other 
words, I enjoy non-interference “resiliently,” as opposed 
to contingently because this lack of interference is not 
something I come upon by fortunate accident, but something 
that I have the power to command (Pettit 1996: 589). 
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Securing non-domination for the general population, then, 
on this understanding, requires achieving an equal (or 




 More recently, however, Pettit has abandoned this way 
of understanding non-domination. The problem with this 
approach, Pettit now thinks, is that, while promoting 
reciprocal power relations amongst citizens may limit non-
domination, it will never eliminate it. This is because an 
equal distribution of power is still compatible with 
significant degrees of arbitrary interference (Pettit 1999: 
67).  Just because I have recourse does not guarantee that 
you will not choose to interfere with me -- that you won't 
decide that doing so is still worth the risk.  What's worse 
is that, if I do decide to exercise my recourse, I can only 
do so by interfering with you. For example, if you decide 
to stand in front of my apartment door preventing my 
access, I can respond in kind and do the same to you 
provided that our respective power resources are relatively 
equal.  But in this case neither of us will enjoy resilient 
                                                 
5
 In order to develop this view in greater detail, it would of course be 
necessary to say more about what constitutes power and how it can be 
measured and distributed.  Since Pettit abandons this formulation early 
on, I will not develop a more elaborate account here; however, I will 





non-interference.  Rather, we are both subject to the 
constant threat of interference, not in spite of, but 
because of, our reciprocal positions.  It is of course 
likely, Pettit acknowledges, that an equal distribution of 
power will, in many cases, result in fewer total instances 
of arbitrary interference than an unequal one, since each 
individual will have the means to deter interference from 
others, but the threat of arbitrary interference in such a 
regime nevertheless remains.  Thus the anti-power 
formulation does not guarantee freedom if freedom consists 
in protection against exposure to arbitrary interference. 
 Accordingly, in his more recent formulations, Pettit 
has moved away from conceiving of non-domination as a kind 
of anti-power to conceiving it exclusively as the absence 
of the possibility of arbitrary interference.  As will 
become clear, I think this shift in emphasis from anti-
power to arbitrary interference is a mistake on Pettit's 
part, as it renders freedom as non-domination conceptually 
too similar to both negative and positive accounts. In 
fact, I think the anti-power approach is far more promising 
than Pettit acknowledges, and that account informs the 
conception of freedom as anti-domination that I develop in 
Chapter 5. For the remainder of this Chapter, however, I 
will focus on Pettit's second formulation of non-domination 
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as the absence of potential arbitrary interference. 
 In his later articulation, Pettit contrasts his view 
more explicitly with the negative and positive approaches. 
In addition to freedom as the absence of interference and 
freedom as self-mastery, Pettit notes that Berlin’s 
distinction leaves room for an obvious third alternative: 
“absence of mastery by others” (Pettit 1999: 22). Pettit's 
conception thus borrows crucial elements from both negative 
and positive conceptions, but it aspires to not be a mere 
ad hoc aggregate view like those critiqued in the preceding 
Chapter. Instead, Pettit presents his view as a 
conceptually unique hybrid account.      
 Accordingly, Pettit contends, freedom understood as 
the absence of the mastery of others differs from negative 
and positive accounts of liberty in significant respects.  
As has already been stressed, unlike with the negative 
conception, one need not actually be interfered with in 
order suffer domination on this account. But equally as 
important for Pettit, one can be subject to interference 
and not suffer domination provided that this interference 
is non-arbitrary, and interference is non-arbitrary on 
Pettit's view when it is “forced to track” the agent's own 
avowed interests (Pettit 1999: 56). Pettit illustrates this 
point with his favorite example of Ulysses who requests 
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that his sailors tie him to the mast in order to ensure 
that he is incapable of responding to the call of the 
sirens (Pettit 2001: 45, 75).  In doing so, Ulysses's 
sailors indeed subject him to physical interference.  But, 
though they interfere, the relationship between the sailors 
and Ulysses is not one of domination, as this act of 
interference accords with his expressed wishes.  The 
sailors are not dominating Ulysses in tying him to the 
mast; rather, they are obeying his instructions. To put it 
another way, in spite of their interference, the sailors do 
not exercise “alienating control” (Pettit 2008: 102) over 
Ulysses because their actions are still responsive to his 
demands. Though interfered with, Ulysses is, at some level, 
still the agent in control, and binding him therefore 
results in no loss of his freedom.   
 Pettit thus contends that the sort of interference 
present in the case of Ulysses is intuitively not freedom 
limiting, and, he reasons, a similar relationship may 
obtain between the state and individual citizens.  On a 
negative conception, any state law will be inherently 
freedom limiting because, regardless of whether the law is 
justified, enacted democratically, or promotes the common 
good, it will constitute a form of interference.  On the 
non-domination view, however, state laws and regulations 
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are not freedom limiting provided that they track, or are 
responsive to, the interests of individual citizens. A 
state can meet this burden, on Pettit's view, if its laws 
are subject to both democratic scrutiny and the proper 
procedural checks and balances.  Pettit, however, does not 
endorse something like the democratic consent approach, the 
positive implications of which we noted last Chapter.  
Instead, what's crucial for Pettit is not that laws achieve 
either actual or ideal consent, but that they be subject to 
contestation so that they do not become sectional or 
factional in nature, thereby allowing one group of citizens 
to arbitrarily coerce others.  The free state can guard 
against this risk, 
 
by recourse to public discussion in which people 
may speak for themselves and for the groups to 
which they belong.  Every interest and every idea 
that guides the action of a state must be open to 
challenge from every corner of the society; and 
where there is dissent, then appropriate remedies 
must be taken. (Pettit 1999: 56) 
 
Hence the importance of democratic procedures, basic 
rights, and the rule of law.  Should a state lack these 
checks, it risks imposing public “imperium” rather than 
private “dominium” (Pettit 1999: 112).  That is, the state 
itself will become an instrument of domination, and a 
devastatingly effective one at that. But, provided that 
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such checks are in place, state interference will not be of 
the arbitrary sort. Accordingly, a constitutional authority 
could protect people from private dominium by others, while 
not itself becoming a source of imperium, and such an 
authority will be necessary in order to insulate those who 
are vulnerable from the unwanted and arbitrary influence of 
the more powerful (Pettit 1999: 68). 
 So, unlike the negative conception, the non-domination 
account holds that interference and liberty are compatible 
under certain conditions. Some forms of interference do not 
lessen freedom.  This raises the suspicion that non-
domination is a version of positive liberty.  Pettit, 
however, steadfastly rejects this charge. He accordingly 
distances himself from the populist or communitarian strand 
of republican thought: 
 
The approach I take does not support any 
Rousseauesque paradox to the effect that 
submission to the law is a form of self-
emancipation, but only the traditional republican 
refusal to equate law's mode of restraining 
liberty with that of the bully or burglar. (Pettit 
1999: 302) 
 
Again, being free from the mastery of others is not, on 
Pettit's view, equivalent to realizing the more robust 
achievement of self-mastery.  One could be free from the 
arbitrary interference of others without being free from 
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various internal barriers to freedom as identified by Taylor 
(1985), achieving fully fledged autonomy as advocated by Raz 
(1986), or actively participating in public life in the 
manner required by Arendt (1968).  Just as liberty and some 
forms of interference are compatible on the nondomation 
view, so are liberty and the absence of some forms of 
mastery. 
 Before critically evaluating Pettit's non-domination 
view, it is worth highlighting the potential advantages this 
conception has over its negative and positive counterparts. 
Recall that one problem with the negative conception is that 
it is simultaneously both too narrow and too broad, too 
narrow in that it does not count for limitations of freedom 
that are not produced through interference, and too broad in 
that it counts any and all instances of interference as 
equally freedom limiting.  If successful, the nondmomination 
view avoids both worries. In understanding unfreedom in 
terms of domination rather than interference, Pettit's view 
is able to countenance cases of coercion that the negative 
view cannot capture.  Relationships of domination, after 
all, do not only obtain between masters and slaves.  Not 
only will the contented slave count as unfree on Pettit's 
view, but so will the subordinate housewife, the exploited 
laborer, and the marginalized racial minority or ethnic 
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group, because their lack of political and social standing 




 The non-domination account also promises an additional 
advantage over the negative alternative: it can discriminate 
between more valuable and less valuable freedoms.  Traffic 
laws and guard rails on bridges can be seen as trivial 
instances of interference on the non-domination view because 
they are non-arbitrary, as they track citizens' own 
interests. Furthermore, some laws, like criminal laws and 
civic regulations, will not only fail to hinder freedom on 
the non-domination account, but will be essential to 
facilitating it.  Protecting citizens from violence or 
exploitation at the hands of others is one of the 
fundamental ways in which the state can promote non-
domination. But, just as some instances of state 
interference do not inhibit liberty in any meaningful sense, 
others will indeed constitute gross violations of liberty.  
Laws that prohibit freedom of speech, for example, will 
prevent people from being able to express their interests or 
their objections to coercive policies, a capacity that is 
necessary in order to ensure that interference remains non-
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arbitrary.  Likewise, laws prohibiting freedom of the press 
will prevent citizens from having access to necessary 
information so that they may individually evaluate the 
degree to which the state's actions accord with their own 
interests. The same can be said about laws restricting 
religious worship and barring public assembly.  The former 
prevents people from developing their own values and 
commitments, whereas the latter prevents them from forming 
publicly recognizable group identities necessary for 
achieving social recognition and status.  In this respect, 
promoting freedom as non-domination warrants bestowing 
special consideration to the basic liberties over others. 
 The question is: can the non-domination view, in 
contrast to aggregate strategies, achieve these advantages 
without recourse to a positive conception of liberty?  As 
we've noted, Pettit insists that it can.  I am less sure.  
Pettit's view, I contend, ultimately shares more in common 
with positive liberty than he suggests. Further, I also 
think that, despite Pettit’s objections, the non-domination 
view is consistent with pervasive state interference, 
including violations of citizens’ basic liberties. I now 
want to turn to those elements of the non-domination view 




The Positive Aspects of Non-domination 
 
In this section, I will outline four problems with Pettit’s 
account of non-domination.  I will label these: a) the 
authenticity problem, b) the collectivization problem, c) 
the evaluative problem and d) the maximization problem.  The 
first two of these raise questions about what it means for 
interference to be non-arbitrary.  The second two focus on 
Pettit’s consequentialist account of the value non-
domination.   
 Collectively, these problems reveal that, despite 
Pettit's protests to the contrary, the non-domination view 
does, in some cases, justify coercion in the name of 
liberty.  But they also show that the non-domination view is 
not in earnest a status based conception of liberty.  
Accordingly, they call into question what is supposed to be 
the defining feature of Pettit's account.  
 
The Authenticity Problem 
 
One of the chief difficulties for Pettit’s view lies in 
spelling out specifically what makes a given instance of 
interference non-arbitrary rather than arbitrary. Recall 
that, in order to be non-arbitrary, interference must track 
the interests of those subject to it. In the preceding 
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Chapters, however, we have explored at length the problems 
with what we might call interest-based theories of liberty.  
One problem is that, if we think that tracking the interests 
of citizens requires making evaluative distinctions between 
more and less worthy desires (Taylor 1985), then our 
conception of liberty will be an inherently positive one. 
Pettit, however denies that we have to understand what it 
means to track the interests of others in this manner.  He 
insists that this process is “not essentially value-laden,” 
but rather, “there is a fact of the matter as to whether or 
not the state is effectively forced to track non-sectional 
interests and ideas when interfering in people's lives” 
(Pettit 1999: 56; emphasis added).  Hence, Pettit's 
republicanism shares with liberalism a commitment to 
neutrality. Interference is consistent with freedom on the 
non-domination view, not when it is aimed at promoting some 
substantive conception of the good that is independent from 
citizens' actual wants and desires, but when it is 
institutionally constrained in such away so as to track only 
those interests that citizens' do, as a matter of fact, hold 
in common.  A republican government operating under the norm 
of non-domination pursues only those aims and goals that in 
some sense acceptable to all.   
 It is not clear, however, whether such an assessment 
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can be entirely free from normative considerations. As John 
Christman points out, an effective criminal successfully 
tracks the interests of his or her victims in some sense 
(Christman 1998: 205). For example, a kidnapper must be able 
to track the interests of those hoping to secure the release 
of the victim in order to demand the proper ransom. In 
short, effectively exploiting people requires that one be 
responsive to their interests just as much as honoring their 
wishes does.  But surely a state that tracked the interests 
of its citizens in order to exploit them would not be 
defending its citizens from domination, but rather 
perpetuating it.  What is important then is not just that 
state policy be responsive to citizens' interest in some 
purely factual sense, but that it be so in the right way. 
 The problem is, once we start to elaborate on what the 
proper mode of responsiveness is, the non-domination view 
encounters a dilemma familiar to positive conceptions in 
general.  This is because the question of whether or not the 
state is forced to track the interests of citizens is at 
least partially evaluative in another significant sense. As 
we saw with Christman's (1991) own content neutral view of 
positive liberty, a conception of liberty can be evaluative 
not only with respect to the value of an agent's interests 
and desires, but also with respect to their authenticity.  
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While it may be the case that the state can effectively 
track the interests of its citizens without considering the 
relative worth of these interests objectively understood, it 
can hardly remain neutral with respect to the authenticity 
of these interests; at least it cannot if it is to protect 
them against domination.   
 Again, consider Christman's example of the subordinated 
housewife who, because of her relatively marginalized status 
and the prevalent cultural attitudes of the society in which 
she lives, comes to regard her position as justified and 
accordingly defers to her male partner in all major 
decisions.  This clearly seems like a paradigmatic case of 
domination.  Provided that she shows the proper deference, 
the housewife will avoid actual interference, yet this non-
interference is won at the price of her subordinated status.  
She is clearly unfree despite the fact that she may 
encounter little physical coercion, and the fact that she 
does not actively resist her subjugation is only further 
evidence of the extent of her domination. Indeed, this is a 
case in which a state authority could intervene and protect 
her from domination.  But, were the state to ignore the 
authenticity of her interests, it could reasonably claim 
that her current situation is one in which her interests are 
respected.  After all, deferring does accord with what she 
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herself desires. In addition, as Marilyn Friedman (2008) 
points out, one of the most prominent historical 
justifications for why women should be subordinate to male 
authorities is that men, in their supposed role as 
“protectors” and “bread winners,” are best suited to act in 
the best interests of women (Friedman 2008: 257).  The 
subordinate housewife in this case might very well concur 
that this is a correct assessment of her own interests.  Of 
course, we might suspect that these interests are themselves 
the product of her domination, but, unless the state is able 
to make this evaluative discrimination, it will have to 
regard her interests as successfully tracked in this case. 
 It seems clear that Pettit does not mean to assert that 
tracking the interests of citizens should be evaluatively 
neutral in this latter sense.  The oppressed housewife is 
one of his own examples (Pettit 1999: 5), and Pettit 
acknowledges that being subject to “manipulation” is one of 
ways in which someone can suffer domination (Pettit 1999: 
60, 159).  At times though, Pettit does seem to suggest that 
we should understand “interests” in an evaluatively neutral 
sense. According to Pettit a “set of practices and polices 
will be in a person’s net interest, plausibly, if it is one 
whose expected results are something that the agent wants 
for himself or herself, where that want satisfies conditions 
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that guard it against charges of clear irrationality” 
(Pettit 2004: 153).
7
  But if Pettit employs this 
understanding of interests, then his view is overly narrow 
in the same manner as negative conceptions.  Accordingly, 
not countenancing cases like the one depicted above would 
severely limit the applicability of Pettit's conception of 
liberty. On this score, even the contented slave could be 
regarded as free from domination, and surely this is an 
unacceptable result for Pettit's view.   
 Unfortunately, this puts Pettit in a rather serious 
bind, because if tracking the interests of citizens is an 
evaluative endeavor, then Pettit's view faces a problem 
familiar to positive conceptions like Christman's.  If the 
state can avoid dominating its citizens by being responsive 
only to their authentic as opposed to their inauthentic 
desires, then it can interfere with them against their own 
professed wishes, and such interference will not be regarded 
as freedom limiting. As with positive conceptions, Pettit's 
non-domination view validates state coercion in the name of 
freedom.  Even setting aside the generally disturbing 
                                                 
7
 Presumably, what Pettit means here by “rational” is something like the 
fairly weak sense of rational employed by Benn and Weinstein (1971) to 
account for the freedom inhibiting effect of threats.  A threat, such 
as “your money or your life,” deprives you of your negative liberty on 
their view because no rational person would choose the former over the 
latter.  I will discuss this issue somewhat further in Chapter 4. For a 
discussion of Pettit’s evaluatively neutral understanding of interests, 
see Costa 2007. 
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implications of this thought, this result is particularly 
damaging to Pettit's view, because notice now it is not a 
person's status that determines his or her freedom, but 
whether or not his or her desires conform to some evaluative 
standard. If citizens can be coerced, in the name of freedom 
and against their professed wishes, then their objections to 
such interference have no real force.  They will, in a 
sense, be at the mercy of the state which has the authority 
to determine their own authentic interests.  Regardless of 
whether we think this is something the state can effectively 
do, such a conception of liberty renders citizens 
effectively powerless because, were they to voice the 
objection, “you cannot do this to me as a free citizen,” the 
state could always respond, “but our actions accord with 
your true interests.” Again, the citizen's objections could 
only count as a prudential consideration concerning the 
effectiveness of coercion, not its moral permissibility. Not 
only is Pettit's view not as impartial as he suggests, but 
it also fails to preserve his crucial insight that one's 
status determines one's freedom.  Accordingly, Pettit's view 
is not only insufficient on a liberal view, but also fails 






The Collectivization Problem 
 
Despite his persistent objections, there is a sense in which 
Pettit's view strongly resembles what he calls the populist 
strand of republicanism.  He readily acknowledges that 
citizens will often have self serving interests.  I may not 
wish, for example, to pay taxes, abide by traffic laws, or 
adhere to state regulations, and I will thus regard such 
impositions as contrary to my interests.  If state policies 
must track these interests in order to be non-arbitrary, 
this requirement will make the state's efforts to promote 
non-domination difficult, if not impossible, for two 
reasons. First, this would entail that anyone's objection to 
any proposed law would be sufficient to block that law's 
passage.  Since few if any laws will enjoy universal 
consent, this would make it virtually impossible for the 
state to enact any laws at all, even when they serve to 
benefit everyone (Pettit 2001: 163ff).  Second, insofar as 
people's interests will often conflict, were the state to 
act in accordance with the desires of one citizen or group 
or citizens, this will often times necessarily entail that 
its actions are in conflict with the interests of others.  
In such cases, whatever the state does will be an 
instantiation of domination, since its actions will 
inevitably fail to track the interests of some. 
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 Pettit thus insists that the interests that the state 
must be forced to track in order to avoid interfering 
arbitrarily are not of this self serving-sort, but those 
interests that citizens hold in common: 
 
I may have an interest in the state imposing 
certain taxes or in punishing certain offenders, 
for example, and the state may pursue these ends 
according to procedures that conform to my ideas 
about appropriate means.  But I still may not want 
the state to impose taxes on me – I may want to be 
an exception – or I may think that I ought not to 
be punished in the appropriate manner, even though 
I have been convicted of an offense.  In such a 
case, my relevant interests and ideas will be 
those that are shared in common with others, not 
those that treat me as exceptional, since the 
state is meant to serve others as well as me.  And 
so in these cases the interference of the state in 
taxing or punishing me will not be conducted on an 
arbitrary basis. (Pettit, 1999: 55 – 56)  
 
If this is what Pettit has in mind, however, then tracking 
the interests of citizens is necessarily an evaluative 
project in another significant respect (Waldron 2007: 152; 
Carter 2008: 65).  It is important that the state not track 
citizens' interests simply as they are, as citizens will 
have parochial or self serving interests.  Instead, there 
must be procedures in place that enable the state to 
distinguish between common and sectional interests. 
 But, even if we agree that it would be wrong for people 
to pursue their selfish desires at the expense of others, 
why should we think that preventing them from doing so is 
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not a limitation of their freedom?  The worry of course is 
that we are slouching even further towards a positive view 
by understanding freedom not in terms of the availability of 
options, but in terms of their value.  Perhaps, though, 
Pettit could make the case that restricting the relevant 
interests to only those held in common is not intended to 
imply that these interests are somehow morally more worthy 
or valuable, but that this restriction is necessary in order 
to ensure that each person's status as a free citizen is 
protected.  At the same time, prohibiting people from acting 
on the basis of their self-serving desires does not seem to 
diminish their status as free citizens even if it does limit 
some of their options.  Or, as Pettit puts it, laws may 
“condition” people's freedom, in limiting the number of 
options available to them, but they do not necessarily 
thereby dominate them (Pettit 1999: 301). 
 Pettit's contention has some plausibility.  Under a 
status based conception of liberty, we might reasonably 
claim that preventing people from engaging in certain 
activities is necessary in order to protect the status of 
others, while holding in turn that this interference does 
not diminish the status of those subject to it.  For 
example, if I insist that others pay taxes for my benefit, 
but refuse to pay them myself, or if I demand that the state 
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employ force to protect me from violent criminals, yet seek 
to inculcate myself from similar sanctions, then I will 
effectively be dominating others. They will be subject to my 
arbitrary will without recourse.  But surely I cannot object 
that I am in turn being dominated by them in not being 
allowed to exploit them.  I am certainly not subordinated to 
a lesser status if I cannot take advantage of others 
provided they cannot take advantage of me.  In this respect, 
a status based conception of liberty captures Dworkin's 
intuition that it is absurd to think that I am somehow 
rendered unfree by laws that prevent me from murdering my 
critics (Dworkin 2001: 88).  We might say, with Pettit, that 
laws against murder certainly condition people's freedom, 
but they do not subject them to domination, since not being 
able to murder people who disagree with me in no way 
diminishes my status as a free citizen.  So we can explain 
why laws against murder are not inherently freedom limiting 
without having to borrow from positive conceptions of 
liberty, as Dworkin effectively does.  
 As long as the “common interest” is interpreted 
narrowly to mean only those privileges or penalties that 
citizens are willing to grant or impose on each other 
reciprocally, then Pettit's view seems to avoid any 
Roussuean implications. Unfortunately, Pettit's notion of 
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common interest seems to involve a good deal more than this. 
Difficulties arise for Pettit's view when citizens disagree 
about what constitutes the common interest. In such cases, 
those in the minority will not be able to regard the 
coercive actions of the state as non-arbitrary, not because 
they do not conform to their own self-serving interests, but 
because they do not conform to what they understand as the 
common interest, particularly when the policy in question 
severely disadvantages them. Such citizens are not demanding 
special privileges or immunities for themselves, and 
accordingly they are not trying to dominate others; rather, 
they are objecting to impositions that specifically burden 
them. 
 Pettit, however, insists that, as long as the proper 
democratic institutions and procedures are in place, these 
adversely effected citizens should not feel dominated. 
Suppose, to borrow Pettit's examples, a group of citizens 
objects to a proposed legal prohibition or does not want a 
major roadway built near their homes: 
 
All that is necessary is that they be assured that 
the judgment is made according to their ideas 
about proper procedures and that it is dictated, 
ultimately, by an interest that they share with 
others: an interest in the order secured by the 
criminal justice system or an interest in the 
possibilities of travel realized by roads and 
airports.  They may bitterly regret the fact that 
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the judgment disadvantages them, but under the 
assurance described they can look on that 
disadvantage as a misfortune on a par with a 
natural accident; they do not have to see it as a 
token of domination by the state or groups within 
the state. (Pettit 1999: 198) 
 
Thus, according to Pettit, while such disadvantages 
condition the liberty of some citizens, they do not 
constitute arbitrary interference and are hence 
nondominating. 
 It is not clear, though, why citizens would have to 
regard these outcomes in this way.  Perhaps Pettit's claim 
is plausible if we understand common interests in terms of 
Pareto-efficiency. Citizens can accept instances of state 
interference that make them better off, or at least no worse 
off, even if these policies benefit others more than they.  
Though they may resent the fact that they didn't come out on 
top, they can still see the policy as in their interest 
since it does not make them worse off than they otherwise 
would be without it.  It is unlikely, though, that many 
state policies would achieve Pareto-efficiency, and Pettit 
readily admits that often times democratically enacted 
policies will make certain groups worse off.  He concedes:   
 
It may be a matter of common avowable interest 
that the tax system be made more efficient, that 
new power station should be constructed, or that 
various anti-pollution measures should be 
implemented. But any way of advancing such a cause 
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is bound to hurt some more than others.  There 
will always be a minority who are negatively 
affected by any improvement in the tax system, a 
minority who live in the vicinity of the new, much 
needed, power station, and a minority who depend 
for their livelihood on industries hard hit by 
important anti-pollution legislation. (Pettit 
2001: 163) 
 
But given that citizens like those in the above example are 
forced to suffer an imposition which disadvantages them in 
order to benefit others, how can they view this imposition 
as anything but arbitrary? That is, why shouldn't they 
regard this policy, against which they have no recourse, as 
exploitive and hence dominating?  It cannot be because 
opposing such a policy violates reciprocity, because these 
citizens are not demanding special privileges for 
themselves, but are merely objecting to a policy or set of 
policies that uniquely disadvantages them; nor can it be 
because they still serve to benefit, since the policies in 
question are not Pareto-efficient by stipulation.
8
   
 The only remaining possibility is that these sorts of 
policies are not arbitrary because they accord with some 
more substantive understanding of the common interest.  The 
problem is there will likely be significant disagreement 
over what constitutes the common interests amongst citizens.  
Even if we think a consensus could be reached on a list of 
                                                 
8
 Carter also briefly considers, and then quickly rejects, the Pareto-
efficient interpretation of what Pettit might mean by common interests 
(Carter 2008: 65). 
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certain basic goods (such as security, education, a clean 
environment, access to travel, etc.), ranking these values 
is bound to be controversial (Gaus 2001: 157).  Since 
political decision making will inevitably involve cost 
benefit analysis resulting in various trade-offs, almost any 
government policy will conflict with some citizens' 
conception of the common good. Accordingly, if citizens can 
be coerced on the basis of a conception of the good which 
they explicitly reject, and this coercion is entirely 
consistent with their freedom, then they can quite plainly 
be forced to be free.  
This puts Pettit in somewhat of a bind, or, more 
specifically, a kind of trilemma.  First, he could simply 
concede that government action will, in most cases, 
constitute domination of at least some group of citizens (a 
result he would likely find unacceptable since, on his view, 
the state is the primary means by which we can combat 
domination). Second, he could assert that what constitutes 
the common good is just any policy that is passed through 
the appropriate democratic procedures.  Christopher McMahon 
(2005) in fact interprets Pettit in this way.  The problem 
with this option, as McMahon points out, is that any state 
policy will be non-dominating on this view provided that it 
passes democratic muster (McMahon 2005: 81). But then we 
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would have to admit that, theoretically at least, almost any 
policy, no matter how intuitively objectionable, could be 
considered non-dominating under the appropriate 
circumstances, and accordingly there would be virtually no 
limit on what the state might do.   
Pettit explicitly rejects this second option (Pettit 
2005).  In response to McMahon, he denies that state 
policies are made non-arbitrary by virtue of being passed 
through democratic procedures. Instead, Pettit argues that 
there is a determinant answer as to what constitutes the 
common interest objectively understood, and democratic 
procedures are essential because, if properly administered, 
they will often yield the correct answer.  In short, Pettit 
accuses McMahon of committing a Euthyphro like error: a 
policy will be licensed by democratic procedures, on 
Pettit’s view, “because it is nonarbitrary […] rather than 
being nonarbitrary because it is licensed” (Pettit 2005: 
279).   
Accordingly, Pettit seems to opt for a third option: he 
defends a particular objective conception of what 
constitutes the common interest. The conception of the 
common interest he has in mind is a contractualist one, 
wherein the common good is understood as what people could 
reasonably agree to under fair deliberative conditions 
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(Pettit 2001: 157f1). This strategy, however, faces serious 
problems as well.  One problem is that real world 
deliberative conditions will rarely if ever be of this ideal 
sort, and Pettit’s contention that democratic procedures 
will often yield results that will conform to this standard 
is hardly plausible. Under real world conditions, there will 
inevitably be constraints on time and limited information 
and, as such, democratic deliberations are likely to be 
fallible at least some of time and not generate the same 
results that would be reached under ideal conditions.   
In addition, whatever contractualist strategy we employ 
will inevitably rely upon an appeal to people's ideal rather 
than actual selves, otherwise the problems of self serving 
interests or pervasive disagreement are simply 
reintroduced.
9
 But even if a contractualist approach 
provides the correct framework for developing just political 
institutions and social arrangements, they cannot serve as 
foundation for liberty without evoking a positive account. 
On any such view, citizens can be coerced against their own 
                                                 
9
 There are several possible candidates Pettit could appeal to.  On a 
contractualist approach, the common good could be understood as what 
agents would agree to when behind the veil of ignorance (Rawls 1971), 
or as “what no one could reasonably reject as the basis of informed, 
unforced, general agreement” (Scanlon 1982: 11), or as those norms 
“that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their 
capacity as participants in a practical discourse (Habermas 1990: 66). 





professed wishes, yet in accordance with their freedom, 
because this coercion is leveled with the consent of their 
ideal if not actual selves. In this respect, Pettit's view 
resembles Waldron's democratic consent approach despite his 
initial objections. 
 This problem is only deepened by Pettit's contention 
that the non-domination view justifies some rather 
controversial policy proposals; indeed, he sees this as a 
virtue of the view: “freedom as non-domination supports a 
rich, even radical set of policies, providing ecumenical 
ground for what might otherwise seem like sectional demands 
on the state” (Pettit 1999: ix).  Pettit goes on to argue 
that policies such as wealth redistribution (Pettit 2001: 
158),   public health care (Pettit 1999: 159; 2010: 96), 
environmental protection and energy independence (Pettit 
2010: 97) or all justified in the name of non-domination.  
Such policies are sure to be controversial, however, because 
they will no doubt place significant burdens on some 
citizens who do not regard them as essential to the common 
good. Yet, on Pettit's view, we should not regard such 
impositions as restraining the liberty of these citizens.   
 The problem is not that we should regard such policies 
as intuitively or inherently freedom limiting. The 
conception of freedom I will argue for in subsequent 
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Chapters in some cases justifies similar policies. The 
problem, rather, involves Pettit's explanation for why these 
policies do not constitute violations of individual liberty. 
At bottom, this explanation must be because these policies 
accord with some notion of the public good as determined by 
the hypothetical deliberation of citizens' ideal selves. One 
worry of course is how do we determine the limits of what 
the state might impose upon citizens in the name of liberty?  
If the policies discussed above can be justified, what's to 
say that more radical ones cannot be as well, especially 
given that there is bound to be much epistemic disagreement 
over which policies do in fact conform to this standard 
(Costa 2007: 302).  This is a problem familiar to positive 
views, but, aside from this more general worry, this result 
is particularly problematic for Pettit's non-domination 
alternative because again it seems as if one's status is no 
longer decisive.  If the state can justify interference by 
appeal to my ideal as opposed to actual consent, then the 
force of my explicit objections will be rendered impotent, 
as the objections can always be circumvented.  I will have 
no recourse against any policy that aligns with the common 
good even if I do not recognize it as such. The state will 
be able to utterly ignore my protests without violating my 
liberty. On such a view, my freedom is not determined by my 
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status, but to the extent to which the laws I am subject to 
conform to some higher ideal. 
 
The Evaluative Problem  
 
The next two objections I will raise target Pettit's 
treatment of non-domination as a teleological principle as 
opposed to a deontological one. On Pettit’s account, non-
domination is a value to be maximized rather than a 
“constraint” to be respected (Pettit 1999: 98).  If we 
understand non-domination in this former consequentialist 
sense, then “we think that the state should be designed so 
that the expected non-domination amongst those who live 
under the system is at a maximum,” whereas, if we 
understand non-domination deontologically, then, at least 
on Pettit's view, we think that the state itself must never 
violate the norm of non-domination, not even as a means to 
maximize the level of non-domination enjoyed by citizens 
overall (Pettit 1998: 99).   
 Pettit argues that the teleological understanding both 
better conforms with the historical tradition of 
republicanism and is intuitively more compelling. Treating 
non-domination in this way, however, generates significant 
problems for his view. In the first place, in order to 
determine how best to maximize non-domination, we will have 
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take into account not only the extent of non-domination 
citizens enjoy but its relative significance.  Citing 
Taylor (1985) approvingly, Pettit insists that it will 
often be the case that enjoying non-domination over a 
certain range of options will be of more value to an agent 
than enjoying it over others: “it will also be important 
insofar as domination in some areas is likely to be 
considered more damaging than it is in others; better be 
dominated in less central activities for example, rather 
than more central ones” (Pettit 1999: 58).  
 Once we understand non-domination as something that 
must be maximized, it is clear why Pettit has to make this 
further stipulation. Without it, his view would face a 
problem familiar to negative accounts that hold that the 
state should maximize non-interference.  Were we not to 
take evaluative considerations into account, the non-
domination view would sanction some rather counter 
intuitive results.  
 For example, consider Two Societies.  Society One is 
similar to the one depicted in Ray Bradbury's Fahrenheit 
451 (1950). In this society, citizens are free to engage in 
almost any activity they like.  There are no laws 
prohibiting drug use or various sexual behavior, there are 
no censorship laws prohibiting indecent entertainment, and 
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there are no paternalistic safety regulations mandating 
that citizens wear seat belts or bike helmets.  There is, 
however, a fairly strict prohibition on any material 
promoting what the state regards as “critical thinking.”  
Consequently, the state forcibly confiscates, or prevents 
the transmission of, any book, website, film, television 
program, etc., that provokes people to critically reflect 
on their values, desires, or inherited cultural norms. 
 Society Two is much like the present-day United States 
or other liberal democracies.  In this society, there is a 
well established legal protection of speech and press 
rights which prevent the state from passing any law, or set 
of laws, that would effectively suppress critical thinking 
however understood. Yet, in this society, the state does 
impose many legal restrictions that the society described 
above lacks: there are laws against recreational drug use, 
there are laws against prostitution, there are laws 
censoring some pornographic material, or at least that make 
this material more difficult to obtain, and there are laws 
mandating that motorists and cyclists wear either seat 
belts or helmets even if their noncompliance would pose no 
danger to others. Furthermore, suppose that at least some, 
if not most, of these regulations are arbitrarily imposed.  
They exist simply because there are prevalent social 
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taboos, endorsed by the majority, against certain 
behaviors, not because they are necessary to promote the 
common good or protect public safety.   
 Citizens in Society One will therefore enjoy non-
domination over a wide range of options that those in 
Society Two lack.  Still, it would seem absurd to hold that 
the citizens of Society One enjoy a greater degree of non-
domination overall than those of Society Two because these 
citizens lack a significant freedom that those of Society 
Two possess, namely the freedom to produce, promote, and 
consume materials encouraging critical thinking.  I take it 
that this intuition still holds even if the citizens of 
Society One are exposed to less arbitrary interference on a 
day-to-day basis than those of Society Two.  That is, though 
they have the option, the citizens of Society Two do not 
often engage in activities that encourage critical 
reflection.  More often than not they prefer to entertain 
themselves with the same sorts of uncritical distractions 
that are readily available to the citizens of Society One 
except, in this regard, the citizens of Society Two are more 
likely to encounter arbitrary interference than their 
counterparts in Society One. 
 Despite this, it seems clear that the citizens of 
Society Two enjoy not less but more non-domination than 
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those of Society One.  There is little doubt, I think, that 
liberal democracies, like the United States for example, 
sometimes impose laws intended to regulate what are publicly 
considered “undesirable” behaviors on what amounts to a 
purely arbitrary basis.  Though regrettable, these laws are 
not equivalent to the more objectionable restriction of 
fundamental liberties, which constitutes a much more severe 
limitation of liberty. The Prohibition period in the United 
States, for example, no doubt violated the liberty of 
American citizens before it was ultimately repealed, but it 
would have been far worse had the government permitted the 
consumption of alcohol but prohibited any literature, art, 
or news media critical of societal or cultural norms.  
Citizens under prohibition may have rightly lamented the 
fact that they could not consume alcohol, but it seems 
counter intuitive to assert that they were subject to the 
same level of domination as citizens deprived of their most 
basic freedoms. 
 If we understand non-domination as a value to be 
maximized, and hence something that can be quantified in 
some sense, then how do we account for this discrepancy?  
The problem we are faced with is similar to the one that 
Charles Taylor (1985) poses against negative views in 
general.   Recall that Taylor charges that, under a negative 
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view, we would have to regard traffic lights as greater 
impediments to liberty than laws restricting religious 
worship because they would likely result in more day-to-day 
interference for most citizens than prohibitions on 
religious practice.  In the case of non-domination, however, 
the traffic light example no longer has any force because, 
presumably, traffic lights constitute non-arbitrary 
instances of interference and are hence nondominating (of 
course, as we saw with the two preceding objections, the 
introduction of this qualification generates serious 
problems of its own).  As the above example shows, however, 
we can imagine similar cases in which citizens are exposed 
to a fair degree of arbitrary interference, or even the 
possibility of such interference, and yet this infraction 
seems less egregious than exposure to arbitrary interference 
in other more central areas of life, even if this former 
exposure extends over what seems like a quantifiably greater 
range of options.  
 As was noted earlier, Pettit attempts to avoid this 
problem by essentially endorsing Taylor's solution.  He 
asserts that enjoying non-domination in certain areas of 
one's life might be more or less significant, and hence of 
greater or lesser consequential value, than others (Pettit, 
1999: 58).  Pettit does not elaborate much here on what 
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accounts for their greater value, but we are left to 
presume, based on his reference to Taylor, that it is 
because the range of actions that compose the more central 
or significant areas of our lives in some sense constitute 
more worthwhile pursuits, the implication being that we do 
value, or should value, the activity of critical thinking 
over indulging in more banal forms of entertainment.  
Accordingly, not being exposed to arbitrary interference in 
our pursuit of these activities is of greater value to us.  
Presumably, the greater value of these activities will have 
a multiplier effect such that the freedom to perform them, 
or more specifically the absence of the possibility of 
arbitrary interference when performing them, will account 
for a greater amount of non-domination than the freedom to 
perform less central activities. 
 Pettit's view now, however, strongly resembles one of 
the aggregate strategies we examined in the previous 
Chapter, namely the overall freedom approach. Accordingly, 
it encounters the same problems. The central problem is 
that, if the relative value of performing certain actions 
determines, in part, the extent of their contribution to 
one's overall level of freedom, then the conception of 
liberty at work is either an exercise concept, or the value 
of liberty is rendered purely instrumental. One way to 
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account for the multiplier effect of more significant 
freedoms is to insist that freedom itself consists in the 
active pursuit of worthy courses of action rather than their 
mere availability.  So, to return to the example above, if 
freedom itself involves critical self-reflection, then 
obviously the freedom to perform those activities that 
encourage critical self-reflection will be more valuable 
than ones that do not and certainly more valuable than ones 
that might distract one from such pursuits.  This is indeed 
Taylor's own explanation, as we have already seen.  But, 
were Pettit's view to incorporate this explanation, freedom 
as non-domination would become a thoroughly positive account 
of liberty.   
 Given that Pettit is at pains to insist his view is not 
a positive one, we can assume he would not advocate this 
approach, his endorsement of Taylor's position 
notwithstanding.  Alternatively, another way to account for 
the multiplier effect of more significant freedoms, is to 
maintain that, while freedom itself is an opportunity rather 
than exercise concept, the freedom to perform certain 
actions nonetheless make a greater contribution to one’s 
overall freedom because performing these actions is more 
valuable, though this is not to say that the performance 
itself is what constitutes our liberty.  Again, the problem 
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with this approach is that it renders the value of freedom 
merely instrumental.  If what is truly important is not 
freedom itself, but what this freedom enables us to do, then 
we have to concede that, in some circumstances at least, 
interference, or even the mere possibility of interference, 
will be just as effective of a means, if not more so, of 
achieving these various ends.  Again, to return to the above 
example, citizens will no doubt require a degree of freedom 
from non-interference, or the possibility of arbitrary 
interference, in order to think for themselves, but they 
will likely need other things as well.  They might need 
coaching to encourage them to think critically when they 
lack the capacity to do so, they might need to be 
disciplined when they slack off and fail to diligently think 
critically, or they may need to be barred from engaging in 
certain mindless activities that only serve to distract them 
from their more worthy pursuits.  While, unlike positive 
accounts, an instrumental conception of freedom does not 
itself justify state interference, it is still compatible 
with a paternalistic state that imposes a significant degree 
of interference on its citizens. 
 Additionally, a purely instrumental account of the 
value of freedom is incompatible with a status based 
conception of liberty of the sort championed by Pettit in 
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the name of non-domination.  If enjoying non-domination is 
not a value in itself but rather a means to realizing some 
other value, then the status one achieves in virtue of 
enjoying a substantial degree non-domination has no 
independent value of its own.  That is, on an instrumental 
account, one's status is no longer inviolable, but can be 
disregarded for the sake of achieving some higher end.  In 
short, Pettit's consequentialist approach is in tension with 
a conception of liberty that is status based.
10
 
 Pettit could, of course, avoid these implications by 
insisting that such interference does not count as 
dominating because it tracks the interests of citizens and 
is therefore non-arbitrary.  The problem is that, in order 
make this claim plausible, we would have to understand 
people's interest in some ideal rather than actual sense.  
But this only pushes Pettit's view farther down the positive 
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 I do not mean to suggest that a status based conception of liberty is 
incompatible with consequentialism in general.  One could hold, for 
example, that enjoying the status of a free person, whatever that 
entails, is a value that must be weighed against other values in a 
consequentialist fashion, and I am not asserting that there is anything 
obviously inconsistent about this.  If the status of a free person, 
however, consists in one's freedom from the possibility of arbitrary 
interference (i.e. the extent to which one enjoys non-domination), then 
achieving this status must have some value over and above the 
instrumental value of maximizing non-domination if it is to have any 
independent value of its own even in the consequentialist sense 
(without this independent value, including the value of status in our 
consequentialist calculus would amount to a kind of double-counting).  
What I am arguing here is that Pettit must give up on the independent 





spectrum.  Even if Pettit's view does not entail a full 
blown positive account, however, it is not clear how Pettit 
can introduce evaluative standards while avoiding the 
troubling implications of similar aggregate strategies.  At 
the same time, it seems that such standards are necessary if 
Pettit's view is to avoid some rather counter intuitive 
results.  It is not clear what resources the non-domination 
view provides to avoid this dilemma. 
 
The Maximization Problem 
 
The final problem we will examine, which I will call the 
maximization problem, also targets Pettit's treatment of 
non-domination as a teleological value. This problem 
concerns the extent to which arbitrary state interference 
itself may result in a net decrease in overall domination. 
If the value of non-domination is to be understood 
teleologically, then there must be instances in which the 
state may permissibly perpetuate domination in the interests 
of decreasing overall domination.  That is, there be must 
cases of tradeoff. Pettit illustrates this point by 
analogizing the value of non-domination with that of peace 
(Pettit 1999: 98). If we treat peace as constraint on our 
actions, then we will never act in an non-peaceful manner 
even to promote greater peace overall.  We will, in short, 
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practice strict pacifism.  If, on the other hand, we treat 
peace as a value to be maximized, then we will think that it 
is necessary in some circumstances to engage in violence in 
order to secure greater peace in the future.  Analogously, 
if we also treat non-domination this way, then there will be 
occasions on which it will be necessary to engage in 
arbitrary interference in the interests of securing greater 
overall non-domination. 
 This feature of non-domination is central to Pettit's 
view.  Recall that one of the primary distinctions between 
freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-domination is 
that the former is only concerned with actual interference 
whereas the latter is concerned with the possibility of 
interference.  On Pettit's view, the negative tradition's 
fixation with actual interference over potential 
interference is the result of a spurious distinction between 
freedom and its security.  William Paley, anticipating 
something like the non-domination view, objects that it, 
“describes not so much liberty itself, as the safeguards and 
preservatives of liberty” (Paley 1825: 359).11  What 
Pettit's example of the slave under the rule of a benevolent 
master is supposed to highlight, however, is that there is 
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an essential connection between one's status as a free 
citizen and the security of one's negative liberty.  Recall 
that a slave in this circumstance will enjoy a good degree 
of negative liberty provided that he or she maintains the 
master's favor, but this slave still does not enjoy freedom 
as non-domination because the master could decide at any 
moment to interfere in the slaves' affairs with impunity.  
The slave in this case remains a slave not because he fails 
to possess a sufficient degree of negative liberty, but 
because his possession of this liberty is not secure. 
 If the goal of governmental institutions designed to 
promote non-domination is to maximize the degree of freedom 
from arbitrary interference that citizens enjoy, then, 
Pettit insists, there will be occasions on which the 
government itself may engage in arbitrary interference if 
such interference is necessary to protect citizens against 
the possibility of even greater levels of arbitrary 
interference.  He states: 
 
There are all sorts of ways in which it may be 
quite natural to tolerate a political failure to 
honour non-domination, if the failure represents 
the most effective means of increasing non-
domination overall. It may be that the cause of 
maximizing non-domination overall requires giving 
parliament special unfettered powers in some area, 
for example, or giving judges a lot of sentencing 
discretion for a certain sort of offence.  And if 
the cause of maximizing non-domination does 
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require such departures from the perfect 
constitution  – from the constitution that 
exemplifies non-domination in each and every 
feature of its design – then it would seem only 
natural to tolerate those departures; it would 
precious, even fetishistic, to insist on remaining 
faithful to the abstract ideal. (Pettit 1999: 102) 
 
The permissibility of engaging in domination in the name of 
maximizing greater non-domination overall, however, 
generates some potentially disturbing results.  If the 
measures Pettit outlines above are justifiable, then what 
is to say that more extreme measures will not, in some 
circumstances at least, be justifiable as well? For 
example, could the institution of martial law constitute an 
increase in non-domination in certain cases?  Could the 
temporary installation of a benevolent but unchecked 
dictator do the same?  
 Pettit insists that such concerns are overblown.  While 
it is permissible for the state to deviate from the 
commitment not to arbitrarily interfere in the lives of its 
citizens on occasion, there is a strict and discernible 
limit on the extent to which the state can have such powers 
without itself becoming the greatest threat to freedom as 
non-domination: 
 
One of the recurrent lessons of republican 
thinking […] is that as a state gains the powers 
necessary to be a more and more effective 
protector – as it is allowed a bigger and bigger 
181 
 
army or police force or intelligence service, for 
example – it becomes itself a greater threat to 
freedom as non-domination than it seeks to remove. 
(Pettit 1999: 105)  
 
Pettit's confidence, however, is unwarranted.  If the state 
is charged with protecting citizens' overall security in 
order to maximize the range of options over which they 
enjoy non-domination, then we can easily imagine cases in 
which fairly pervasive state interference would indeed 
increase non-domination overall.   
 Take the imposition of martial law briefly mentioned 
above. Imagine a city, or some section of a city, that has 
become completely overrun with crime. In this city, theft 
and violence are common place, and citizens live in what 
amounts to a constant state of fear.  These citizens are 
thus constantly subject to the possibility of arbitrary 
interference.  Their day-to-day activities can be 
interrupted at any moment by the threat of violence, and 
this will be no less true for those citizens who happen to 
be fortunate enough to escape any actual coercive 
interference. Now imagine that, in response, the state 
imposes martial law, granting state institutions the 
authority to conduct random searches, detain people without 
cause, and impose strict curfews.  It is certainly 
plausible that the majority of citizens in this case will 
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now enjoy a greater level of non-domination after the 
imposition of martial law than before.  While they are now 
exposed to the possibility of arbitrary interference at the 
hands of the state, these citizens will be exposed to a 
lesser degree of arbitrary interference in their day-to-day 
activities provided that the state’s measures are 
successful.  They will be able to conduct these activities 
with a relative degree of security.  This is precisely what 
the imposition of martial law is meant to achieve. But do 
we really want to say that these citizens are made more 
free by the imposition of martial law?  Pettit seems 
committed to answering in the affirmative, but this seems 
implausible.  A state under the imposition of martial law 
intuitively seems like the very antithesis of a free state.  
Even if we think that martial law in some cases might be 
justified, it is justified at the expense of citizens' 
freedom, not in the name of it.   
 Perhaps Pettit could concede that, in extreme cases, 
giving the state massive unchecked power does promote 
greater freedom if the alternative is a state of choas and 
widespread fear.  The worry though is that examples like 
the one outlined above will not be all that rare.  Any 
occasion when there is significant paranoia about crime 
will justify such measures on Pettit's non-domination 
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account (Christman 1998: 206).  This problem is compounded 
further when we include the potential impact of external, 
in addition to internal, threats to security. Paranoia not 
only about crime, but also about the possibility of an 
imminent terrorist attack -- as has become common in post 
September 11
th
 America and much of the rest of the world -- 
or the threat of infiltration by a foreign enemy -- as was 
the case with post Second World War “red scare” -- will 
also justify invasive government policies in the interest 
of protecting security and hence maximizing overall non-
domination.  We do not need to go too far back in history 
to find examples of expansionary state policies predicated 
on this type of justification.  J. Edgar Hoover, for 
example, defended the almost Orwellian methods of the House 
Un-American Activities Committee on the grounds that such 
measures were necessary to guard against the alleged threat 
the spread of communism posed to freedom.  In a speech 
given before HUAC, he declared “the communists have been, 
still are, and always will be a menace to freedom.”12 More 
recently, US Senator Orin Hatch defended the “Patriot Act” 
-- which, among other things, gave various federal 
authorities far greater discretion to detain individuals 
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and access their personal records and electronic 
communications – on similar grounds. In response to the 
objection that such discretionary powers represented a 
threat to basic liberty, Hatch responded that they were 
essential to “protect what is perhaps our most important 
civil liberty: the freedom from future terrorist attacks.”13  
 This kind of rationale for the expansion of state 
discretionary power, as offered by Hoover and Hatch, is not 
that the value of security trumps the value of liberty.  It 
is rather that the value of security is itself 
constituitive of the value of liberty.  But this rationale 
has potentially disturbing implications because it places a 
remarkably weak limit on the extent to which the state can 
yield arbitrary power over its citizens while ostensibly 
remaining committed to the value of liberty.  If, however, 
we follow Pettit, both in positing an intimate connection 
between freedom and its security and in treating freedom as 
a value to be maximized, then it seems like we are forced 
to embrace this implication.  
 Perhaps, though, Pettit might object that this worry 
is still overly exaggerated.  Appeals of the sort made by 
Hoover and Hatch, while theoretically defensible on the 
non-domination view, are ultimately not warranted by the 
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 “In Defense of the Patriot Act,” USA Today, May 14, 2003. 
185 
 
evidence. The actual probability, so this argument might 
go, of a communist take over from within during the Cold 
War or of another large scale terrorist attack following 
September 11
th
 were not so great as to justify the sorts of 
expansionary measures ultimately undertaken by the state.  
Such expansion of state power does, as a matter of 
empirical fact, pose a greater threat to overall non-
domination than the threats these measures were designed to 
combat.  So while there may be no theoretical limit on the 
extent to which the state may employ discretionary power to 
promote non-domination, there is a fairly accessible 
empirical limit.  In short, we have good empirical reasons 
to think that an overly powerful state will abuse its power 
and will become, in relatively short order, the greatest 
threat to non-domination of all. 
 Again, we might wonder if the empirical evidence 
actually bears this out.  Regardless, however, this type of 
argument is not available to Pettit because, as he is often 
at pains to stress, enjoying freedom as non-domination 
entails being free from the mere possibility of arbitrary 
interference and not just that the probability of such 
interference is relatively low. Pettit recognizes that 
rendering arbitrary interference actually impossible will 
not always be feasible, but, even in such cases, Pettit 
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seems to suggest that non-domination is achieved only to 
the extent that the probability of arbitrary interference 
is actively rendered as unlikely as is possible. Were this 
not the case, then the slave under the rule of the 
benevolent  master could legitimately be considered free 
since the probability he or she will encounter actual 
interference is again fairly minimal. Again, on the non-
domination view there is a tight and essential connection 
between freedom and its security, and, as Pettit 
emphasizes, the security that the non-domination view is 
concerned with is “the sort of security which means, not 
just that people with a power of arbitrary interference 
probably will not exercise it, but that the agents in 
question lose that power: they are deprived of the capacity 
to exercise it or at least their capacity to exercise it is 
severely reduced” (Pettit 1999: 73).  He later puts the 
point even more strongly: “the point is not just to make 
arbitrary interference improbable; the point is to make it 
inaccessible” (Pettit 1999: 74).  
 Now let's return to the terrorist example from above.  
Surely it will take a great deal of government intervention 
to render the possibility of a future terrorist attack 
impossible or even as improbable as is feasible. Even when 
we think that the likelihood of a future attack is fairly 
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minimal, it will still remain possible. But, to the extent 
that the only reason the terrorists decide not to strike 
again is because they judge that the costs are too high or 
that their resources are best spent elsewhere (say in more 
regional conflicts), they will still exercise domination 
over their potential targets simply because they remain 
capable of caring out such an attack. Accordingly, even 
when the prospects of an attack have been greatly 
diminished, the state will still be justified in yielding 
significant discretionary power to combat this hypothetical 
threat, and both the possession and exercise of this power 
is combatible with the advancement of non-domination. 
 Given all the possible threats to security -- both 
real and imagined, internal and external -- Pettit's view 
seems to justify a fairly powerful and intrusive state.  
The problem is that, in treating non-domination this way, 
Pettit has made the connection between freedom and security 
too tight.  Again, the issue is not that security concerns 
never warrant the expansion of state power.  The worry is, 
rather, that, if we do not maintain a distinction between 
freedom and security, the normative limit on the extent to 
which the state can expand its power becomes an 
increasingly vanishing one.  Our conception of political 
freedom should allow us to weigh the relative values of 
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freedom and security, not render them synonymous.   
Otherwise, measures such as the imposition of martial law, 
arbitrary searches and seizures, warrentless wire taps, and 
other forms of unchecked state power will not count as 
infringements on individual liberty provided that the 
potential stakes are great enough. As Benjamin Franklin 
once famously remarked, “those who would give up essential 
Liberty, to purchase a little Safety, deserve neither 
Liberty nor Safety” (Franklin 1959: 242). Regardless of 
whether we agree with Franklin's ranking (and his rather 
harsh assessment of those who don't), it hardly seems 
plausible that he is guilty of a conceptual confusion. 
 Accordingly, even if it is not a straightforwardly 
positive view, the non-domination account still runs afoul 
of Berlin's central concern: it justifies widespread and 
pervasive state interference in the name of liberty.  But, 
even setting this Berlinian worry aside, this implication 
is particularly problematic for Pettit's view. First, it is 
no longer clear that non-domination can be effectively 
measured at all given the incredibly high standards of 
success Pettit places on achieving non-domination. Does the 
mere possibility of a catastrophic threat to security, such 
as a terrorist attack, justify imposing less severe, though 
more likely to be realized, restrictions on citizens 
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negative liberty?  Given that eliminating the risk of 
arbitrary interference posed by one agent will require 
bestowing some other agent, like the state, with 
substantial and relatively unfettered powers, how can such 
relative comparisons be made? What is a greater threat to 
non-domination, the possibility of a terrorist attack or 
the possibility of an overreaching police state given that 
we cannot render one of these threats impossible without de 
facto rendering the other possible?  To highlight this 
problem, consider that, if the state itself has the 
potential to become the greatest threat to non-domination, 
a concern Pettit readily acknowledges, then we can easily 
neutralize this potential threat by simply dissolving the 
state entirely.  Arbitrary interference at the hands of the 
state would thus become strictly impossible.  But this 
would expose citizens to arbitrary interference from myriad 
other sources.   
 The problem is this: if maximizing non-domination were 
a matter of maximizing the probability that citizens will 
encounter as little arbitrary interference as possible, 
then measuring the amount of non-domination citizens enjoy 
under different political regimes becomes a relatively 
straightforward process. But it is a crucial feature of the 
non-domination view that it regards the mere possibility, 
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rather than the relative probability, of arbitrary 
interference as what’s significant.  Possibility, however, 
unlike probability, does not admit of degrees.  Under any 
political regime, some form of arbitrary interference, 
either at the hand of the state itself or some internal or 
external threat, will be possible strictly speaking. 
Accordingly, how are we to compare the relative threat one 
source of possible arbitrary interference poses to non-
domination in contrast to another except by appeal to the 
probability of these threats materializing? Unfortunately, 
this is precisely the sort of appeal Pettit rules out.   
 I will revisit this issue some in the next Chapter 
when I discuss the “pure negative” view, but now I want to 
turn to an even deeper problem for Pettit's view.  If we 
can maximize the degree of non-domination people enjoy at 
the expense of exposing them to at least some degree of 
arbitrary interference, then again it is no longer clear 
that the non-domination view constitutes a status based 
conception of liberty.  For example, if non-domination is 
to be viewed teleologically, there plausibly could be cases 
in which a slave, under the rule of a benevolent master, 
suffers less domination overall than he or she would as say 
a wage laborer. While the benevolent master may possess the 
unfettered capacity to interfere in slave's affairs at 
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will, he or she may also provide for the slave's well-fare 
and protection.  It could plausibly be said that such a 
slave will enjoy a greater degree of non-domination than 
the laborer   
who can be fired at any moment and hence lacks such 
security.  If so we cannot say that the slave is not free, 
or at least less free than he or she would be otherwise, 
without knowing something about the slave’s situation.  But 
then it is not the slave’s status as a slave that makes him 
or her unfree in the relevant sense.  Accordingly, slavery 
no longer serves as the paradigmatic case of unfreedom.  
Ironically, the very feature of the non-domination account 
that distinguishes it from the negative one, namely its 
emphasis on the importance of the security of one's 
liberty, also undermines its ability to effectively capture 
the intuition that underpins the lucky slave case.  But 
this was supposed to be its defining feature. 
 When we extrapolate from the slave case, the 
implications of Pettit's view become even more worrisome.  
Could a benevolent dictator in some cases ensure greater 
non-domination for all than a democratically controlled 
state? Pettit's non-domination account unfortunately does 
not offer us a means for ruling out this possibility. 
Pettit is in fact surprisingly quick to dismiss the 
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inviolability of traditional checks against government 
power, such as basic rights.  When addressing the 
historical connection between republicanism and the 
doctrine of natural rights, Pettit states: 
 
My inclination is to think that when republicans 
spoke of natural rights […] they generally meant 
to argue that certain legal rights were essential 
means of achieving freedom as non-domination, and 
that the description of such rights as natural 
did not have more than rhetorical significance 
for them. In particular, it did not imply that 
the rights were fundamental norms that called to 
be honoured in deontological fashion. (Pettit 
1999: 101) 
 
Again we encounter a familiar problem.  Pettit understands 
the value of basic liberties to be purely instrumental in 
nature.  As such, they are not the sorts of things one can 
appeal to in order in order to oppose coercion.  That is, 
they do not empower people to actively resists unwanted 
interference. Presumably the value of other democratic 
institutions must also be instrumental in nature on 
Pettit's view, and we are accordingly left to wonder 
whether the non-domination account really does establish a 
fundamental connection between liberty and democratic 








When taken in conjunction, the four problems outlined above 
highlight the ultimate inadequacy of Pettit's non-
domination account as it stands.  If state administered 
interference accords with your interests (either 
authentically or collectively understood), if it promotes 
the degree of nondominated choice you enjoy in the 
evaluatively more significant areas of your life, or if it 
is designed to maximize the overall amount of non-
domination you enjoy, it need not be considered freedom 
limiting.  It is accordingly difficult to identify any 
discernible limit to state power on the non-domination 
account.  
As such, despite its initial promise, the non-
domination account fails both on its own terms and as a 
viable candidate for a liberal conception of liberty.  It 
fails on its own terms because it does not ultimately 
constitute a status based conception of liberty and 
accordingly cannot account for that feature of slavery that 
makes the lucky slave unfree. And it fails as a liberal 
conception because it is overly lax when it comes to the 
permissibility of state interference, particularly in 
regards to basic liberties.  As we noted earlier, in 
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attempting to develop a non-liberal conception of liberty, 











PURE NEGATIVE LIBERTY 
 
Pure Negative Liberty and Non-domination 
 
The hope explored at length in the previous chapter was 
that Pettit’s non-domination view could provide an account 
of liberty that was richer than the negative conception but 
avoided the anti-liberal implication of the positive 
conception. Ultimately, however, Pettit’s view succumbs to 
the same fate as the aggregate strategies we explored in 
previous chapters: it collapses into a kind of positive 
view. Still, I hope to argue that the initial promise of 
Pettit’s approach can be salvaged with a reformulated 
account of non-domination -- or what I will call anti-
domination -- that avoids these problems.   
 Before doing so, however, I want to first examine 
another line of criticism that has been leveled against 
Pettit's view. This line of criticism comes from proponents 
of the “pure negative” view of liberty (Carter 2008), Ian 
Carter and Matthew Kramer, who argue  that the negative 
conception, properly understood, better accounts for the 
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sorts of violations of liberty that Pettit asserts are 
uniquely captured by the non-domination account. According 
to Carter and Kramer, Pettit is right to recognize the 
deficiencies of liberal defenses of negative freedom, but, 
they maintain, it is not the conception of negative liberty 
as such that  is the problem but the way in which this 
conception has traditionally been articulated (Kramer 2008: 
34; Carter 2008: 58).  The conclusion to draw from Pettit’s 
insights then is not that a third conception of freedom is 
required, but that we need a more systematic and fully 
coherent account of the negative view.   
 Were such an account available, it would indeed 
provide an appealing option from the liberal perspective.  
The pure negative view would presumably avoid the problems 
inherent to positive views, which we have discussed at 
length, while also being able to account for the harms of 
domination.  The question then is can the pure negative 
articulation avoid the criticisms levied at negative views, 
traditionally construed, in addition to avoiding the anti-
liberal implications of positive views. 
 Unfortunately, while I think the criticisms advanced 
by Carter and Kramer against Pettit's non-domination 
account are successful, their own project is less 
promising.  While superior to traditional articulations of 
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the negative view in some respects, the pure negative view, 
as I will argue, still contains serious deficiencies and is 
ultimately insufficient on liberal grounds.  In the end, 
Pettit is right to think that a status based conception 
liberty is able to capture something normatively 
significant that the pure negative conception cannot even 
if his own view falls short of fully realizing such a 
conception.   
 I will take up this project in Chapters 5 and 6, but 
in this chapter I will first examine the criticisms posed 
by Carter and Kramer and the inadequacy of Pettit's 
response.  I will then evaluate the pure negative view on 
its own terms. 
 
 
The Possibility of Interference 
 
 
Recall that domination, on Pettit's formulation, consists 
in the exposure to the possibility of arbitrary 
interference. Carter and Kramer focus their criticisms on 
what it means for interference to be both possible and 
arbitrary. We spent a considerable amount of time 
discussing the problems the arbitrariness standard creates 
for Pettit's view in the preceding chapter, so I will not 
revisit them here.  We also explored to some degree the 
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problems that the possibility standard creates as well, 
but, since the sorts of criticisms advanced by Carter and 
Kramer – and shared by others who are not themselves 
proponents of the pure negative view – are to some extent 
unique from the ones we explored earlier, and because this 
issue formulates the crux of the debate between Pettit on 
one side and Carter and Kramer on the other, it is worth 
exploring these issues further. 
 One problem we examined last chapter was that, if we 
hold that it is the mere possibility of interference rather 
than its relative probability which matters, then freedom 
becomes impossible to measure.  Unfortunately, freedom must 
be measurable if non-domination is to be regarded as a 
value in the consenquentialist sense as Petitt insists. 
Aside from this internal tension within Pettit's own view, 
however, there is the more general worry that his 
insistence on focusing on the possibility rather than the 
probability of interference leads to some rather 
counterintuitive conclusions.  The problem is that the 
possibility standard is so weak it extends the umbrella of 
dominating relationships far too wide.   
 Kramer offers a somewhat fantastical example of one 
such relationship (Kramer 2008: 41ff): imagine a gentle 
giant who, because of his large size and brute strength, 
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could at any moment, and with relative ease, interfere in 
the life of any member of his community.  Because of his 
shy and passive demeanor, however, the giant would never 
think of acting in such a manner, and his fellow citizens 
are fully aware of this fact.  He certainly has the 
capacity to interfere, but the likelihood that he will 
exercise it is miniscule, perhaps even approaching zero. To 
take the example somewhat further than Kramer does, suppose 
also that, in addition to being shy and passive, the giant 
is also extremely deferential and accommodating.  Not 
wishing to upset others, whenever possible he honors their 
requests and obeys their directives.  
 On Pettit's view, it seems we would have to conclude 
that, in spite of all this, the giant is nonetheless a 
dominator on account of his capacity to interfere. But this 
hardly seems plausible.  The giant after all not only has 
no intention of harming anyone, he also obeys whenever 
commanded. At the very least, we could hardly imagine that 
his fellow citizens would experience this relationship as 
one of domination, and we would be hard pressed to think of 
a reason why they should. The giant's mere capacity to 
interfere thus intuitively seems insufficient to produce a 
relationship of domination absent some higher degree of 
probability that he will utilize it. 
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 Perhaps Pettit could dismiss this example as overly 
fantastic.  In more real world examples, we will never have 
such assurances that a more powerful party will not choose 
to interfere.  In addition, if the giant's extreme aversion 
to committing interference functions as a kind 
psychological incapacity, like some form of “pathology” 
(Pettit 2008: 123), then we could reasonably conclude that 
the chances of him interfering are not merely unlikely but 
effectively impossible, in which case he would not exercise 
domination over his fellow citizens on Pettit's own 
standards.   
 I do not think, however, that the problem highlighted 
by Kramer's example can be so easily dismissed.  Gerald 
Gaus has developed the following much more real world 
example with similarly counterintuitive results: 
 
A downright counterintuitive consequence of 
Pettit's freedom barometer is that my freedom is 
affected by people with whom I have nothing to do, 
of whom I have no knowledge and who have never 
altered my option set.  Suppose, for example, that 
in Ukraine there was an ex-Soviet general who, 
during the 1990s, kept control of a battery of 
nuclear missiles for old times' sake; keeping them 
in working order was his hobby.  Certainly, the 
consequence of this is that I was a little less 
secure than I thought I was in the 1990s, but to 
Pettit I was less free.  This general had the 
capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis with 
certain choices of mine.  He never did, and 
because I had no knowledge of him, he had no 
impact at all on my life.  It strikes me as 
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counterintuitive that when the general finally 
gave up his missiles at the end of the decade, my 
level of freedom went up. (Gaus 2008: 73)   
 
Gaus's example highlights a problem we explored last 
chapter: Pettit's view effectively conflates liberty and 
security.  In Gaus's example, we need not ascribe to the 
general any pathological condition in order to account for 
the improbability of his interfering.  The general simply 
has no interest in using the missiles as weapons. He is 
only trying to keep himself busy.   
 Again, we can strengthen these counterintuitive 
implications by elaborating on this example somewhat 
further.  Suppose that the general does not even know that 
the missiles he is in control of are opperational.  In 
fact, he has assumed, albeit incorrectly, that they have 
been disarmed.  Maintaining them for him is simply a daily 
ritual. He has no intention of yielding their destructive 
power nor does he even realize that he could do so. Can we 
really assert that a relationship of domination obtains 
here? Perhaps Pettit would want claim that, in this case, 
the general's lack of knowledge effectively renders his 
capacity to interfere impossible, since he cannot knowingly 
exercise it, and that therefore, like the gentle giant, he 
also fails to exercise domination over anyone.  This does 
not follow, however, since the general could, at any 
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moment, decide to launch the missiles on a whim; he could 
simply push the launch button purely for his own amusement.  
The fact that he does not realize the devastating 
consequences this would have in no way prevents him from 
doing so.  
 No doubt, we should find this scenario troubling.  The 
chance that the general might unwittingly or accidentally 
launch these missiles, however unlikely, is surely still 
cause for concern.  But it intuitively seems like our 
concern in this case is for our security, not our freedom.  
While the potentially absent minded general puts our lives 
at risk, he no more dominates us than does the reckless 
driver or the careless surgeon,
1 and this is what underpins Gaus's 
intuition that Pettit's “freedom barometer” is highly skewed. 
 Even when considering the sorts of cases that the non-
domination view is supposedly designed to best accommodate, 
Pettit's emphasis on the significance of merely possible 
                                                 
1
 It is worth noting that this example raises certain questions that I am 
unable to explore here fully.  In particular, there is the vexing 
question of, should the general (or the reckless driver or careless 
surgeon) actually come to interfere in my affairs, does their 
interference constitute a reduction of my freedom if they had no 
intention of doing so?   The way Gaus presents the example suggests 
that he leans towards no.  Kramer, however, argues that they do (see 
Kramer 2008: chapter 4).  This in itself is an enormously complex 
issue, but I will not address it here since I think that both Gaus and 
Kramer would agree that Pettit's view cannot handle such examples 
successfully.  Whereas Kramer would want to insist that actual 
interference due to recklessness does diminish freedom and Gaus would 
not, both would agree that, when the likelihood of such interference is 
low, we should not be overly concerned about its freedom reducing 




interference generates serious worries.  Consider again the 
case of the housewife who, as long as she remains properly 
deferential to her husband, will encounter little or no 
actual interference in her day-to-day affairs.  On the non-
domination account, she remains unfree even when not 
interfered with because her husband retains the capacity to 
interfere.  Like the lucky slave, the subordinated 
housewife is supposed to be one of the instances of 
unfreedom that the non-domination view is uniquely well 
suited to capture.  Nonetheless, Pettit's justification for 
why this scenario constitutes a case of domination exposes 
his view to a line of feminist criticism.  As Marilyn 
Friedman (2008) has argued, Pettit's view entails an 
implausible, and perhaps even masculinist, conception of 
human beings as completely independent and entirely self-
sufficient.
2
  As Friedman points out, Pettit often describes 
those who suffer domination as “dependent” (Friedman 2008: 
254), and indeed it seems to follow that, if one is in 
anyway dependent on another, then one is thereby subject to 
the possibility of arbitrary interference, as one's 
dependency can always be exploited by whomever one is 
dependent upon.  The problem, according to Friedman, is 
                                                 
2




that human beings are necessarily interdependent by their 
very nature:  
 
Being dependent on others for at least some times 
or some aspects of survival is the common lot of 
all human beings.  There is nothing to scorn in 
dependency.  What is needed instead is a proper 
appreciation of how to manage the inter-
dependencies of human relationships in ways that 
benefit all participants while minimizing 
arbitrary interference and abuses that dependency 
may permit to happen. (Friedman 2008: 255)   
 
Pettit's view essentially neglects the significance of 
relationships of care.  Such relationships are fundamental 
features of human life, but they necessarily expose us to 
the possibility of arbitrary interference.
3
  If such 
dependency is all that is necessary to produce a 
relationship of domination, then achieving non-domination 
is an impossible feat for anyone.  Accordingly, we should 
not be concerned with the mere possibility of interference, 
but the relative likelihood that one party of a 
relationship will experience arbitrary interference over 
the course of time (Friedman, 2008: 256). 
 I hope to revisit these examples in the following 
chapter, but for now I want to examine the extent to which 
the pure negative view is better equipped to avoid the 
                                                 
3
 Pettit could respond that relationships of care are not dominating 
because interference done in the name of care is not arbitrary.  This, 
however, would only reinforce the worry that Pettit's view is 




problems associated with these examples as well as the 
problems discussed in the preceding chapter. 
 
Pure Negative Liberty 
 
 
As we have seen, Pettit's requirement that interference be 
possible and arbitrary in order to be dominating renders 
his account deeply problematic in a variety of respects.  
It is worth asking then whether our conception of freedom 
must be formulated in this way in order to account for the 
sorts of cases that concern Pettit.  Essentially, Carter 
and Kramer argue that it does not.  In fact, they argue 
that the negative conception is perfectly well equipped for 
the task once properly formulated. 
 Drawing on the work of Hillel Steiner (1994), Carter 
(2008) and Kramer (2008) have developed what what Carter 
calls the “pure negative” view (Carter 2008), wherein 
liberty is measured by the total number of possible actions 
available to an agent.  This view is pure in the sense that 
it only considers whether performing such actions is 
physically possible and not whether doing so is desirable, 
rational, prohibitively costly, etc.  In short, it is a 
strictly non-aggregate conception of negative liberty (it 
is worth noting that Kramer's view is not, in the strictest 
sense, a “pure negative” view, since he does introduce 
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evaluative considerations into the measurement of overall 
liberty. We will have an opportunity to reexamine this 
detail of Kramer's view a little later in this chapter). 
 As liberals, we have good reason to be concerned about 
the measure of our overall liberty, Carter and Kramer 
contend, since liberty is a quantitative good. Liberty has 
quantitative value in two respects: it has both “non-
specific instrumental” and “non-specific constitutive” 
value (Carter 1999: chapter 2). Liberty has instrumental 
value because it allows us to engage in a host of valuable 
activities.  If we had little or no freedom, we would be 
prevented from doing the sorts things that we find 
valuable.  Yet freedom is nonetheless non-specifically 
valuable in this sense because we often do not know in 
advance what sorts of activities will have value for us 
(Kramer 2003: 430).  Because life is filled with 
contingencies, we want to have as much liberty as is 
reasonable so that we might be able adapt accordingly. In 
this respect, liberty is like money (Carter 1999: 51).  We 
desire money because it is a means to obtaining other 
valuable things, but we also seek to amass large quantities 
of money itself because we do not always know when we will 
need it or what we will need it for. In short, we do not 
just want vouchers for certain specific goods; we want a 
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currency which we can exchange for any possible good. 
 Freedom also has non-specific constitutive value 
because it is a constituent element of another essential 
value, namely individual autonomy (Kramer 2003: 431). In 
order to be autonomous, I must possess a degree of negative 
freedom.  If I am physically prevented from pursuing 
certain actions, I am thereby unable to exercise my will. 
Again, it is essential to note that freedom is still non-
specifically valuable in this sense because, in order to 
achieve autonomy, it is crucial not only that I be free, in 
the negative sense, to do what I choose, but also that I 
have the option of not pursuing a host of other possible 
courses of action that I might have chosen.
4
  I am more 
autonomous when I purposefully select one option from many 
after deliberation than I am when I have only one choice, 
even if this is the option I would have ultimately chosen 
anyway (Kramer 2003: 431).     
 This is why proponents of the pure negative view 
contend we should be interested in maximizing an agents 
overall negative liberty.  In this respect, freedom, as 
Steiner stresses, is to be understood extensionally as 
                                                 
4
 This view is similar to Raz's (1986)  which we explored in chapter 1, 
except Carter and Kramer are explicit that they are interested in 
options understood in the purely extensional, negative sense (and I say 
more about this later in this chapter) whereas Raz is much less clear 
on this issue. 
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opposed to intensionally (Steiner 1994: 34ff.).  That is, 
actions are to be characterized in terms of the physical 
components necessarily involved in performing them rather 
than in terms of the possible descriptions they could 
accurately fall under.  If freedom were treated 
intensionally, measuring it would prove impossible, since 
any action could satisfy an indefinite number of possible 
descriptions.  For example, in mowing my lawn, I am engaged 
in an activity that takes place over a quantifiable 
physical area involving the lawn, my body, the mower, etc.  
But this very same activity admits of indefinitely many 
descriptions: completing a burdensome chore, trying to 
pacify my neighbors, just killing time, etc.  What is 
relevant in terms of my freedom in this case, Steiner 
contends, is that I can physically perform this action.  
Thus, we should say that I am free to perform one definite 
action in mowing my lawn rather than indefinitely many 
actions (free to complete a chore, free to pacify my 
neighbors, free to kill time, etc.). 
 Such an account will no doubt have to be able to 
answer some rather difficult questions concerning whether 
freedom is measurable even in the purely extensional sense.
5
 
                                                 
5
 Here are just some potentially vexing questions: if space and time are 
infinitely divisible, is it not the case that, in being able to perform 
one action, I am thereby free to perform an infinite number of actions, 
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Steiner (1994), Carter (1999), and Kramer (2003) argue at 
length that such measurements are, in theory at least, 
possible, and they spend a considerable amount of time 
disputing objections to the contrary.  For my purposes 
here, I will simply assume that they are right about this.  
But there is one potential objection I do want to consider 
since it is particularly relevant to our present 
discussion.  
 At first glance, the lucky slave appears to put a 
wrinkle in the pure negative view.  The lucky slave may 
have access to the physical components necessary to perform 
a host of actions, and yet we still want to say that the 
slave is not free in a significant respect.  Steiner in 
fact seems fully aware of this problem when he states: 
 
Evidently persons who are owned by other persons 
possess no assigned freedom whatsoever.  It's not 
that slaves have few rights: they have none.  Of 
course, they usually do have some freedom.  How 
else could they perform tasks?  But that freedom 
doesn't belong to them.  It lies, as they do, 
entirely within their owners' domains. (Steiner 
1994: 231) 
 
The problem, though, is that to understand the slave's 
predicament in this way is to understand the slave's 
                                                                                                                                                 
and doesn't this render quantitative comparisons between levels of 
freedom impossible?  Other questions must be answered as well, such as, 
how do we determine the size of our unit of measurement?  How do we 
take into consideration probability and contingencies?  How do we 
account for collective actions? Etc.    
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freedom intensionally and not just extensionally.  To see 
this, let us revisit the lawn mowing example.  Though 
mowing my lawn is an action that takes place over a 
definite physical area during a definite duration of time, 
certain intensional descriptions of this action seem 
relevant in order to determine whether or not I am 
performing it freely.  It matters, for example, whether I 
am mowing my lawn purely on my own accord, or whether I 
have merely been given permission to do so by another.  If 
I were a slave, I might be perfectly free, in the purely 
extensional sense, to mow my lawn either because this is 
something my master commands me to do or because it is 
something he or she merely tolerates (perhaps I am only 
able to live at on “my” property by master's good graces, 
and mowing my lawn is something he or she requires of me).  
Either way, it seems as if my freedom to mow my lawn (or to 
perform any other task) differs significantly under these 
conditions from my freedom to do so when I am the sole 
agent of control.  In order to be free in this stronger 
latter sense, the action of mowing my lawn must fall under 
the description of “doing something I am entitled to do” 
rather than the description of “doing something I am 
permitted or commanded to do” though both descriptions have 
the same extension; they both describe the same single 
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physical act.   
 What the purely extensional account seemingly fails to 
capture is the significance of one's status in determining 
one's freedom.  At least as Steiner presents it, the pure 
negative view by itself cannot account for the freedom 
limiting effects of slavery without being supplemented by 
something like Pettit's non-domination account. 
Accordingly, we might think that Pettit is therefore 
correct in asserting that there is a conceptual distinction 
between freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-
domination.   
Kramer and Carter, however, question whether this 
conceptual distinction really holds, or at least whether 
the harms identified by Pettit under the banner of 
domination cannot be equally well accounted for by the 
negative conception.  To this end, Kramer and Carter 
highlight a crucial distinction overlooked by Pettit as 
well as many proponents of the negative view, including 
Berlin: the distinction between an agent's negative freedom 
to perform any single act and his or her overall negative 
freedom, or the total number of actions he or she is free 
to perform. As Kramer puts it, the “overall freedom of each 
person […] is determined by the range of combinations of 
conjunctively exercisable opportunities that are available 
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to him” (Kramer 2008: 34).  Freedom, on this understanding 
of the negative view, is concerned not just with the 
interference an agent encounters in attempting to engage in 
any particular act, but with the range of possible actions 
he or she could perform unimpeded under given 
circumstances.  Understood this way, negative freedom is a 
“modal” concept (Kramer 2003: 4).  That is, it takes into 
consideration not only actual interference but the relative 
likelihood of possible future interference. 
 To illustrate this point, consider the ways in which 
threats constitute coercion though no actual interference 
need occur. Recall from chapter 1 that one of the problems 
with the negative view is that it seemingly cannot account 
for why threats have this freedom-reducing effect. Provided 
that you comply with whatever the threatening agent 
demands, no actual interference will occur.  Furthermore 
threats rarely prevent you from doing whatever you wish to, 
strictly speaking; they just make it rather costly.  So 
when the bully threatens to beat me senseless if I do not 
act in accordance with his or her wishes, I may still 
choose to act otherwise if I am willing to pay this rather 
steep price.  Accordingly, some have argued that, unless we 
supplement the negative view with some account of what 
choices can reasonably be considered viable, it cannot 
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account for the coercive nature of threats (Benn and 
Weinstein 1972). 
 Carter and Kramer, however, stress that the pure 
negative view can easily accommodate such cases once we 
recognize the distinction between an agent's freedom to 
perform a given action and his or her total net liberty.  
While threats may not prevent an agent from performing this 
or that particular act, they will greatly reduce his or her 
overall freedom.  When the highwayman threatens, “your 
money or your life,” or the bully demands to be treated 
with deference, you may avoid physical interference 
provided that you comply, but your freedom will nonetheless 
be diminished in the pure negative sense because the range 
of conjunctively exercisable opportunities has been greatly 
reduced.  The highwayman prevents you from keeping your 
money and your life just as the bully prevents you from 
engaging in any range of behaviors that would upset him or 
her.  
 Kramer and Carter argue that something similar 
obtains in the case of the lucky slave.  Even though 
the lucky slave might not suffer actual interference at 
any given moment, he or she will be subjected to 
interference if he or she acts against the master’s 
wishes or if the master’s relatively tolerant 
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disposition were to suddenly change.  Either way, the 
slave’s range of conjunctively exercisable options will 
be limited simply because he or she is at the mercy of 
the master, and this will be no less true at times when 
the slave is able to avoid the master’s wrath.  
 Carter stresses that the link between slavery and 
unfreedom on the pure negative view is thus an empirical 
rather than an essential one (Carter 2008: 80ff).  Based on 
what we know about the institution of slavery, we have good 
reason to believe that slaves will suffer significant 
interference over the course of their lives, and we thus 
have good reason to be concerned about the status of slaves 
on the pure negative account.  In turn, policies and 
institutions designed to promote negative liberty should be 
sensitive to the condition of lucky slaves.  According to 
Kramer and Carter then, there is no real substantive harm 
captured by the non-domination view that isn’t as equally 
well accounted for by the pure negative view. 
 Pettit's most recent articulation of the non-domination 
account seems to confirm Carter and Kramer's suspicions.  
Consider how Pettit distinguishes domination from mere 
interference: 
 
Take the scenario where others do not interfere in 
a given case because, as it happens, they are 
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happy with the way I am acting or they are happy, 
at least for the moment, to let me have my way.  
They are able to interfere arbitrarily with me, 
should that be to their tastes, and the only 
reason they do not interfere in a particular case 
is that I display a congenial profile.  They leave 
me alone so long as I behave to their taste but 
they are ready to interfere if I ever begin to 
deviate from that pattern – or if their taste 
changes.  They economize on interference, 
resorting to it only on a need-for-action Basis. 
(Pettit 2010: 36; emphasis added) 
 
An agent under this condition, Pettit adds, “will no longer 
have access to the option x, for example, but only x-
provided-it-is-to-the -taste-of-those-others” (Pettit ??? 
59).  It is clear, though, that this agent's negative 
liberty is drastically reduced in this scenario.  He or she 
will be unfree, in the pure negative sense, to perform any 
range of actions that are not “to-the-taste-of-those-others” 
even if he or she is able to avoid actual interference by 
not engaging in these sorts of activities.  Understood this 
way, it is indeed hard to see how freedom as non-domination 
and freedom as non-interference substantially differ. 
 Indeed, Pettit's non-domination view is particularly 
vulnerable to the sorts of objections advanced by Carter and 
Kramer because, as we saw last chapter, he insists on 
treating non-domination as a value to be maximized rather 
than a constraint to be respected.  So, recall that there 
may be instances when it is worthwhile to give certain 
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legislative or judicial authorities a large degree of 
discretion or unchecked power in the service of maximizing 
overall non-domination.  If this is so, however, then there 
can be possible cases in which a slave, under the rule of a 
benevolent master, suffers less domination overall than he 
or she would as say a wage laborer.  As such, we cannot say 
that the slave is not free, or at least less free than he or 
she would be otherwise, without knowing something about what 
freedom reducing harms he or she is likely to suffer in this 
or that situation.  But then it is not the slave’s status as 
a slave that makes him or her unfree in the relevant sense.  
Rather it is something about the harms the slave is likely 
or not likely to suffer in virtue of occupying this status.  
The connection between slavery and unfreedom on Pettit’s 
non-domination is accordingly also an empirical rather than 
an essential one.  As such, it is hard to understand what 
the harms of domination could be other than that of 
interference. 
 Pettit offers two responses to this objection (Pettit 
2008), neither of which, I will argue, is adequate.  First, 
Pettit insists that the pure negative view individuates 
options in an implausibly coarse manner.  On Pettit’s view, 
threats constitute coercion not because they remove a 
possible option, but because they change the content of the 
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options available.  This is because an option is best 
understood as, “a package of probabilistically weighted 
possible consequences, each with its own attractive or 
aversive aspect” (Pettit 2008: 121).  So when the highwayman 
threatens you with the choice between your money or your 
life, the first option is not the same as the option of 
keeping your money when no such threat is present because, 
with the threat, the consequences of selecting that option 
have dramatically changed.  As such, options must be 
evaluated in context and cannot be treated as the same in 
isolation. 
 To illustrate the implausibility of the pure negative 
view, Pettit argues that the overly coarse way of 
individuating options leads to counterintuitive judgments 
concerning the rationality of decisions.  Say in choice 
situation A, you are given the choice between a large apple 
and an orange, and you are disposed to take the apple and 
give your friend the orange.  In choice situation B, you 
are given a choice between an orange and a small apple, and 
you are disposed to take the orange and give your friend 
the apple.  Now let’s say in choice situation C you are 
given a choice between a large apple and a small apple.  If 
we stick to the coarse individuation of options, 
transitivity would demand that you take the large apple and 
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give your friend the small one.  Pettit, however, insists 
that this is counterintuitive, since you may have good 
reason to keep the small apple and give your friend the 
large one, perhaps because you don’t want to be rude 
(Pettit 2008: 122).  The choice of the large apple is not 
the same across situation A and situation C (and likewise 
for the small apple across situation B and C) because the 
context has changed.  So one can be rational in picking the 
large apple in choice situation A, the orange in B, and the 
small apple in C. The pure negative view, however, would 
seem to require that you must pick the large apple in 
situation C in order to avoid acting irrationally by 
violating transitivity. 
 Pettit’s first objection, however, is question 
begging.  Individuating options in the manner Pettit 
suggests requires that we consider not just the physical 
availability of these options, but their qualitative worth 
as defined by their “attractive and aversive aspects” 
(Pettit 2008: 121).  But it is precisely these sorts of 
evaluative considerations that the pure negative view 
contends we should ignore when considering the range of 
options available to an agent, even though they may be 
relevant for other determinations, such as rationality.  
The manner in which we individuate options is determined by 
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our purposes for individuating them.  Nothing in principle 
prevents us from holding that options should be treated 
purely extensionally when evaluating an agent's liberty, 
but should be treated differently when evaluating his or 
her rationality.  Pettit simply asserts that there should 
be symmetry here without argument. 
 Proponents of the pure negative view, however, hold 
that we have good reasons for not treating freedom and 
rationality as symetrical in this sense.  Assessing an 
agent’s rationality requires that we take into 
consideration not only the availability of certain options, 
but their desirability either by the agent’s own lights or 
by some more objective standard.  In short, rationality is 
an exercise concept rather than an opportunity concept.  
The mere availability of one or many courses of rational 
action is clearly not enough to declare that an agent who 
possesses them is thereby acting rationally.  Acting 
rationally requires that he or she actively engage in one 
of these courses of actions.  So we should not be surprised 
that there is an asymmetry between how we demarcate actions 
for the purposes of determining rationality and how we 
demarcate them for the purposes of determining freedom if 
we think, as proponents of the pure negative view certainly 




 In addition there are good reasons not to treat 
freedom as an exercise concept in order to preserve this 
symmetry.  If an agent’s evaluative judgments are relevant 
when determining the content of options, then one’s options 
can change not only through threats, but also through 
changes in one’s own preferences.  On Pettit’s method of 
individuating options, the choice between your money or 
your life necessarily changes not only when the highwayman 
forces you to choose between the two, but also when you 
change your own qualitative evaluations of the worth of 
these options.  You may, for example, suddenly come to 
recognize the depravity of a life that places so great an 
emphasis on material goods, in which case giving up your 
money might seem less like tragic loss and more like a 
welcomed opportunity.  But we clearly wouldn’t want to take 
such changes in preferences into account when assessing an 
agent’s overall freedom because then a slave could become 
more free simply by desiring less (Berlin 2002: 31).  As 
such, not only lucky slaves, but rather unlucky ones, could 
be counted as free provided that they come to desire only 
those things that their masters permit.   
 A conception of freedom that equates alleviating the 
plight of slaves through the imprisonment of slave holders 
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with convincing those suffering from enslavement to simply 
lower their expectations is a politically deficient one on 
any measure, but this prospect is particularly troubling 
for Pettit’s view, since slavery is supposed to be 
paradigmatic case of unfreedom on the republican account.  
So not only does the pure negative means of individuating 
options seem better able to account for the harms of 
slavery than Pettit's, we again see here how Pettit's view 
begins to resemble a positive conception of liberty under 
further scrutiny. 
 Pettit's second objection is that the Carter/Kramer 
view cannot account for cases in which an agent is exposed 
only to the possibility of interference, and we have little 
reason to believe that this interference will ever actually 
materialize -- in other words, cases in which the 
dominating agent will never exercise his or her power to 
interfere no matter what the dominated agent does.  
Unfortunately, though, it seems as if the only cases 
covered by this stipulation are the cases in which the non-
domination view intuitively fairs rather poorly, such as 
Kramer's gentle giant example and Gaus's Soviet general 
example.  On the pure negative view, we can explain why the 
gentle giant and the Soviet general intuitively do not 
substantially limit our freedom because neither has any 
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impact on the range of conjunctively exercisable actions we 
are free to perform. Were the giant to suddenly become not-
so-gentle or the general to become not-so-disengaged, we 
would think differently about these scenarios.  But the 
pure negative view can accommodate this shift in attitude 
because now the likelihood that either the giant or the 
general will have a substantial negative impact on the 
range of actions we may perform has greatly increased. 
Furthermore, concentrating on the probability of 
interference in favor of the possibility of interference 
avoids the measurement problems we explored in the previous 
chapter as well as the interdependency problems raised by 
Friedman.  Accordingly, the fact that the non-domination 
view includes cases of possible interference that the pure 
negative view excludes seems more like a vice than a 
virtue. 
 As such, Pettit's responses to Carter and Kramer's 
objections are ultimately unsatisfactory.  Still, we might 
wonder whether a more successful defense could be marshaled 
in favor of the non-domination view. Pettit does, at the 
very least, highlight one intuition that plausibly cuts 
against the plausibility of the pure negative account.  The 
slave who is spared the wrath of his or her master because 
the master has suddenly “fallen in love” or “discovered 
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religion,” will no doubt appreciate the resulting decrease 
in actual interference, Pettit acknowledges, but he or she 
is still subjugated in a way that the person whose social 
and political status necessarily protects him or her from 
being subjected to this kind treatment is not (Pettit 2008: 
125). But whatever the merits of this intuition, Pettit's 
view is ill-equipped to capture it because, as we explored 
at length last chapter, the non-domination view is, at its 
core, ultimately not a status-based conception of liberty 
either.  I hope to save these intuitions in the proceeding 
chapter, but now I want to examine the feasibility of the 
pure negative view on its own terms. 
 
Problems with Pure Negative Liberty 
 
 
In several respects, the pure negative view, as articulated 
by Carter and Kramer, has considerable appeal.  It does 
seem able to accommodate the lucky slave example (and 
others like it), and it also avoids a problem common to 
negative conceptions explored in chapter 1, namely the 
problem involving the coercive nature of threats.  So, 
while the pure negative view is still an interference-based 
account of liberty at bottom, it is able to account for 
cases of unfreedom that do not involve actual interference.  
Accordingly, it is not hamstrung in the same manner as 
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other negative accounts, such as Berlin's. 
 The pure negative view also seems well suited to avoid 
another set of common of objections that I have advanced 
against both negative and positive conceptions alike.  This 
set of objections pertains to views which render the value 
of freedom purely instrumental in nature.  The worry with 
such views is that, if freedom is simply an instrumental 
value, there will be, from a liberal perspective, an 
unacceptably high number of instances in which it will be 
permissible to restrict freedom to achieve some other end; 
in short, freedom will no longer serve as a central 
political value.  While Carter and Kramer highlight the 
instrumental value of liberty, they also note its “non-
specific” (Cater 1999: 32) or “content-independent” (Kramer 
2003: 431) character.  Because we can never know in advance 
what freedoms will be instrumentally valuable for us, we 
have good reason to value freedom in general rather than 
simply valuing certain specific freedoms only for specific 
purposes.  Further, Carter and Kramer both note that 
freedom is not simply instrumentally valuable, it also 
constitutively valuable, again in the non-specific sense, 
as it is an essential element of individual autonomy.  
Thus, negative liberty is not merely a means for achieving 
autonomy, but part of what makes a given life autonomous. 
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 The question then is whether the pure negative view is 
a satisfactory view all things considered.  In this 
concluding section, I will argue that it is not.  I will 
outline three specific problems with the pure negative 
view.  The first I will call the relational problem, the 
second the new traffic light problem, and the third is the 
familiar problem of basic liberties.   
 
The Relational Problem 
 
One problem with the pure negative view is that it 
potentially broadens the scope of individual liberty in a 
way that renders it far too wide.  If my freedom consists 
in the total number of acts I am free to perform in 
conjunction, then my liberty can be decreased by natural 
barriers every bit as much as social or political ones.  On 
the pure negative view, it seems that we should be equally 
concerned with the freedom limiting effects of natural 
disasters, disease, and the inherent limitations of human 
physiology, as we would be with police states, the 
institution slavery, or coercive threats.  In fact, it is 
indeed possible that natural events, on this view, 
constitute a far greater threat to liberty than any social 
or political phenomenon, and technological advances 
therefore constitute a far greater expansion of liberty 
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than any possible political reform.   
 This, however, seems highly counterintuitive.  As 
Steiner notes, to draw this conclusion is to conflate 
“liberty” and “ability” (Steiner 1983: 74).  While I might, 
for example, regret my inability to fly, I do not regard 
this limitation as equivalent to the kind of limitation I 
suffer when I am subject to physical coercion at the hands 
of others.  Political liberty and physical ability are 
conceptually distinct notions.  It is not clear, however, 
how the pure negative view can account for this 
distinction.  Again, if my freedom is measured in terms of 
the physical components necessarily involved in performing 
any given range of actions, then why isn't my inability to 
fly not every bit as much a limitation of my freedom as 
various social or political barriers, if not more so?   
 For his part, Steiner simply asserts that, “liberty is 
a social relation, a relation between persons” (Steiner 
1983: 74).  So whenever we discuss freedom, what we mean is 
those actions we are free to do absent interference from 
other people.  Accordingly, Steiner further insists, “the 
restraints imposed upon us by nature, and our struggles and 
successes in overcoming them, are subjects deserving of our 
closest attention.  But it is not to physicists, doctors, 
or engineers whom we turn in seeking answers to the 
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question of 'How Free'?” (Steiner 1983: 75). Carter 
explicitly follows Steiner in this respect: 
 
The idea, in other words, is that freedom is a 
social concept -- that 'freedom' expresses a 
relationship between persons -- so that mere 
natural obstacles do not as such constrain a 
person's freedom.  The creation, through 
technological innovation, of the means by which 
obstacles can be overcome does effect freedom, but 
only in the sense that we must ask ourselves, once 
such means have been created, whether and how far 
certain agents withhold those means from others. 
(Carter 1999: 172) 
 
The problem is that this stipulation is entirely ad-hoc.  
There is nothing inherent in the pure negative conception 
itself that would suggest obstacles produced by human 
agents are more significant than natural ones.  Kramer, in 
fact, readily admits that there is no non-circular means of 
justification for circumscribing the scope of negative 
liberty to interpersonal relations (Kramer 2003: 362).  
Still, Kramer sides with Steiner and Carter in asserting 
that this stipulation is ultimately warranted because it 
squares with our basic intuitions (Kramer 2003: 366).  
 Nonetheless, this seems like a major defect with the 
pure negative view.  When inquiring into our conception of 
liberty, we want to know why freedom is a social or 
relational concept, not simply that it is.  In other words, 
we want to know what is it about our conception of liberty 
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that makes social relationships particularly significant.  
For all its faults, Pettit's non-domination view is at 
least capable of doing this much.  If we think that its 
arbitrary interference, rather than interference 
simpliciter, which threatens liberty, then we can easily 
account for why social relationships have the significance 
that they do.  While natural events no doubt frequently 
interfere in our lives, they are hardly capable of 
interfering arbitrarily or non-arbitrarily; they can 
neither track nor fail to track our avowed interests. They 
accordingly limit freedom, but they do not dominate in 
Pettit's terms.  The pure negative view, however, rejects 
including the condition of arbitrariness, hence its purity.  
But if this purity is supposed to be the defining feature 
of the pure negative account, then what justifies the 
stipulation that only human caused obstructions constitute 
interference?  How is this stipulation not prohibited on 
the pure negative view's own terms?  To say that this 
qualification is necessary to avoid certain 
counterintuitive results, while true, is hardly insightful.  
Again, we can always construct, in an ad-hoc fashion, a 
conception of liberty that perfectly fits our intuitions, 
but, as I have noted before, such ad-hoc conceptions are as 
easy to formulate as they are useless. 
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 This methodological concern aside, however, 
restricting the scope of the pure negative view in this way 
creates additional problems for Carter and Kramer's 
position, since this restrictions is in direct tension with 
the stated value of freedom as a quantitative good.  If 
freedom has non-specific instrumental value, then the means 
by which it is obstructed should be entirely irrelevant.  
If it is important for me to possess as much freedom as is 
possible because I have no way of knowing in the future 
what needs I will have or what ends I will wish to pursue, 
then why will it matter to me whether this freedom is 
obtained by limiting interference from others or from 
natural events, especially if natural events represent a 
greater threat of interference?  On the pure negative view, 
my freedom of movement is valuable in itself; securing it 
against intrusion from other people does not somehow make 
it more valuable. 
 This issue is especially relevant because the 
conceptual distinction between natural and human sources of 
interference has significant political implications.  
Imagine, for example, a state with a strong centralized 
government and an entirely state-run economy committed to 
fostering rapid industrialization and economic expansion (a 
state not unlike the post Second World War Soviet Union or 
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China). Such a state will no doubt frequently interfere in 
the lives of its citizens.  But imagine a state official 
justifying this interference by pointing out how the 
advances in technology and infrastructure accomplished 
through rapid economic development allow citizens to do 
much more than they ever could before.  They are, this 
state official might argue, therefore more free overall, 
not in spite, but because of, government interference.  
 What we would likely want to say in response to this 
official is that, even if it were true that state 
controlled economic development provides citizens with new 
opportunities, it does so at the expense of their liberty.  
Under a relational conception of liberty, it would be easy 
to explain why this is so.  Under the pure negative 
conception, however, we would be at somewhat of a loss.  If 
freedom is best understood as the total number of actions 
an agent is free to perform, then the state official has a 
potentially compelling case; on the whole, state control 
produces greater overall liberty.  It is hard to see how 
Carter and Kramer's flat assertion otherwise is at all 
compelling. 
 Perhaps Carter and Kramer could argue that, while this 
objection may hold when we consider the non-specific 
instrumental value of freedom, it does not hold when we 
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consider the constitutive value of freedom.  Insofar as 
negative liberty is a constituent element of autonomy, it 
is only interference from other people that can decrease 
it.  Again, it is not clear why this must be so.  If the 
extent of my autonomy is in part a function of the 
opportunities I am free to reject, why does it matter if I 
secure these opportunities against interference from others 
rather than interference from natural events?  If I am 
destitute and at the mercy of the elements, then won't this 
severely limit my autonomy even if there is no other person 
causally responsible for my predicament?  Some theorists at 
least do hold that natural obstacles significantly limit my 
freedom in this respect (Sen 1992), and Carter and Kramer 
offer no argument to the contrary.   
 Defenders of the pure negative view are accordingly 
incapable of offering an argument in response to cases like 
the one described above.  As such, the circular nature of 
their view is less innocent than they initially let on.  
The problem is that Steiner, Carter, and Kramer are 
ultimately right: political liberty is a relational 







The New Traffic Light Problem 
 
The above considerations give rise to a related, yet 
ultimately, distinct problem. Recall Charles Taylor's 
famous traffic light example (Taylor 1985): if freedom is 
understood in the negative sense, as primarily freedom of 
movement, then traffic lights, Taylor contends, will 
constitute a far greater infraction of liberty than legal 
prohibitions against religious worship, since they will, on 
the whole, result in greater restrictions on one's freedom 
of movement.   
 At first glance, it might seem as if the pure negative 
account cannot escape this result.  Traffic lights often do 
restrict most people's range of conjunctively exercisable 
options whereas, for many at least, prohibitions against 
religious worship would rarely do so.  Carter, however, 
insists that this does not necessarily follow, since, 
contra Taylor, traffic lights do not, on the whole, 
restrict people's range of movement, rather quite the 
opposite: “traffic lights generally serve to increase, not 
decrease,  the overall quantity of action available to 
motorists.  That is what they are designed for” (Carter 
1995: 824,n.13). A state that had no traffic laws would 
thus hardly be more free, in the pure negative sense, than 
one that does; and a state that had no traffic laws and 
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prohibited religious worship would fare even worse in this 
comparison.  Accordingly, Carter contends that the pure 
negative view does not have the counterintuitive 
implications that Taylor suggests. 
 The problem with Carter's response, however, is that 
it proves too much, because now it seems as if traffic 
lights provide a greater contribution to overall liberty 
than laws protecting freedom of religious worship (as well 
as other basic liberties, such as freedom of speech, 
assembly, press, conscience, etc.).  If this is so, then 
the pure negative view still encounters the traffic light 
problem, only now in reverse: a state that has many traffic 
laws and legally restricts religious worship is plausibly 
more free than one that has relatively few traffic laws and 
also no legal prohibitions on religious worship. 
 I think we can better appreciate the difficulty this 
example raises if we broaden its scope somewhat.  Imagine a 
regime that legally prohibits religious worship on the 
basis that religious diversity leads to social instability. 
If citizens are beholden to religious authority, so this 
regime might contend, then this threatens the rule of law, 
and, without the stability provided by the rule of law, it 
will be difficult for citizens to coordinate their actions 
and pursue them in peace.  Under such a justification, the 
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state can reasonably claim that prohibitions against 
religious worship increase, rather than decrease, citizens' 
overall liberty. 
 Of course, on the pure negative view, it does matter 
whether the state is right about this.  If, as an empirical 
matter, permitting religious worship would not result in a 
breakdown of the rule of law, then the pure negative view 
would recommend against imposing these restrictions.  But 
it is not hard to imagine a situation in which a state 
authority would be justified in making this claim, and it 
is not unlikely that some present day states do find 
themselves in a situation like this.
6
 
 Whatever one thinks about the above examples, this 
problem can be broadened further still.  Consider the 
following case: in Italy, following the Second World War, 
it was said of the former deposed and executed fascist 
leader, Mussolini, “at least he made the trains run on 
time.”  The implication of course was that, while Mussolini 
was without question a brutal and oppressive dictator, at 
least pre-war Italy, under his rule, was a place of order 
                                                 
6
 On a smaller scale, at least, we can imagine someone offering this sort 
of a justification for the recent headscarf ban in France or the 
minaret ban in Switzerland.  The growth of a devout minority, whose 
identity is more tied to their religious community than the state they 
reside in, perhaps represents minds of many a threat to social 





and efficiency.  Post-war Italy on the other hand had 
descended into chaos and disorder, suddenly making the day-
to-day activities that people had previously taken for 
granted much more difficult to perform. In making the 
trains run on time, for example, Mussolini greatly 
increased citizens overall freedom of movement, though we 
hardly want to say that he thereby made them more free all 
things considered. On the pure negative view, however, we 
are committed to saying that pre-war Italy was indeed more 
free than post-war Italy, not in spite of, but because of, 
Mussolini's fascist government. 
 Again, the crucial point is that what we want to say 
about such cases is that they perhaps embody a genuine 
conflict between liberty and stability.  But oppressive 
state policies that promote stability do so at the expense 
of citizen's liberty, not in the name of it.  In equating 
liberty with freedom of movement, however, the pure 
negative view effectively collapses the concept of 
political and social order into the concept of liberty.  
Consequently, it provides no means for criticizing certain 
oppressive regimes on the basis that they fail to respect 
individual liberty. 
 This problem is similar to the one concerning the 
relationship between security and non-domination that we 
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explored last chapter, and it is worth noting that the pure 
negative view faces similar difficulties.  Just as 
oppressive regimes might be better suited to provide order 
and stability, so they might be better suited to provide 
greater security.  In doing so, they will also be promoting 
freedom on the pure negative view because any threat to 
one's security potentially limits one's range of available 
actions.  If I am constantly terrorized by violent 
criminals or the prospect of a terrorist attack, I will be 
prevented from engaging a wide range of activities.  
Indeed, Kramer highlights this feature as one of the 
virtues of the pure negative view. Under this view, he 
stresses, “what some negative-liberty theorists have 
perceived as a dichotomy between unfreedom an insecurity 
will turn out to dissolve into a single complicated 
condition of unfreedom” (Kramer 2008: 34).  
 If this is so, however, then the pure negative view 
has the same disturbing implications as the non-domination 
view on this score.  A state that exercises marshal law, 
imposes strict curfews, or engages in intrusive 
surveillance can reasonably claim to be promoting 
individual liberty in the pure negative sense.  This again 
seems like a major defect in the pure negative account.  In 
debating the merits of the Patriot Act or the practice of 
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pretextual traffic stops, we want to be able to weigh the 
potential increase in security against the decrease in 
individual liberty, but the pure negative view, like the 
non-domination view, deprives us of this conceptual 
resource.  Were we to object that the Patriot Act 
sacrifices liberty for security, our objection would not 
simply be wrong on the pure negative view; it would be 
incoherent.   
 To be sure, the pure negative account does have an 
advantage over the non-domination account in regards to 
this issue.  Because the pure negative view is concerned 
with the relative probability of interference rather than 
its mere possibility, under that view, we can say that, 
when a security threat is overblown -- as was likely the 
case with “red scare” -- then the heightened measures of 
security undertaken by the government will not be 
justified.  Still, it is not hard to imagine scenarios in 
which this will not be the case, and in such scenarios we 
want to be able to weigh security concerns against liberty 
concerns, not collapse them. 
 
The Problem of Basic Liberties 
 
Whether Carter and Kramer can marshal an effective response 
to the objections outlined above hinges on whether the pure 
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negative view is capable of accounting for the significance 
of the basic liberties.  It is worth noting, though, this 
problem is distinct from the one discussed above.  The 
problem of basic liberties involves simply whether the pure 
negative view can account for the added significance we 
place on these specific liberties.  The problem outlined 
above, however, concerned the extent to which highly 
invasive efforts by states to ensure either stability or 
security are compatible with promoting overall liberty.  
If, however, the pure negative view can explain why certain 
liberties have greater value, then this problem is 
potentially avoidable.  When state efforts to provide for 
security or stability violate these more basic liberties, 
the pure negative view will be able to hold that such 
efforts do in fact hinder individual liberty on the whole. 
 It is not immediately apparent, however, what 
resources the pure negative view has to account for the 
basic liberties' added significance.  In this respect, 
Taylor's original traffic light problem is still at least 
partially applicable.  Even if traffic lights do not 
constitute a reduction in overall liberty on the pure 
negative account, it is still not clear how basic 
liberties, such as freedom of speech or freedom of 
religion, themselves substantially contribute to overall 
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liberty. After all, the conjunctive range of actions 
involved in speech acts, or anything but the most elaborate 
religious ceremonies, is fairly limited.        
 Carter attempts to respond to this objection by again 
highlighting the distinction between an agent's freedom to 
perform a particular act and his or her overall freedom.  
While it is true, Carter notes, that speech acts themselves 
do not require much in terms of the quantifiable area 
needed to perform them, preventing people from engaging in 
speech acts will require imposing significant restraints, 
and these restraints in turn will greatly limit one's range 
of available options: 
Where agent A is rendered unfree to speak, then, 
there is very likely to be a great reduction is 
A's freedom in an overall sense.  For A will as a 
result be unfree to perform certain bodily 
movements, or will at least be deprived of access 
to the physical space (through which the sound 
waves would have traveled) which would otherwise 
have been directly causally linked to A's body.  
And this will also imply A's unfreedom to bring 
about those events that would be consequent upon 
A's moving her body in those prevented ways (or 
upon A's use of the space or matter to which she 
has been deprived access). (Carter 1999: 206)  
 
There are two problems with this line of response, both of 
which are noted by Kramer (Kramer 2003: 458ff). First, in 
order to show that freedom of speech is significant in 
terms of one's overall liberty, Carter needs to show that 
possessing this liberty substantially contributes to this 
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total measure.  What he has shown instead is that 
restricting this liberty substantially decreases it (Kramer 
2003: 459).    
 This discrepancy makes a significant difference.  To 
see this, consider that we can give virtually any liberty 
greater significance by applying Carter's analysis.  Take 
for example one's freedom to, say, relieve oneself in 
public.  If someone is intent on engaging in this behavior, 
then it will certainly require a great deal of physical 
restraint to prevent him or her from doing so.  
Consequently, his or her range of conjunctively exercisable 
options will be greatly reduced by these preventative 
measures.  But surely this does not make the liberty to 
relieve oneself in public a fundamental or basic one.  That 
question involves whether this activity is something that 
one is entitled to do, and the pure negative view seems 
ill-equipped to answer this question. 
 The second problem is that preventing people from 
engaging in speech acts does not necessarily require the 
employment of such severe physical restraints (Kramer 2003: 
459).  While it is true that the threat of imprisonment, 
for example, will have this kind of effect if carried out, 
other methods will not. At the very least, we can imagine 
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some hypothetical examples of such techniques.
7
  Suppose, 
for instance, that a government was able to develop special 
microchips which it forcibly installed in the brains of all 
citizens.  These microchips prevent citizens from engaging 
in any speech acts the government disapproves of, but their 
effect is limited to this area.  Accordingly, these chips 
would be devastatingly effective at restricting free 
speech, but they would have relatively little effect, if 
any, on citizens' overall available options understood in 
the extensional sense.
8
   
 We do not need to appeal to science-fiction like 
examples, however, to illustrate this problem.  A state 
could just as easily regulate speech by imposing severe 
sanctions on certain speech acts that do not involve long 
term imprisonment.  For example, a state could subject 
citizens who engage in anti-government speech to severe 
beatings and torture, both of which would likely be quite 
effective at discouraging such speech, but neither of which 
would entail significant limitations on the other actions 
citizens would otherwise be free to perform.  The fact that 
restrictions on speech often result in restrictions on 
                                                 
7
 This seems to be the sort of case that Kramer has in mind in objecting 
to Carter's position (Kramer 2003: 459ff) 
 
8
 Carter and Kramer disagree over the extent to which mental acts and 
speech acts can be measured extensionally.  See Kramer 2003. 
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other behaviors – behaviors which in turn do require 
possession over an extensive range of physical space – is 
thus a purely contingent matter, and, as such, the pure 
negative view cannot account for why certain liberties are 
regarded as basic. 
 As was noted in chapter 2, Kramer attempts to solve 
this problem by deviating somewhat from the pure negative 
approach, and I think we are now in a better position to 
give his argument fuller consideration.  When measuring an 
agent's overall freedom, Kramer contends, it is not only 
permissible but necessary to introduce evaluative 
considerations in order to avoid the sorts of problems 
outlined above. Kramer, however, objects to the charge that 
such qualitative considerations are unjustified and 
arbitrary on any pure negative account.  He argues that, 
while freedom does have non-specific, or content 
independent value, we need to recognize that it also has 
specific, or content dependent value (Kramer 2003: 432ff).  
That is, while freedom is in general valuable, certain 
freedoms are more valuable.   
 Recall that freedom, on Carter and Kramer's account, 
has non-specific value, in one respect, insofar as at it is 
constitutive of individual autonomy.  The more freedoms I 
have, the more autonomous I become, regardless of the 
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content of these freedoms. But we can acknowledge that any 
and all freedoms contribute to my autonomy to some extent, 
while also recognizing that certain freedoms make a greater 
contribution, and this contribution cannot necessarily be 
reduced to the extent to which they add to my overall 
freedom of movement.  Any measure of overall freedom 
therefore needs to take into consideration the added 
significance of these evaluative factors.  Otherwise, the 
pure negative view is doomed to have highly 
counterintuitive implications like the ones just 
highlighted. Once we incorporate qualitative considerations 
into our overall metric, however, we can acknowledge the 
proper weightiness of the basic liberties.  These liberties 
are more fundamental despite their relatively meager 
contribution to one's overall freedom of movement because 
they are essential elements of one's individual autonomy 
(Kramer 2003: 463). 
 The question is whether the introduction of 
qualitative considerations avoid the problematic 
implications of the pure negative view at the expense of 
embracing the anti-liberal implications of positive ones.  
Kramer insists that this need not be the case, since we can 
regard the qualitative worth of certain freedoms as having 
a secondary importance in the overall measure of one's 
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freedom.  Of primary importance is whether or not a given 
course of action is physically available to an agent.  
Crucially, while evaluative considerations can give added 
weight to the overall contribution of certain specific 
liberties, they cannot decrease it.  In our overall freedom 
metric, the lowest value any freedom, however small or 
trivial, can have is 1; it cannot be zero or negative 
(Kramer 2003: 428).  Accordingly, evaluative measures can 
only enhance one's liberty understood in the negative 
sense.  As Kramer puts it, “qualitatively-oriented 
weightings, then, occupy, a subordinate place in our 
measurements.  They never lower the numbers at which we 
arrive through our enquiries into the purely physical scope 
of each person's freedoms and unfreedoms” (Kramer 2003: 
429). 
 Kramer's privileging of the “purely physical” 
components of liberty is what broadly places him within the 
pure negative camp despite his inclusion of evaluative 
measures.  It is also what allows him to claim that his 
view avoids certain troubling consequences of positive 
conceptions and other aggregate views.  If freedom is 
primarily a measure of the range of actions one is 
physically capable of performing, then physical force can, 
by stipulation, only decrease one's liberty and never 
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increase it.   
 The question again, though, is what justifies this 
stipulation.    As was mentioned in chapter 2, if certain 
freedoms have content specific value, what prevents others 
from having content specific disvalue (G. Dworkin 1988: 
chapter 5).
9
  And if some freedoms do have disvalue, 
shouldn't our measure of overall freedom include negative 
multipliers as well in order to reflect as much?  Including 
such calculations of course necessarily entails that 
physically restraining people from pursuing certain options 
can, in some cases, result in an increase of their overall 
liberty. As was noted, Kramer strictly rules out this 
possibility, but recognizing the value of certain liberties 
while ignoring the disvalue of others seems entirely 
arbitrary. 
 Even if we grant Kramer that qualitative 
considerations can only add to one's overall liberty, 
however, I do not think his view avoids the above 
implication. If liberty is valuable because it is an 
essential component of autonomy, then it is autonomy, 
rather than negative liberty itself, which is ultimately 
valuable. Further, it must be acknowledged that there are 
other constituent elements of autonomy in addition to 
                                                 
9
 See also: R. Dworkin 2000 and Steiner 1994: 88. 
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negative liberty, and, as Taylor (1985) points out, 
sometimes promoting these elements will be in conflict with 
promoting negative liberty. In order to be autonomous, it 
is necessary not only that I have a significant degree of 
overall negative liberty, in addition to certain specific 
liberties, but also that I generally behave rationally, 
that I have the right sort of knowledge, that I be free 
from fear and manipulation, and that I do not often succumb 
to laziness.  Promoting these elements of my autonomy 
might, in some circumstances at least, require education, 
training, and conditioning that interferes with my overall 
negative liberty (think of our example of Alf and Sergeant 
Green from chapter 1).  Even if it is true that, in order 
to be fully autonomous, I will need to possess a degree of 
negative liberty at some ultimate point in time, it does 
not follow that my negative liberty should be promoted 
above other constituent elements of my autonomy nor even 
that it must be respected in each and every case.  At 
bottom, autonomy is an exercise rather than an opportunity 
concept, and I can possess all the necessary negative 
liberty and yet still not be fully autonomous because I 
fail to act in the appropriate manner. 
 The problem though is that, if freedom is valuable 
because it is necessary for autonomy and our measure of 
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overall freedom is supposed to reflect this, then autonomy 
should be what is primary in terms of one's freedom and 
negative liberty should be given a subordinate status 
(after all, negative liberty is constituent of autonomy and 
not the other way around).  That is, having more negative 
liberty no doubt increases my autonomy, but only if I have 
already achieved some degree of autonomy in other respects 
(i.e. only if I behave rationally, posses the appropriate 
knowledge, do not succumb to fear or laziness, etc). 
Kramer, however, comes to the exact opposite conclusion. 
The only possible justification for this inversion is that 
holding negative liberty as primary, in favor of autonomy, 
is necessary in order to avoid the rather anti-liberal 
implication that one can indeed be forced to be free.  But, 
again, not only does this render Kramer's view entirely ad-
hoc, this stipulation is inconsistent on his own terms.   
 I do not see how Kramer can avoid this problem.  
Notice that this difficulty is not made any better when we 
consider the instrumental value of liberty.  If certain 
specific liberties have content specific instrumental 
value, say because they allow us to do valuable things, 
then, on some occasions at least, forcing people to 
participate in these sorts of activities will be a more 
effective means of achieving these ends than granting them 
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certain allowances.  So we again must ask why not regard 
the instrumental value of liberty as primary and its 
physical extension as secondary. 
 Nor will it help if we, contra Kramer, exclude 
evaluative considerations from our overall measure of 
liberty, but grant that certain liberties can have specific 
value in addition to their contribution to overall liberty. 
This is the line ultimately taken by Carter: 
 
[Valuing freedom in general] will not stop us from 
saying different kinds of freedom, or indeed that 
one kind of freedom – say, freedom of religion – 
is more valuable than another kind of freedom – 
say, freedom of movement – because choosing to 
pursue a particular religion is more valuable than 
choosing to move in a certain direction.  For we 
may still attempt to compare these different kinds 
of freedom in terms of their nonindependent value. 
(Carter 1995: 824)     
 
This approach at least avoids the inconsistency of Kramer's 
alternative, but it does so at the expense of dramatically 
reducing the value of negative liberty itself. In offering 
this concession, Carter is ceding much of the debate to the 
defenders of the positive view.  If Taylor is right in 
thinking that the value of the basic liberties is best 
captured by a positive conception -- and so far we have not 
seen a satisfactory rejoinder from the negative camp -- and 
the value of the basic liberties trumps, on Carter's own 
terms, the value of negative liberties, then the positive 
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conception is, to this extent, normatively superior to the 
negative one, at least on liberal terms.  Recall that, in 
introducing this distinction in the first place, Berlin was 
not concerned with whether negative and positive liberty 
are somehow mutually exclusive at the conceptual level -- 
he thought that quite plainly they are not -- but with 
which one should serve as the normative foundation for a 
liberal political regime.  While Berlin sides with the 
negative conception, if it turns out that this conception 
cannot account for the primacy of the basic liberties, this 
contention seems highly suspect.  Ultimately, Carter 
effectively concedes that the pure negative view is 
insufficient on liberal grounds. 
 
Pure Negative Liberty and Domination Reconsidered 
 
 
Perhaps it could be objected that I have interpreted the 
pure negative view too strongly.  Perhaps proponents of 
this view could argue that it is not their intention to 
show that negative liberty serves as the ultimate 
foundation for all liberal political norms and 
institutions, but simply to show that negative liberty is 
valuable in and of itself, and that, therefore, our 
political institutions, whatever other ideals they might 
embody, must be in part designed to promote pure negative 
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liberty.   
 But Carter and Kramer seem to have a far more 
ambitious agenda in mind.  Recall from our discussion at 
the beginning of this chapter that they both contend that 
the pure negative view can sufficiently account for the 
harms of domination.  What the above objections reveal, 
however, is that it ultimately cannot do so. Despite 
whatever virtues it may have, the pure negative view cannot 
account for what is distinctive about social relationships 
or why citizens are entitled to certain basic liberties, 
nor does it even necessarily prohibit pervasive state 
interference; in fact, sometimes it sanctions it.   
 Though Pettit fails to effectively respond to the 
Carter's and Kramer's objections, I think he is ultimately 
right to insist that there is something unique about the 
phenomenon of domination that the negative view fails to 
properly recognize even in its pure negative form.  The 
slave who avoids his or her master's wrath because the 
master has suddenly fallen in love is indeed, contrary to 
the pure negative view, less free than the slave whose 
status affords him or her protection against such 
treatment, and the additional deficiencies of the pure 
negative view explored at length above only strengthen this 






FREEDOM AS ANTI-DOMINATION 
 
Towards a Status Based Conception of Liberty 
 
In the preceding chapters, I considered and rejected 
various conceptions of liberty on the basis that none of 
these conceptions fit well with central liberal commitments 
and intuitions.  As I argued in Chapter 1, negative 
liberty, at least as Berlin (2002) conceives it, is 
inadequate insofar as it fails to recognize the various 
ways in which one can be rendered unfree by means other 
than interference and because it cannot account for the 
significance of the basic liberties.  Positive liberty, 
however, is equally inadequate because it is compatible 
with, and, on some formulations even encourages, pervasive 
state interference.  Accordingly, it can, at best, offer no 
argument against what are, from the liberal point of view, 
intuitively oppressive regimes, and, at worst, serves to 
justify them. 
 In Chapter 2, I examined several strategies for 
aggregating negative and positive liberty in order to avoid 
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these difficulties.  The problem with these approaches, 
however, is that they either reduce to a positive 
conception, or they are conceptions of liberty only in the 
ad hoc sense.  If they are the former, then they inherit 
all the problems germane to positive views.  If they are 
the latter, then they fail to establish genuine reflective 
equilibrium. 
 Having considered and rejected both negative and 
positive accounts, as well as various ways of combining 
them, in Chapter 3, I examined Pettit's attempt to 
construct a third conception of liberty, freedom as non-
domination.  There I argued that, despite Pettit's 
objections, this conception has “positive features” as 
well.  For one, it forces us to take people's interests 
into account when assessing their freedom, thereby 
justifying, in some cases, interference in the name of 
liberty.  Second, the interests it requires us to consider 
are the common interest. As such it risks collapsing into a 
collectivist conception of freedom.  Further, I argued that 
Pettit's consequentialist understanding of non-domination 
is ultimately in tension with the liberal commitments to 
democracy and basic rights.           
 Finally, in the preceding chapter, I examined the 
“pure negative liberty” approach advanced Ian Carter and 
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Mathew Kramer.  While it has some advantages over the 
traditional formulation, pure negative liberty is also at 
odds with the core commitments of liberalism.  Not only can 
it not account for the value of democracy and basic rights, 
but the pure negative view even suggests that liberty may 
be best realized under illiberal, anti-democratic regimes.  
As we saw, Carter and Kramer can avoid this implication 
only by rendering their account of liberty ad hoc in 
crucial respects.             
 Accordingly, none of the conceptions of liberty 
examined thus far are viable on liberal grounds.  At worst, 
they fail on the reflective equilibrium standard because 
they conflict with other core liberal commitments.  At 
best, they establish reflective equilibrium, but only in 
the weak sense.  Recall that a theory of liberty achieves 
reflective equilibrium in the weak sense to the extent that 
it offers a conception of freedom that is merely consistent 
with other liberal values, but fails to establish any 
stronger relationship between them.  If there is another 
conception of liberty, then, that can establish reflective 
equilibrium in the stronger sense -- one that is not only 
consistent with, but also reveals the relationships between 
core liberal values -- then liberals would have good reason 
to endorse it.  In this chapter, I will make the case that 
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there is such alternative conception available: freedom as 
anti-domination. 
 Despite their differences, all of the conceptions 
examined thus far share a salient feature: they are  act 
based rather than status based conceptions of liberty. That 
is, they understand freedom in terms of the quality of the 
actions an agent can perform or does perform, as opposed to 
in terms of the position an agent occupies in relation to 
other agents.  On the negative account, for example, it is 
the availability of various options which is relevant, 
whereas, on the positive account, it is something like the 
successful performance, authenticity, or worth of the 
actions an agent chooses to pursue, depending on the 
specific account in question. In either case, both 
conceptions are, at bottom, focused on the actions of 
persons rather than the relations between persons. Pettit, 
of course, presents his non-domination conception as 
exceptional in this respect, but, as we saw in chapters 3 
and 4, his view also does not prioritize the role of an 
agent's status. Recall that what ultimately makes the lucky 
slave unfree, on Pettit's account, is not so much his or 
her status as a slave, but the extent to which this status 
exposes him or her to the possibility of arbitrary 
interference. So, while different from other act based 
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accounts, Pettit's view is still primarily concerned with 
the kind of interference an agent suffers or is exposed to 
rather than the standing he or she occupies.   
 Further, in addition to their other faults, act based 
conceptions seem incapable of properly recognizing the 
degree to which one's status determines one's freedom.  As 
we have seen, the negative view cannot explain why some 
instances of slavery are intuitively freedom limiting.  
Even if it can account for why the institution of slavery 
is in general empirically likely to limit the liberty of 
those who suffer under it, it cannot account for the 
intuitively salient distinction between the slave who is 
free in the negative sense because his  master has, as 
Pettit puts it, “fallen in love” or “discovered religion” 
(Pettit 2008: 125), and the one who is free because his 
master has been compelled, by force, to respect the slave's 
status as an agent and be responsive to his demands. Again, 
the chief virtue of Pettit's non-domination view is 
supposed to be that it can account for this difference, 
but, as I have argued, it is not clear that it can.  
Because Pettit treats non-domination as a value to be 
maximized, his view is compatible with unchecked government 
power and even some forms of slavery.    
 The positive conception fares little better on this 
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score.  Recall from Chapter 1 that, even when the positive 
conception does recommend against interference, it does so 
on the basis of the wrong kind of reason.  On a positive 
account, an agent's objection to interference counts, at 
best, as evidence that such interference might not be 
instrumentally effective; it has no independent force of 
its own.  In other words, the agent's objection as such 
does not count as a reason against employing interference.  
So even when an agent is not interfered with on this 
conception, it will not be because of any power of her's to 
command non-interference, to borrow Pettit's phrase (Pettit 
1996: 589). Again, the power to command non-interference is 
supposed to be one of the defining features of freedom on 
Pettit's non-domination view, but, on closer examination, 
it does not appear that the non-domination conception 
substantially differs from the positive one in this 
respect.  Because interference can be non-dominating 
provided that it is also non-arbitrary, citizens can, on 
the non-domination view, be exposed to a significant degree 
of interference in spite of their explicit protests without 
a significant loss of freedom, as I argued in chapter 3.   
 My proposal, which I will defend at length in this 
chapter, is that a status based conception of liberty is 
able to capture central liberal intuitions concerning the 
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proper normative role of freedom while avoiding the 
problems that plague various act based conceptions.  In 
order to develop this status based account, I will draw on 
Pettit's earlier formulation of non-domination as anti-
power, or one's power to resist interference from others 
(Pettit 1996).  Recall that Pettit later rejects what he 
calls “the strategy of reciprocal power” as a means of 
fostering non-domination because he thinks that this 
strategy does not necessarily eliminate one's exposure to 
the possibility of arbitrary interference (Pettit 1999: 
67).  Just because citizens possess roughly equal power 
does not, he insists, guarantee that they will not 
interfere, on a purely arbitrary basis, in each other's 
affairs. What I intend to argue, however, is that precisely 
what it means for one to possess freedom in the status 
based sense is that one stands in a reciprocal relation of 
power to one's fellow citizens.  This kind of reciprocity 
is therefore, on my view, not a means of achieving freedom, 
but freedom itself. 
 In order to distinguish my view from Pettit's, I will 
call this conception of freedom, freedom as anti-
domination.  The anti prefix is meant to emphasize that, on 
this conception, one enjoys freedom to the extent that one 
is able to actively resist being dominated by others. 
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Notice that this feature is absent from Pettit's non-
domination account, or at least from most recent 
formulations. It is not an essential feature of this view 
that one's freedom from the possibility of arbitrary 
interference be the direct result of one's own power.  One 
might enjoy freedom as non-domination because one is 
protected from interference by the power of a third party, 
namely the state. It is true that, on Pettit's view, this 
third party can only avoid becoming an instrument of 
domination itself by being “forced to track” the interests 
of citizens when interfering in their affairs (Pettit 1999: 
56; emphasis added).  So we might think that citizens do, 
in some sense, exercise power on Pettit's view to the 
extent that they can force the state to be responsive to 
their interests.  But once we recognize that the interests 
the state must be responsive to are people's authentic and 
collective interests, it is no longer clear that this power 
resides with individuals themselves. 
 In what follows, I will first outline my conception of 
freedom as anti-domination.  What I will be able to offer 
here is only sketch; developing a complete account goes 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. What I do hope to 
show, however, is that this conception of freedom 
represents a viable third alternative. I will then defend 
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this conception against various possible objections, some 
occasioned by this conception and other more familiar ones. 
In doing so, I hope to both further clarify and stress the 
distinctiveness of the anti-domination view.  Next, I will 
show why freedom as anti-domination is the conception best 
suited to liberalism.  Finally, I will conclude by arguing 




Freedom as Anti-domination: a sketch 
 
 
As I mentioned briefly, in order to enjoy freedom as anti-
domination, one must stand in a reciprocal relation of 
power to others. The question of course is what exactly 
this entails.  Just as there are many varying conceptions 
of freedom, there are many varying conceptions of power, 
and we do not want to pursue a strategy that simply 
relocates problems concerning freedom to power. Such a 
strategy would only put off these conceptual difficulties 
rather than resolve them. So it will not help to simply 
assert that freedom as anti-domination consists in enjoying 
reciprocal power unless we can say something about what 
“power” means. For the remainder of this section, I will 
attempt to spell out what kind of power one must possess in 
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order to be free in the anti-domination sense. 
 We might start by defining power rather broadly as the 
ability to “make things happen” (Pettit 1996: 859), or, if 
this still too vague, we may follow Hobbes in thinking of 
power as one's “present means to obtain some future 
apparent good” (Hobbes 1962: 72).  It should be readily 
apparent, though, that this conception is far too broad for 
our present purposes because it is insufficiently 
relational.  Power, on this understanding, extends not only 
over other people, but over natural objects and events as 
well (in fact, power on this broad understanding will 
likely be more of a feature of our interaction with natural 
objects and events than with each other. Our relationships 
with other people will be but one rather small subset of 
our power broadly construed).   
 The kind of power involved in relationships of 
domination, however, is of a more specific sort; it is the 
kind of power commonly referred to as power over.  There is 
a significant distinction between possessing power in the 
sense of making things happen or securing goods and 
possessing power over others.  For example, you may have 
the power to, say, dunk a basketball whereas I do not, but 
this surely doesn't entail that you have any power over me 
(except perhaps in the specific case in which we happen to 
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be playing basketball, and even that's questionable if I 
possess other skills that you lack). The fact that you can 
dunk a basketball ordinarily has no effect on me 
whatsoever.  Yet, strictly speaking, you can make something 
happen which I cannot. Likewise, suppose you possess the 
material resources necessary to build a pool in your 
backyard whereas I lack them.  It is still not at all clear 
that you have any power over me even though you can secure 
a good that I cannot. It might of course turn out that, as 
an empirical matter, the fact that you possess these 
resources whereas I do not likely entails that you also 
have the the means to dominate me (perhaps because your 
ability to build a pool is an indication of your enormous 
wealth), but until we know what it means for you to possess 
power over me, we cannot establish this empirical 
connection. 
 Intuitively, cases in which A dominates B have 
something to do with the power A has over B.
1
 So we might 
say that a reciprocal relationship of power obtains in 
cases in which A has no power over B and B likewise has no 
power over A.  This narrower conception of power is better 
suited to capture the disparity of power that constitutes 
                                                 
1
 I will use this A and B schema when describing power relationships, as 
is common in the literature. 
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the condition of enslavement.  The slave is at the mercy of 
the master, not simply because the master can make things 
happen or secure goods that the slave cannot, but because 
the slave is power-less to effectively resist the master's 
control. Of course it is likely the case that the master's 
power over the slave is the result of his or her greater 
overall power in the broader sense, but a disparity in the 
degree of power enjoyed by two individuals will not result 
in a relationship of domination (and in the extreme case, 
one of enslavement), unless this disparity in some sense 
places one member of the party at the mercy of the other. 
 This is why, in his initial formulation, Pettit 
characterizes freedom as a kind of anti-power.  Anti-power 
is the kind of power one exercises in resisting unwanted 
incursions from others.  As Pettit puts it, “anti-power 
relates to subjugating power in the way that antimatter 
relates to ordinary matter: it represents something 
repellent to subjugating power” (Pettit 1996: 589).  
Someone who possesses anti-power can effectively neutralize 
the potential power advantage others have over her. 
Essentially, anti-power levels the playing field, 
establishing a relationship in which each party can prevent 
incursions perpetrated by the other. 
 The problem with this formulation is that it only 
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tells us what anti-power achieves not what it consist in, 
or, to put it somewhat differently, it describes the effect 
of anti-power but not its essence. We know that someone who 
possesses anti-power is able to effectively resist being 
subjugated, but, if this account is to be complete, we need 
to be able determine further how one comes to possess anti-
power in the first place.  
 Perhaps, though, one could object that this desire for 
a more complete account is misguided because there is 
nothing more to anti-power than just this.  One possesses 
anti-power precisely to the extent that he or she is able 
to avoid interference from others.  It is therefore a kind 
of category mistake to think that there is something over 
and above this in which anti-power itself consists. It 
should be apparent, however, why this response is 
inadequate. Under the envisioned conception of anti-power, 
we would have to consider the lucky slave as free. Recall 
that one might be able to avoid interference from others 
through appeasement, charm, or simple good fortune, but he 
or she nonetheless still suffers domination if these others 
could choose at any point to interfere solely at their own 
discretion.  On this reductive view of anti-power, we would 
have to say that lucky slaves do in fact possess it even 
though, intuitively, the condition of enslavement is itself 
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characterized by the slave's distinct lack of power. 
 For his part, Pettit does not endorse this reductive 
approach, but instead proposes a variety of means by which 
we might balance the access citizens have to various 
essential resources – essential in the sense that they are 
necessary in order somehow ward off or at least deter 
interference from others (Pettit 1996: 590ff).  But, unless 
we can say something more about what anti-power is, we will 
not be able to identify precisely what resources are 
essential to it.  We are still in need of a more complete 
understanding of the concept of power over if we are to 
make sense of Pettit's notion of anti-power. 
 Frances Lovett (2001) offers a potentially promising 
approach. On Lovett's formulation, a crucial feature of 
relationships of domination is that they render one party 
dependent on the other, and he further proposes that we can 
measure dependency in terms of the costs one would incur in 
trying to exit the relationship (Lovett 2001: 102).  On the 
whole, I think that Lovett's account of domination suffers 
from the same problems as Pettit's since he basis it 
largely on Pettit's view,
2
 but his approach hints at a 
                                                 
2
 On Lovett's view domination consists in three factors: an imbalance of 
power between two parties (where power is understood in the broad sense 
discussed above), the extent of one party's dependency on the other, 
and the absence of established rules which prevent arbitrary uses of 
power.  I think the second condition is vulnerable to the objection 
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possibly fruitful way of understanding the concept of power 
over.  Borrowing Lovett's insight that dependency can be 
understood in terms of exit-costs, we might formulate power 
over as follows:  
A has power over B to extent that A's ability to 
impose costs on B is greater than B's ability to 
impose costs on A, and further that A dominates B 
in those cases in which A can impose fairly 
substantial costs on B and B has little to no 
means of imposing costs on A. 
   
Such a formulation, I think, nicely captures the lack of 
reciprocity between masters and slaves, as well as in other 
relationships of domination.  Even when the master does not 
exercise his or her ability to impose costs on the slave 
for the slave's failure to comply with the master's wishes  
– say because the slave is for the most part obedient and 
does not fail to comply or because the master has become 
lazy or fairly tolerant – the fact that the slave would 
have no recourse should the master choose to impose these 
costs is what accounts for the slave's subjugated status.   
 Whatever its potential merits, however, this approach 
faces serious difficulties once we try to spell out exactly 
what constitutes a cost.  Suppose we treat costs 
subjectively; a cost, in this sense, is anything that 
                                                                                                                                                 
that dependency is the natural condition of human agents which we 
explored in chapter 4, and the third condition is vulnerable to all the 
objections that apply to the stipulation that non-arbitrary 




prevents an agent from doing/becoming/or getting something 
that he or she wants.  The problem of course is that, if 
the agent happens to be satisfied with his subjugated 
status, he will not view the potential sanctions that keep 
him in this condition as real costs on this understanding. 
Whereas the reductive strategy struggles with the case of 
the lucky slave, this strategy instead struggles with the 
case of the contented slave.   
 Alternatively, we could try to develop an objective 
account of costs.  So, on this approach, we would try to 
develop some list of activities/achievements/goods that any 
normal agent should pursue (or perhaps would pursue under 
ideal conditions).  A cost could then be understood as 
anything that hinders these pursuits.  This approach, 
however, simply reintroduces all the problems inherent to 
positive conceptions of liberty.  On this understanding of 
power over, the use of physical force as means of 
encouraging someone to pursue these sorts of activities, 
achievements, or goods would not count as costs even if 
this person vigorously objected to such treatment.   
 As I mentioned earlier, the status based approach will 
not constitute much of an advance if it simply relocates 
the problems associated with other conceptions of liberty 
to a different level.  We therefore need to avoid 
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conceiving of power over in a way that essentially reduces 
it to a positive conception of liberty.  To this end, I 
propose that we think of one's power over others, not in 
terms of the costs one can impose on them, but in terms 
one's ability to limit their options (or, if we want retain 
the language of costs, we can understand costs in the 
narrow negative sense of limits on opportunities).  So, 
under this formulation, power over is as follows: 
 
A has power over B to the extent that A can limit 
B's range of options. 
 
With this understanding of power over in mind, we can 
further characterize domination as: 
 
A dominates B to the extent that A's ability to 
limit B's range of options is greater than B's 
ability to limit A's range of options. 
 
Or, in more condensed form: 
 
A dominates B to the extent that A's power over B 
is greater than B's power over A. 
 
Finally, a condition of reciprocity obtains when A's power 
over B is roughly equal to B's power over A.  
 The account of power over offered above is admittedly 
still just a sketch, but we can flesh it out a little 
further by highlighting some of its central features.  
First, as I have already stressed at length, power over is 
a relational conception of power, or what is also commonly 
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referred to as social power. Second, this conception of 
power is non-evaluative in two significant respects (and 
this stipulation is necessary in order to avoid the 
problems generated by positive conceptions of liberty).  It 
is non-evaluative in one respect insofar as it takes no 
account of the interests or desires of the agent over whom 
power is exercised.  Again, the master has power over the 
slave regardless of whether the slave endorses or objects 
to his or her enslavement, and likewise, the master still 
exercises power over the slave even if he or she only 
interferes with slave in the slave's own best interests.  
Contrast this approach with Steven Lukes' well known 
account of power relations.  According to Lukes, “A 
exercises power over B when A effects B in a manner 
contrary to B's interests” (Lukes 2002: 50).3 Lukes 
formulates his conception in this way because he is worried 
about cases in which one could exercise power over another 
through methods such as ideological indoctrination.  As we 
have seen though, including these sorts of evaluative 
considerations risks turning power over into a kind of 
analog to positive liberty and consequently inherits all 
                                                 
3
 Alvin Goldman holds a similar view: “In determining a man's overall 
power, therefore, we must look not only at the number of persons that 
would be affected by the issues w.r.t. [with respect to] which he has 
power, but also at how much difference in welfare the outcomes of the 




its problems. Plus, I hope to demonstrate in the final 
section of this chapter that freedom as anti-domination 
avoids the kind of worries Lukes has in mind. 
 The conception of power over I have developed here is 
also non-evaluative in another crucial sense. It not only 
ignores the interests of those over whom power is 
exercised, but also of those who possess it.  Again, take 
the master/slave example: what matters is that the master 
could significantly limit the slave's opportunities, not 
that by doing so he or she could produce some valuable 
outcome. Contrast this with Hobbes's account of power as 
one's ability to obtain a future good, or Lovett's 
formulation of social power as one's “means to influence 
the situation of others [sic] persons or groups for the 
purpose of bringing about some new, desired state of 
affairs” (Lovett 2001: 106). Again, it is crucial, for our 
purposes, that power over exclude these kinds of value 
assessments. If power over is in part a function of the 
ends one is able to successfully achieve, then interference 
designed to promote one's interests, objectively or 
subjectively understood, will not limit one's freedom.  
Therefore, under the conception of power I am advancing 
here, power over consists in one's ability to limit the 
options of others regardless of either the value of those 
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options to the person from whom they are removed or of the 
value of limiting those options for the agent who has the 
power to remove them.   
 A third key feature of this conception of power over 
is that it is an opportunity concept rather than an 
exercise concept. This feature is essential for two 
reasons.  First, power over must be treated as an 
opportunity concept in order to do justice to the plight of 
the lucky slave.  The master still has power over the slave 
even when he or she chooses not exercise it.  One's power 
over another consists in what one could do to another, not 
in what one does do.  Second, if power over were not 
conceived of in this way, it could not serve as the basis 
for a status based conception of liberty.  A conception of 
liberty based on the exercise concept of power over would 
be an act based one; it would be concerned with what one 
actually does rather than the status one holds in relation 
others.  Further, suppose we did treat power over as an 
exercise concept and consequently freedom as anti-
domination as the extent to which one exercises power over 
others.  This would turn freedom as anti-domination into a 
positive conception of liberty of a very bizarre sort.  
Freedom, on this understanding, would consist in one's 
active mastery over others, and this would certainly not be 
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a very promising conception from the liberal point of view. 
 Finally, this conception of power is not a behavior 
based conception. On a behavior based model, A holds power 
over B to the extent that A can get B to do something B 
would otherwise not do.
4
  Ian Carter, for example, offers 
the following behavior based model: “Let us say that A 
exercises power over B when A's behavior induces B to 
modify her course of action in accordance with A's 
interests” (Carter 2008: 59).5 In contrast, the conception I 
offer here holds that A has power over B to the extent that 
A can limit B's opportunities regardless of how this might 
affect B's behavior.  Of course in cases in which A chooses 
to exercise her power by preventing B from pursuing some 
course of action that he would have pursued absent A's 
interference, then A's power will necessarily have some 
effect on B's behavior.  But this is an incidental feature 
of this conception since A will continue to hold power over 
B, according to my view, even when A fails to have any 
discernible effect on B's behavior whatsoever.  
 I recognize that this might seem somewhat 
counterintuitive, but again I think this stipulation is 
                                                 
4
 See Dahl (1968) for a fairly systematic account of a behavior based 
model of power.   
5





crucial to understanding the power relationship between 
masters and slaves. In the first place, the lucky slave's 
behavior may only be marginally affected by the master's 
power.  Therefore, if we hold a behavior based conception, 
we would have to say that the master really does not hold 
power over the lucky slave.  But, equally as important, the 
behavior based model is just as lacking when it comes to 
the case of the not-so-lucky slave. A slave may effectively 
refuse to abide by his master's wishes provided that he is 
willing to suffer some fairly severe consequences.  No 
master could possess such absolute power (except perhaps 
under rather fantastical conditions) so as to be able to 
force the slave to perform certain tasks even when the 
slave physically resists.  Nonetheless, it seems fairly 
intuitive to assert that the master still possesses power 
over the slave even when the slave refuses to do what the 
master wants because the master has the ability to impose 
severe sanctions for non-compliance. 
 In summary, the conception of power at work in freedom 
as anti-domination is a 1) relational, 2) non-evaluative, 
3) opportunity, and 4) non-behaviorist conception of power.  
Each of these features is crucial in order for freedom as 
anti-domination to be a workable conception of liberty, one 
capable of avoiding the sorts of criticisms I have advanced 
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against other views. But it is important to stress that it 
is also an intuitively appealing conception of power on its 
own because it best captures the power relationship that 
obtains between masters and slaves.  The master has power 
over the slave even when he or she chooses not exercise it, 
even when he or she cannot compel the slave to behave 
exactly how he or she wants, and even when he or she can 
sincerely claim to be acting in the slave's own interests. 
It is the fact that the master could behave towards the 
slave in any way which he or she chooses and with total 
impunity that accounts for the power differential between 
them.   
 Power over understood as the ability of one agent to 
limit the options of another best describes the kind of 
power that masters hold over slaves.  The master can impose 
severe and strict limitations on the slave's activities 
whereas the slave could never hope to have any similar 
effect upon the master.  If Pettit is right in thinking 
that the master/slave relationship is paradigmatic of 
relationships of domination in general, and I think he is, 
then we can expand this model to cover these other cases as 
well, such as the subordinate housewife who is wholly 
dependent on her husband, or the wage laborer whose 
fortunes depend entirely on the whim of his or her 
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employer. One achieves freedom as anti-domination then, to 
the extent that it is in one's own power to resist 
domination from others, or to the extent that one does not 
suffer impositions without equal recourse. And this occurs 
when one's power over is roughly equal to those with whom 
one interacts. 
 I should note, however, that the formulation above is 
over simplified in one crucial respect. In most real world 
scenarios -- and certainly under most political 
arrangements -- there will be more than just two actors.  
In formulating power over, domination, and reciprocity in 
this way, I do not want to give the mistaken impression 
that freedom as anti-domination is only concerned with bi-
lateral relationships.  In fact, quite the opposite is 
intended: one's status on this view is determined not by 
one's relationship with any one particular agent, but by 
one's relationship to a network of multiple agents.  In 
this sense, one's standing is determined multi-laterally. 
So, one enjoys freedom as anti-domination to the extent 
that one is not at a power disadvantage with respect to 
other agents, keeping in mind both that agents can often 
act as groups and that agents can act on each other's 
behalf.  Obviously, the more potential agents we introduce, 
the more complex this equation becomes.  For simplicity's 
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sake, I will often use examples of bi-lateral 
relationships, but this should not be taken to imply that 
this model has only a narrow application, and, in the 
proceeding sections, I will say more about the significance 
of multi-lateral relationships. 
 It is worth noting that liberty as anti-domination has 
both a negative and positive element.  Its negative element 
consists in the fact that power over is understood on this 
conception as one's ability to limit the total range of 
options, in the pure negative sense, of another agent; or, 
in other words, one's power over consists in one's power to 
interfere. Again, it is essential that we construe power 
over in this way so as to avoid reintroducing the anti-
liberal implications of positive views. In order stave off 
some potential confusions, however, it is worth keeping 
some points in mind.  First, borrowing an insight from 
Carter and Kramer's pure negative approach, it is important 
to recognize that one can limit the total range of options 
of another through means other than direct physical 
interference.  I can, for example, significantly limit your 
options by monopolizing certain resources or issuing 
threats (provided that I am able to make good on them 
should you fail to comply).  Second, one's power and status 
is always a matter of proportion. For example, while the 
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slave can certainly interfere with the master by refusing 
to comply with the master's demands even under the threat 
of severe sanction, it is still the case that the master  
dominates the slave because the master's power to limit the 
slave's options is far greater in proportion to any meager 
resistance the slave could possibly muster.  Finally, it is 
important to stress that, while it has a negative 
component, freedom as anti-domination is not ultimately a 
negative conception of liberty. One's freedom on the anti-
domination view is not necessarily limited just because one 
is interfered with.  It is limited, however, when one is 
exposed to a greater degree of possible interference than 
others because, in such cases, one will be at a significant 
power disadvantage.  This is what makes freedom as anti-
domination a status based conception of liberty rather than 
an act based one, though it does employ the notion of 
interference.      
 Freedom as anti-domination also has a positive element 
in that it conceives of liberty as the possession of a kind 
of power.  It is important, however, to stress again that 
it does not thereby reduce to a positive conception of 
liberty. Because the anti-domination view holds that power 
over is both a non-evaluative and opportunity concept, it 
avoids the implication that one can be forced to be free. 
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Because freedom as anti-domination is a status based 
conception, forcibly compelling someone to engage in 
certain actions can in no way increase his or her freedom.  
This is why we should not find the fact that actual 
interference itself is not necessarily freedom limiting on 
the anti-domination view particularly troubling, because it 
is equally true that actual interference can never enhance, 
or even be consistent with, one's freedom as anti-
domination. Returning to Taylor's (1985) example, the 
reason why traffic lights do not significantly hinder 
freedom on the anti-domination view is not because they are 
some insignificant or trivial instances of physical 
interference, but because they impose on everyone equally; 
they do not uniquely advantage or disadvantage any person 
or persons. 
 So while freedom as anti-domination has both a 
negative and positive element, it is a unique third 
conception of liberty rather than an ad-hoc aggregate 
conception.  It is also distinct from Pettit's non-
domination account in that it holds that one's freedom is 
determined by one's power to resist interference from 
others rather than one's exposure to the possibility of 
arbitrary interference. Freedom as anti-domination is also 
distinct from other reformulations of Pettit's non-
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domination conception.  James Bohman (2005), for example, 
offers an account of non-domination that is similarly 
power-based.  Bohman, however, casts his version of non-
domination in explicitly Arendtian terms.  That is, on his 
view, one enjoys freedom as non-domination to the extent 
that one has the power to initiate democratic deliberation.  
It is not clear to me, however, what exactly this entails 
or how this view avoids reducing to a positive conception 
of liberty of the specifically Arendtian sort.  The anti-
domination view I offer here is also distinct from Henry 
Richardson's formulation of non-domination as freedom from 
arbitrary power rather than arbitrary interference 
(Richardson 2003).  I do not intend to go into Richardson's 
distinction between power and interference in any detail 
here except to note that Richardson's own power-based 
reformulation of the non-domination view retains Pettit's 
arbitrariness criterion.  Accordingly, I think that, 
whatever its other merits, Richardson's view inherits all 
problems that accompany this standard.    
 Now that we have a rough sketch of freedom of anti-
domination and its essential components, in the remainder 
of this section I want to say a little bit about how we 
might promote and ultimately achieve it.  There are a 
variety of means by which we can foster reciprocity of 
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power amongst citizens.  First, there is the obvious, 
though perhaps somewhat unappealing, strategy of arming 
everyone – say by outfitting every citizen with an AK-47 – 
so that none is exposed to the possibility of being 
threatened by others without having at his or her disposal 
a substantial means of recourse.  Again, whether this 
strategy helps promote anti-domination or not, it is 
probably unappealing for a variety of independent reasons, 
and the prospect of such a scenario is, I think, why Pettit 
abandons his earlier formulation of freedom as anti-power 
in favor of his latter formulation of freedom as the 
absence of arbitrary interference (Pettit 1999: 67).   
 There are several reasons, however, why I think such a 
strategy will not successfully promote anti-domination, and 
I plan on revisiting this issue at greater length in the 
following section.  For now, it is worth noting that the 
conditions produced by this strategy are bound to be 
unstable.  Say we were able to arrive at an ideal 
distribution of what we might call punitive powers – or 
one's power to inflict physical punishment – and that we 
were somehow able to institute this distribution.  Over 
time, conflicts will inevitably ensue, individuals and 
groups will collude, and eventually someone, some group, or 
some groups will gain the upper-hand.  Unless there is a 
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third party prepared to step in and redistribute punitive 
powers when imbalances begin to emerge, such a strategy 
will not effectively prevent domination.  Further, unless 
this third party is itself incredibly powerful, it is hard 
to imagine how it could successfully fulfill this function.  
If this third party is sufficiently powerful, however, then 
it will necessarily be an agent of domination since all 
other agents will necessarily be at its mercy even if this 
third party did not choose to use its power in any 
malevolent way. 
 While I think this strategy is bound to be ultimately 
unsuccessful on its own, it is still worth noting that the 
distribution of punitive powers does play some role in the 
level to which citizens enjoy freedom as anti-domination.  
The freedom of the members of states, nations, or ethnic 
groups depends in part on the extent to which they can 
defend themselves against potential aggressors. Any state, 
nation, or ethnic group that cannot do so will thereby be 
at the mercy of others and forever dependent on their good 
will.
6
  Of course if any nation, state, or ethnic group is 
                                                 
6
 In contrast, Berlin seems to deny any link between the political 
independence of states, nations, or ethnic groups and either negative 
or positive liberty (Berlin, 2002: 204).  Given that national 
independence is often thought of as integral to liberty (think of the 
American Revolution for example), the fact that the anti-domination 




overly aggressive in, or preoccupied by, providing for its 
own defense, it might create a condition in which the 
individual members of this group are subordinated to this 
end, in which case they will be rendered relatively 
powerless as individuals. In this respect, the anti-
domination view does not collapse security and freedom.  It 
recognizes that an overly zealous preoccupation with 
security threats can result in domination of individual 
group members, but it also recognizes that a group which is 
entirely defenseless is exposed to a degree of domination 
as well.  This is a good example of how multi-lateral 
relationships can complicate matters, but I just want to 
emphasize here that the extent to which a group's 
investment in its own defenses contributes to or infringes 
upon the freedom of its members depends upon how it affects 
the amount of power over that they enjoy as individuals in 
comparison to the amount of power over that they are 
exposed to when taken as a whole.     
 Another possible strategy would be to establish some 
third party, such as the state, charged with regulating the 
affairs of individuals so that no one is able to gain an 
unfair advantage and with the power to intervene when 
necessary in order to reestablish reciprocity.  The problem 
with this strategy, as briefly mentioned above, is that 
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this third party will have to be incredibly powerful in 
order to carry out this task, so powerful in fact that 
everyone else will necessarily be at its mercy.  In a 
sense, this is the strategy endorsed by Pettit in the name 
of non-domination: 
 
The strategy of constitutional provision seeks to 
eliminate domination, not by enabling dominated 
parties to defend themselves against arbitrary 
interference or to deter arbitrary interferers but 
rather by introducing a constitutional authority – 
say a corporate, elective agent – to the 
situation.  The authority will deprive other 
parties of the power of arbitrary interference and 
of the power of punishing that sort of 
interference.  It will thereby eliminate 
domination of some parties by others and if it 
does not itself dominate those parties, then it 
will bring an end to domination.  The reason that 
a constitutional authority will not itself 
dominate the parties involved, if it does not 
dominate them, is that the interference it 
practices has to track their interests according 
to their ideas; it is suitably responsive to the 
common good. (Pettit 1999: 67 – 68)  
 
As we saw in chapter 3, however, this way of understanding 
non-domination is highly problematic, and in particular, it 
does not prohibit the creation of an enormously powerful 
state.  In fact, it likely requires it. 
 This kind of strategy will not be viable on the anti-
domination account I am advancing here unless the role of 
the state can be conceived of in such a way as to be more 
congenial to the goal of fostering anti-domination rather 
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than Pettit's ideal of non-domination. I think this can be 
achieved by thinking of the state, not as a third party 
that interferes only in the name of the “common good,” but 
as itself a kind of distribution of institutional and legal 
powers.  A state fosters anti-domination for its citizens 
to the extent that it constitutes an equal distribution of 
these powers among them.  So, for example, a despotic state 
is one in which the distribution of institutional and legal 
powers is very imbalanced and consequently one in which the 
vast majority of citizens are subject to domination.  A 
constitutional democracy on the other hand will be one in 
which power is distributed more equally (I will say much 
more about this in section IV).   
 On the anti-domination ideal, interference by state 
officials will promote freedom, not if it reflects the 
common interest, but if these officials are acting on 
behalf of some citizen or group of citizens. In this sense, 
the kind of power possessed by state officials is a kind of 
power of proxy. So, for example, suppose I call the police 
to forcibly remove an intruder who has entered my home.  
When they do so they act as my proxy or, in other words, as 
an extension of my legal powers.  Alternatively, if they 
fail to remove the intruder, they can later pursue him or 
her to both reclaim my property and begin criminal 
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proceedings.  Accordingly, even if the intruder is able to 
over power me in the moment, say by threatening me with a 
physical violence, I still retain a degree of power over 
him or her.  By summoning the police to act on my behalf, I 
can ideally prevent the intruder from successfully 
interfering in my affairs, or barring that, at least impose 
strict penalties on him or her which ensures that he or she 
has no real overall power advantage over me.  Likewise, to 
give another example, when a government safety regulator 
sanctions an employer because he or she has failed to 
implement safe working conditions, this regulator is 
serving as a proxy for the workers.  Were the employer able 
to neglect worker safety without penalty, he or she would 
be in a position to limit the combined opportunities of the 
workers (in exposing them to the possibility of suffering a 
severe injury), and the workers would have no means of 
recourse.  The regulator therefore empowers the workers by 
establishing safety guidelines and imposing penalties if 
the employer fails to comply. 
 Of course it is true that state officials will likely 
not be very effective in this capacity unless they are able 
to act somewhat independently.  In modern states, 
government agents, such as the police or safety regulators, 
are continually at work overseeing the affairs of citizens; 
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they do not somehow suddenly spring into action only when 
summoned.  Further, it is important that they function in 
this way because it will often be the case that those on 
behalf of whom they are acting will not be fully aware of 
the potential impositions that threaten them.  This might 
lead us to worry that the proxy model I have outlined above 
not only fails to describe any modern existing state, but 
is also hopelessly idealistic.  I do not think this is the 
case, however.  Just because these agents act with some 
degree of independence does not entail that the power they 
are imbued with ultimately resides with them rather than 
those they are supposed to serve.  As long as the 
appropriate checks and balances are in place and citizens 
can rein-in these actors when necessary, it will be the 
citizens themselves who ultimately exercise control. Should 
state actors acquire too much independence, they will of 
course become agents of domination even if they can 
sincerely claim to be acting in the name of the common 
interest.  Under the appropriate limits and checks, 
however, state actors function less like an independent 
third party who wield power over citizens and more like an 
extension of the power citizens have over each other.   
 At this point, it is worth highlighting a significant 
distinction between the anti-domination view and Pettit's 
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non-domination view.  Recall that, according to Pettit, 
non-domination is a good to be maximized, and accordingly, 
the state can itself engage in arbitrary interference if 
this increases the overall level of non-domination citizens 
enjoy.  So, there will be cases in which giving the state a 
significant degree of unchecked discretion will be 
justified in the name of promoting greater non-domination 
overall.  Notice that this line of justification is not 
available on the anti-domination account.  Because the 
state is best thought of as a distribution of powers, a 
state in which certain officials, judges, or 
representatives are given unchecked power will, for that 
very reason, be one in which the distribution of power is 
unequal and hence dominating.  It is therefore conceptually 
impossible to promote anti-domination through an unequal 
distribution of power.  This is not to say, of course, that 
some political arrangements are not better than others at 
fostering anti-domination even when they fall short of the 
ideal.  But, because anti-domination consists in 
establishing reciprocity between parties, it is not a good 
that can be maximized.  We can make relationships more or 
less reciprocal, but it makes little sense to say we can 
maximize reciprocity (beyond making relationships maximally 
reciprocal) as if reciprocity were a quantifiable good. 
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 There are other means by which the state can 
distribute institutional and legal powers in addition to 
the ones described above. It can give people various 
political powers (such as the ability to vote in elections 
or referendums, or the ability to seek public office), it 
can give people various legal powers (such as the ability 
to pursue civil action), it can create legal entities (such 
as corporations and unions) to empower groups, and it can 
bestow people with basic legal rights (the anti-domination 
view's ability to explain the significance of basic rights 
without evoking a positive account is obviously one of its 
major advantages, and I will explore this issue at greater 
length in section IV).  Again, the extent to which these 
mechanisms promote anti-domination depends on the extent to 
which, in conjunction, they equally distribute power. 
  It must be noted, however, that even if the state 
does embody an equal distribution of institutional and 
legal powers, this is not sufficient to ensure that all of 
its citizens enjoy freedom as anti-domination. An unequal 
distribution of certain resources can also produce 
relationships of domination. If, for example, the vast 
majority of material wealth in a given society is held by a 
relatively small percentage of the population, the wealthy 
will be able to dominate the rest of society, since they 
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will be able to limit the options of others in far greater 
proportion than what they are exposed to themselves.  So 
promoting freedom as anti-domination will in some cases 
require redistributing these economic resources (this does 
not mean freedom as anti-domination requires a strictly 
equal distribution of economic resources.  Recall from 
above that greater economic resources does not necessarily 
mean greater power over.  That is, the fact that I have 
more economic resources than you does not entail that I 
have any greater ability to limit your options.  I will say 
more about this is section IV).   
 Of course, the anti-domination view will be concerned 
not only with distribution monetary resources, but other 
basic resources as well. In particular, it should be noted 
that the more access to basic resources people have, the 
less dependent they will be on others, and this 
independence will shield them from the possibility of 
having their options substantially limited by others. If, 
for example, I am not reliant on others to secure access to 
health care, education, or various means of employment, 
they will not be able to limit my opportunities by 
restricting my access to these resources. The point to 
stress here is that we can increase the extent to which 
people enjoy freedom as anti-domination not just by giving 
289 
 
them the means to equitably sanction each other, but also 
by making them more independent from one another.
7
  
Accordingly, the anti-domination view also requires that we 
pay attention to distribution of what Amartya Sen has 
called basic “capabilities” (Sen 2001). Often times, this 
strategy might be the more effective than the strategy of 
increasing people's capacity to punish each other, and it 
also might be more desirable for reasons independent of its 
tendency to foster anti-domination.  
 Finally, the anti-domination view also requires that 
we pay adequate attention to the distribution of what we 
might call social resources. If some citizens have access 
to certain social privileges and opportunities whereas 
others do not, these advantaged citizens could use their 
“social capital” (Bourdieu 1991; Putnam 2001) as a means of 
limiting the opportunities of others.  We have good reason 
then, on the anti-domination account, to be concerned about 
the emergence of a social-hierarchy that limits the social 
resources of certain classes of people. 
 Promoting freedom as anti-domination will, in most 
cases, probably require some combination of three 
                                                 
7
 I do not mean completely independent, of course. I do not want to 
belie the fact, as Pettit is accused of doing, that people are 
necessarily interdependent on each other in significant respects.  I 




strategies outlined above.  Of course it is empirical 
question as to which strategy, or combination of 
strategies, will produce the most equitable distribution of 
power over among citizens, and as such I cannot explore 
this issue in sufficient detail here. What I will argue 
later in this chapter (section IV) is that a liberal 
political regime committed to promoting basic rights, 
democracy, and equality, represents the ideal power 
arrangement on the anti-domination view; this is why 
freedom as anti-domination is the conception of liberty 





Having outlined in broad detail the features of freedom as 
anti-domination, I want to consider, and respond to, 
several possible objections.  In doing so, I hope to not 
only defend the anti-domination account against potential 
criticism, but also further clarify this conception and 
identify its advantages.  The first two objections I will 
consider are occasioned specifically by the anti-domination 
account.  The third is one we looked at last chapter in 






The “Power is not distributive” Objection 
 
Although we examined above several means by which power 
over might distributed, one might worry that there is 
something essential about the nature of power that the 
distributive approach overlooks.  The worry is that, if 
there is some crucial aspect of power that cannot be 
understood in distributional terms, then a distributional 
approach to power will fail to capture some of the ways in 
which power works to dominate and oppress people.  Iris 
Young, for example, charges that, “a distributive 
understanding of power, which treats power as some kind of 
stuff that can be traded, exchanged and distributed misses 
the structural phenomenon of domination” (Young 1990: 31). 
 Young offers several arguments in favor of this 
contention.  Most of them, however, are based on her 
assertion that distributive conceptions of power do not 
appreciate the extent to which power is relational (Young 
1990: 31ff.).  This sort of objection, though, has no 
bearing on anti-domination understanding of power over, 
which is an explicitly relational concept.  Young's other 
line of objection, however, is more directly relevant to 
the anti-domination view.  Young cites Foucault's theory of 
power to suggest that distributive understandings of power 
rest on a faulty ontology. Essentially, Foucault argues 
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that it is wrong to think of power as something substance-
like which can be evenly or unevenly distributed. As 
Foucault puts it in a passage cited by Young (Young 1990: 
32): “power must be treated as something that circulates, 
or rather something which only functions in the form of a 
chain.  It is never localized here or there, never in 
anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece 
of wealth” (Foucault 1980: 98).   
 Assessing the viability of Foucault's treatment of 
power all-things-considered requires a much more in depth 
analysis of the ontology of power than I am prepared to 
give here.  I do want to point out, however, just how 
normatively impoverished this conception is if it entails 
that we can never treat power as a distributive item. 
Unless power is in some sense quantifiable and locatable 
(and the above quote from Foucault suggests that in some 
sense he thinks it is not), then we can never say of two 
agents that one has greater power over the other. But it 
seems essential that we be able to assert this in order to 
critique certain political arrangements.  If we cannot say 
that the master has greater power over the slave, or that 
the despot has greater power over his or her subjects, then 
it is hard to imagine how any political reform designed to 
correct these imbalances could count as progress.  At least 
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as Young presents it, the Foucauldian position would entail 
that protecting the slave from the master's wrath or 
placing institutional checks on the despot can have no 
meaningful impact on the power enjoyed by these respective 
parties because it is a mistake to think of power in these 
terms.  Being able to think of power distributively is 
normatively important, however, because, intuitively, some 
power imbalances produce injustice.  The Foucauldian view 
as advanced by Young, however, seems to entail that this 
sort of concern rests on a confusion. This seems rather 
implausible.  To borrow Rawls's phrase, “to each according 
to his threat advantage” is not a conception of justice 
because it is normatively deficient, not because it is 
conceptually incoherent (Rawls 1971: 134).  
 This is not to say that the Foucauldian position is 
necessarily incorrect all-things-considered.  It might be 
the case that power, in the broadest possible sense, is 
best understood as non-distributive.  The distributive 
conception of power over may very well be derivative of 
some ontologically more fundamental non-distributive 
conception of power.  The  anti-domination view I am 
advancing here need not take any stand on this issue.  But, 
in order to be viable, the Foucauldian conception of power 
must have some way of accounting for the more narrow 
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understanding of power over as something that can be evenly 
or unevenly distributed.  If it cannot do so, then it is 
severely lacking on normative grounds.  If it can, then it 
presents no real challenge to the anti-domination view. 
 
The “War of All Against All” Objection 
 
Even if we agree that power is distributive, there might be 
reason to worry that an equal distribution of power is not 
an appealing political ideal.  I suspect the reason why 
Pettit comes to reject the anti-power strategy is because 
he recognizes that it, in practice, it would ultimately 
reduce to something like the anti-domination view sketched 
above. Pettit thinks that this approach would be attractive 
if the ideal form of anti-power, wherein people could 
somehow always effectively repel unwanted interference from 
others, were realizable.  But he recognizes that this ideal 
is not realizable, and he worries about the second-best 
approach: 
 
The strategy of reciprocal power is rarely going 
to be available in this ideal, defensive form.  
Usually the only thing feasible will be to enable 
each of the parties involved, if not to defend 
themselves against interference by another, at 
least to threaten any interference with punishment 
and threat of punishment on actual interferers.  
But such punishment and threat of punishment are 
themselves forms of interference, as we know, and 
forms of interference that do not track the 
interests and ideas of those who are affected.  
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Thus, under this non-ideal version of the 
strategy, arbitrary interference and domination 
may be reduced, but it is not ever going to be 
eliminated. (Pettit 1999: 67)  
 
The anti-domination view closely resembles what Pettit 
calls here the “non-ideal version” of the “strategy of 
reciprocal power.”  Pettit's concern is that this strategy 
will not eliminate the possibility of arbitrary 
interference. 
 At least as presented above, Pettit's objection has no 
bearing on the anti-domination view since freedom as anti-
domination does not consist in the absence of the 
possibility of arbitrary interference.  Recall that, on the 
anti-domination view, establishing reciprocal power is not 
a means for achieving freedom but constitutes freedom.  
Still, Pettit's worry cannot be dismissed so easily, since 
he paints a fairly unattractive picture of what freedom as 
anti-domination would look like in practice.  Consider 
Gerald Gaus's version of this same objection (here leveled 
against Pettit's earlier anti-power formulation of the non-
domination view).  Gaus worries that, on this kind of 
conception, Hobbes's state of nature would constitute an 
ideal state of freedom, because, in the state of nature:  
we are each symmetrically placed, and have equal 
'threat advantage.' Anyone in a position to 
interfere with me is equally subject to 
interference by me.  So we are all free and 
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nondominated.  As Pettit is fond of repeating, 
each of us can look others straight in the eye – a 
sign of nonservility – though we all tremble as we 
do so (Gaus 2003: 70).  
   
Gaus's objection is aimed at what he sees as an internal 
inconsistency in Pettit's view (and Pettit seems to have 
come to this same conclusion himself), rather than at the 
anti-domination view I have put forward here.  Still, if 
true this would be a rather unhappy result for the anti-
domination account.  First, Hobbes's state of nature – in 
which life is famously nasty, brutish, solitary and short -
- hardly seems free of domination (and I think this is the 
intuition that Gaus is highlighting).  If anything, it 
seems more intuitive to say that one is under constant 
threat of domination in the state of nature.  If this 
intuition is correct, then we might worry that the anti-
domination account does not adequately capture the essence 
of domination in the more common use of the term.  Second, 
if Hobbes's state of nature does constitute an ideal of 
anti-domination, then freedom as anti-domination will not 
be a very appealing conception on liberal terms.  Hobbes's 
argument against the value of freedom is that freedom is 
precisely what one does enjoy in the state of nature, and, 
consequently, one enjoys little else.  This is what, on 
Hobbes's view, necessitates the need for the state (Hobbes 
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1962).  Of course, Hobbes has negative liberty in mind 
(Hobbes 1962: 159ff.), not liberty as anti-domination.  But 
if the same type of concern applies to freedom as anti-
domination, we might question its value as a political 
ideal. 
 The question, then, is whether it is right to think 
that people enjoy freedom as anti-domination in the 
Hobbesian state of nature.  I have already mentioned one 
potential response to this kind of worry. Earlier it was 
noted that an equal distribution of punitive powers will 
not necessarily secure anti-domination for most because it 
will be inherently unstable; over time people will form 
coalitions and eventually some will gain the upper hand 
over others.  The problem, though, is that this response 
does not apply to the scenario being considered here, since 
Hobbes's state of nature is, by stipulation, one in which 
people have not yet joined together and ceded their power 
to some collective body.  In the state of nature, people's 
punitive resources remain perpetually equal. 
 Does this mean, though, that their power over each 
other is equal, or, more precisely, that no one enjoys an 
imbalance of power over anyone else under these conditions?  
I do not think that this is case.  While it is true that no 
single agent can prevail over all others in the state of 
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nature, this does not mean that each individual agent 
stands in a reciprocal relation of power to all other 
agents.  To see this, imagine two agents in the Hobbesian 
state of nature, A and B.  Suppose A and B are of roughly 
equal size and strength and have roughly equal resources at 
their disposal.  Still, in a conflict between A and B, one 
of them will triumph.  Hobbes's state of nature is not one 
in which agents enjoy Pettit's ideal form of anti-power.  A 
cannot automatically repel aggression by B and vice versa 
(otherwise the state of nature would not be such a bad 
place). While it is likely true that, in the state of 
nature, there will be no way for either A or B to know who 
will win this contest except by “having it out” so to 
speak, this does not mean that this question has no 
determinate answer.   
 So suppose that A and B do come into conflict with 
each other, and A ultimately triumphs by either capturing 
or killing B (note that this does not mean that A had to 
first acquire some resource advantage over B. She could 
have just gotten lucky and happened to catch B off guard 
while he was distracted with something else).  In this 
scenario A's power over B is clearly greater than B's power 
over A, since A can successfully limit B's options while 
simultaneously depriving B of any means of recourse. This 
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does not, however, entail that A is now in the clear, since 
there is likely some agent, C, capable of gaining the upper 
hand over A, and likewise some agent, D, capable of then 
gaining the upper hand over C, and so on.  So, while the 
state of nature does describe a situation in which no one 
agent can successfully dominate all or most others, it is 
still the case that agents will necessarily dominate one 
another at various times.  It is therefore not a situation 
in which everyone enjoys freedom as anti-domination, but 
one in which nobody does. 
 We thus need not worry then that Hobbes's state of 
nature represents an ideal arrangement from the standpoint 
of anti-domination.  In fact, consistent with our 
intuitions, the state of nature constitutes a dystopia on 
the anti-domination account.  Still, there remains Pettit's 
less extreme form of this objection (Pettit 1999: 67): if 
anti-domination is constituted by reciprocal powers of 
interference, then doesn't it justify political 
arrangements in which people are constantly interfering in 
each others' affairs on an arbitrary basis, and isn't this 
still an unattractive ideal?   
 I think there are several responses to this objection.  
First, it is an empirical question as to how much 
interference citizens are likely to endure under conditions 
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of reciprocity.  While we clearly do not have access to a 
definite empirical answer at the moment, it does not seem 
unreasonable to assume that people will be effective at 
deterring actual interference once given the power to do 
so.  Insofar as people are likely to not want to be 
interfered with themselves, they will avoid acting as an 
aggressor in order to avoid retribution.   After all, while 
I do not necessarily want to endorse the US system of 
incarceration as an ideal method, it is effective in 
deterring most people from committing crimes. While it is 
true that arbitrary interference will never be strictly 
eliminated even on the anti-domination ideal, this is 
hardly a defect of the view. As we have seen, it is not 
clear that interference can ever be rendered strictly 
impossible, and further, any view of freedom which requires 
that it be so both yields fairly counter intuitive 
implications and serves as a rather poor political ideal. 
 Second, Pettit seems to assume that the only way to 
establish reciprocity where power over is unequally 
distributed is to give the disadvantaged parties greater 
punitive powers.  Recall from above, however, that another 
strategy is to give them greater access to basic resources 
so that they will be relatively independent, making them 
more immune to having their options limited by others.  
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Again, Pettit's view of what constitutes interference seems 
fairly narrow, including only acts of direct physical 
obstruction.  Often, however, the most effective means by 
which one person can limit the options of others is by 
monopolizing, or at least restricting access to, basic 
resources.  So we need not think of the ideal political 
arrangement, on the anti-domination account, as one in 
which citizens are constantly threatening each other.  
Instead, we can think of it as one in which citizens are 
relatively independent from each other. 
 Finally, it is worth pointing out that Pettit himself 
often seems to employ the reciprocal power strategy, though 
he purports to reject it.  Consider Pettit's rationale for 
why free markets do not create conditions of domination: 
“one seller may be able to interfere with another by 
undercutting the other's price, but the second should be 
free, above the level of the competitive price, to undercut 
that price in return; thus there is no question of 
permanent exposure to interference by another” (Pettit 
1999: 205). The reason why neither seller is dominated in 
this case is not because neither is exposed to the 
possibility of interference, but because neither is more 
capable of interfering than the other.  What Pettit seems 
to be advocating here is something more like the anti-
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domination position rather than his own non-domination 
account. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how 
competitive markets could function at all if interference 
of the sort mentioned above were rendered strictly 
impermissible as the non-domination view seemingly 
requires(Gaus 2003: 68ff). 
 
The “Possible vs. Probable” Objection 
 
I now want to turn to a more familiar objection explored in 
the previous chapter.  The anti-domination view retains one 
essential feature of Pettit's non-domination account.  As 
with the non-domination account, it is possible rather than 
actual interference that renders one unfree on the anti-
domination view.  The crucial difference is that the non-
domination ideal seeks to render arbitrary interference 
impossible whereas the anti-domination ideal seeks to 
render powers of interference equitable, while recognizing 
that this will not completely eliminate the possibility of 
interference, arbitrary or otherwise.  Nonetheless, one 
might worry about this focus on the mere possibility of 
interference rather than say on the probability of 
interference.  In particular, one might object that the 
anti-domination view will, rather counter intuitively, 
identify relationships in which the probability of one 
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party interfering with the other is incredibly low as one 
of domination.  Accordingly, it performs equally poorly as 
the non-domination view on the kind of thought experiments 
developed by Gaus (2003) and Kramer (2008). 
 I do not think this is the case, however.  In fact, on 
the contrary, I think the anti-domination account captures 
our intuitions about these cases better than any other 
conception, though this might not be immediately apparent.  
Let's start with Gaus's example. Recall that Gaus asks us 
to imagine an ex-Soviet general who continues to manage an 
arsenal of nuclear weapons located in an ex-Soviet republic 
after the cold war.  The general could, at any moment, 
launch these missiles on a whim; however, he has no 
intention of doing so.  He simply continues to look after 
the missiles as a kind of hobby.  But, because this general 
could interfere in the lives of citizens half-way around 
the world, he necessarily dominates them according to 
Pettit's account, even though these citizens have no 
knowledge of the general and he has no intention of 
exercising this power.   
 It might seem at first that the anti-domination 
account will have to say something similar about this case.  
After all, doesn't the general have at his disposal the 
means to interfere, in a rather devastating way, in the 
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lives of others who have no equal means of recourse?  Not 
necessarily.  Imagine that the general did launch these 
missiles on a country such as the United States.  It is 
plainly not the case that the United States, and its 
citizens, would have no means of recourse, since the United 
States has a nuclear arsenal of its own.  So, while the 
general is capable of exacting enormous consequences on 
others, he can only do so in this case at the cost of 
having these consequences revisited on himself (or at least 
his potential victims retain this capability regardless of 
whether they choose ultimately not to exercise it).  In 
short, the general can interfere, but he does not dominate 
according to the anti-domination view.  Of course, this 
does not mean that this arrangement is ideal in all other 
respects.  The fact that the general could wreak great 
havoc at any moment gives us good reason to be concerned 
about the threat he poses to our safety if not our freedom.  
But the fact that the anti-domination view retains the 
distinction between freedom and security is one of its 
virtues, as we have discussed at the length the disturbing 
political implications of collapsing this distinction. 
 Admittedly, though, this response does not quite 
dispose of this counterexample entirely.  We could just as 
easily imagine the same scenario except with the 
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stipulation that the United States did not have this means 
of recourse, or we could suppose that the missiles were 
turned on some more helpless country.  One might argue that 
the anti-domination view is still committed to the 
counterintuitive assertion that the general will be an 
agent of domination in this kind of case.  But I am not 
sure that our intuitions remain the same under these 
modifications.  Imagine that the general could launch these 
missiles and suffer absolutely no repercussions for doing 
so. He could, if he chose, treat others as mere objects – 
perhaps even as play-things for his own amusement, just 
like the missiles themselves – rather than as agents who 
must be treated with the proper consideration.  If the only 
thing that prevents the general from doing this is his own 
indifference, laziness, or good nature, then it does not 
seem counterintuitive to assert that he exercises a kind of 
domination over others. Even if this still sounds somewhat 
implausible, however, it is worth noting that the anti-
domination view can say something about this case that the 
non-domination view cannot.  Under the anti-domination 
view, even if we are hesitant to think that the general 
exercises domination over others, we can at least say that 
they fail to exercise anti-domination over him because they 
hold no power over him whatsoever.  So we might think that 
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it is more intuitive to say of this case that the general's 
potential victims enjoy non-domination (understood here as 
the incredibly low likelihood they will encounter 
interference at the general's hand), but not anti-
domination. 
 I think that this way of understanding the relation 
between the general and his potential victims better 
captures our intuitions about this case and others like it.  
There is, in fact, evidence that suggests that states seek 
to develop nuclear weapons even when possessing them will 
have no appreciable effect on their security because of the 
status these weapons afford (Sagan 1997: 73ff.).
8
  States 
that possess nuclear weapons gain in international stature 
by virtue of the fact that other states perceive them as 
being powerful, and obtaining this standing is significant 
even if it is the case that they would be exposed to no 
real security threat in the absence of these weapons.   
 The anti-domination view can take the same line on 
Kramer's gentle giant example.  Recall that Kramer asks us 
to imagine a giant whose brute physical strength would make 
it easy for him to interfere in the lives of members of 
nearby village, but, because he is passive, shy, and 
                                                 
8
 Sagan points to the particular example of France following the Second 
World War to illustrate this point. 
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somewhat of a recluse, there is little to no risk that he 
will actually engage in such behavior.  On the anti-
domination view, the fact that the gentle giant could 
interfere is not what is strictly relevant.  What is 
relevant is whether the villagers have a means of equal 
recourse, and, unless the giant is of such immense strength 
that he is virtually immune to any form of retribution 
human beings could muster, it is likely that the villagers, 
functioning as a group, could exercise equal power, or 
roughly equal power, over the giant.  To the extent that 
they can, the anti-domination view will hold that the giant 
does not dominate them.  Of course if they cannot, the 
anti-domination view will hold that the giant does dominate 
them even if he has no intention of interfering, but, as 
with Gaus's example, I am not convinced that this 
conclusion greatly offends our intuitions.  It is not 
entirely counterintuitive to think that the presence of a 
creature so powerful that he could, at any moment, destroy 
an entire village while the villagers could do nothing but 
sit idly by does impose a threat to their liberty.  At 
least it does not seem implausible to think that the 
villages would experience this relationship as one of 
domination no matter how confident they were that the giant 
would never actually harm them (at this point, though, the 
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gentle giant has become so fantastical that we might 
question its effectiveness as an intuition pump in 
general). 
 I revisit these examples because I think they 
highlight a crucial advantage the anti-domination 
conception has over the non-domination view: though both 
conceptions focus on the possibility of interference rather 
than its probability, the anti-domination view does a 
better job explaining the relationship between possible 
interference and unfreedom. This is especially true when we 
consider Friedman's criticisms of the non-domination 
account.  Recall Friedman's (2008) charge that the non-
domination view ignores the essential interdependency of 
human agents.  Because people are, by their very nature, 
dependent on each other, they can always arbitrarily 
interfere in each other's lives.  Freedom as non-domination 
is consequently an unattainable ideal.  The anti-domination 
view, however, avoids this implication.  That two or more 
parties of a relationship are dependent on each other in 
all sorts of vital ways does not, in and of itself, affect 
either's freedom on the anti-domination account.  If, 
however, one party is more dependent on the other, then 
this will adversely affect the freedom of the more 
dependent party, because now the less dependent member can 
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restrict the more dependent member's options in greater 
proportion.  In short, on the anti-domination view, 
dependency itself does not produce domination, but 
disproportionate dependency does.     
 Again, I think this stance best captures our 
intuitions about certain relevant cases. Take for 
example the relationship between spouses.  Spouses are 
without doubt interdependent, and therefore subject to the 
possibility of interference at the hand of the other, but 
it does not seem right to say, except perhaps in jest, that 
people lose their freedom simply by getting married.  If, 
however, one spouse is more reliant on the other, then this 
does produce a relationship of domination. On the anti-
domination view, the subjugated housewife is unfree not 
simply because she is married, but because she is almost 
wholly dependent on her husband for her livelihood (I will 




Anti-domination and Liberalism 
 
 
In the preceding two sections, I have given a rough sketch 
of freedom as anti-domination and addressed some potential 
objections.  I now want to make a more positive case for 
the anti-domination view.  In this section, I will argue 
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that the anti-domination conception is best suited to 
capture liberal intuitions and serve as the normative basis 
for liberal political ideals.  I will first argue that the 
anti-domination view can account for the priority of the 
basic liberties as well as explain the essential connection 
between freedom and democracy without collapsing into an 
anti-liberal positive conception. I will then show that 
freedom and equality are not in conflict on the anti-
domination view, and that freedom as anti-domination 
provides grounds for remedying the kind of inequalities 
that often concern liberals. Essentially, my argument is 
that a strong commitment to each of these – basic 
liberties, democracy, and equality – is necessary in order 
to secure reciprocity of power between citizens. 
 
Anti-domination and Basic Liberties 
 
In previous chapters, I argued that neither negative nor 
positive conceptions of liberty can properly explain the 
priority of the basic liberties.  On the negative view, the 
argument is supposed to be that the basic liberties have 
priority because they maximize overall negative freedom, 
whereas on the positive view, it is that they have priority 
because people must possess them in order to exercise their 
most essential capacities.  The problem with both 
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approaches is that neither ultimately warrants giving the 
basic liberties special protection. As we have seen, being 
afforded certain liberties (like freedom of speech, the 
press, conscience, assembly, etc.) does not make a 
significant contribution to one's overall negative liberty, 
and, in some cases, restricting rather than protecting 
these liberties will maximize overall liberty in the 
negative sense. Likewise, on the positive account, it may 
be necessary to infringe on people's basic liberties when 
they fail to exercise or realize their most essential 
capacities.  On both negative and positive views then, 
violating people's basic liberties is consistent with 
promoting their freedom in a broader sense. 
 The anti-domination conception takes a different 
stance on the significance of the basic liberties.  On the 
anti-domination view, basic liberties are best understood 
as vital checks against the accumulation of power.  That 
is, they help secure limits on the power that any 
individual, or group of individuals, can successfully 
acquire.  Basic liberties often serve specifically to limit 
the power of the state by prohibiting it from engaging in 
certain activities.  In this sense, they function as 
“trumps” in Ronald Dworkin's sense of the term (Dworkin 
2007).  As we shall see, though, they do not function only 
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in this way.  On the anti-domination view, then, basic 
liberties are a necessary, though certainly not sufficient, 
means of guarding against the emergence of power 
imbalances.  In what follows, I will examine three specific 
fundamental freedoms -- freedom of expression (including 
freedom of speech and press), freedom of conscience 
(specifically freedom of religion), and freedom of assembly 
-- and explain why each are essential to securing freedom 
as anti-domination.   
 At first, it might not be immediately apparent why the 
anti-domination view would require giving special 
protection to freedom of expression.  After all, power 
over, on this view, is understood as one's ability to limit 
the options of others, and, if freedom of expression adds 
little to one's overall negative liberty, how does 
possessing it substantially increase one's power in this 
sense?       
While it is true that speech acts themselves do not 
require much in terms of negative liberty and therefore do 
not substantially contribute to its overall scope, freedom 
of expression and the ability to limit it are both 
significant resources of power. If, for example, I could 
somehow deprive others of their ability to express 
themselves in the public arena while retaining this ability 
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for myself, I would gain a tremendous power advantage over 
them, since I would now have a greater influence over 
social and public affairs.  I could advance my own agenda 
while simultaneously silencing the objections of others.  A 
political order in which some people had freedom of 
expression whereas others lacked it would therefore be one 
in which the distribution of power was highly unequal.  
Because the advantaged group would have the exclusive 
privilege of setting the political agenda and the exclusive 
right of raising objections, they could interfere in the 
lives of others with virtual impunity. 
  The vital importance of freedom of expression becomes 
apparent once we remember that the state is supposed to act 
as a kind of proxy for individual citizens under the anti-
domination ideal.  If some citizens lack freedom of 
expression, however, it would be impossible for the state 
to fulfill this function. Suppose, for example, that I had 
the power to silence those who object to my actions on the 
basis that my activities impinge on their range of 
opportunities.  This in and of itself does not mean I will 
necessarily be able to impose upon them however I wish, 
since it might be the case that a third party will prevent 
me from doing so, but, while my critics will no doubt 
appreciate this intervention, it will not promote their 
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freedom as anti-domination unless it is done on their 
behalf.  And if my critic's grievances cannot get a public 
hearing, they will be unable to exercise their power 
through the state.  Of course, one will rarely have the 
power to silence one's critics completely, but even if one 
is only able to restrict the speech of others partially – 
either through prior restraints or post facto sanctions – 
he or she will thereby gain a significant power advantage 
over them. 
 The anti-domination view thus supports what Cass 
Sunstein refers to as the “Madisonian conception” of free 
speech (Sunstein 1993).  On the Madisonian conception, 
freedom of speech is one of the most essential means of 
ensuring that power is not concentrated in the hands of the 
few.  It guarantees that everyone has an equal say in the 
management of public affairs.  This is why Madison regarded 
“free communication among the people” as “the only 
effectual guardian of every other right” (Madison 2006: 
241). Without it, freedom as a whole is jeopardized because 
the concentration of power is unchecked.    
 Before moving forward, a couple of points are worth 
emphasizing.  First, it is not the case that, on the anti-
domination view, all regulation of speech must be strictly 
prohibited, since some regulation might be necessary in 
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order to ensure reciprocity of power.  As Sunstein points 
out, regulations on “commercial speech, libelous speech, 
scientific speech with potential military applications, 
speech that invades privacy, disclosure of the name of rape 
victims, and certain forms of pornography and hate speech” 
do not necessarily violate the spirit of the First 
Amendment, and they might be necessary to protect people 
from suffering various impositions (Sunstein 1993: xviii). 
Second, freedom of expression is not just a negative right 
but a positive one as well on the anti-domination view.  
Freedom as anti-domination might, for example, require that 
the government provide public forums for expression
9
 and 
provide public financing for political campaigns in 
addition to limiting private campaign contributions. 
Without such provision, some citizens might be able to use 
their economic resources to garner greater influence in 
public affairs thus increasing their power advantage and 
hindering true reciprocity.  
 It is important to stress, however, that, even though 
the anti-domination view may permit the regulation of 
expression in certain cases and provide a positive right of 
expression in others, it does not thereby reduce to a 
positive conception of liberty.  The justification for both 
                                                 
9 See Sunstein 2005: 104ff.  
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regulating and promoting free expression is to establish 
reciprocity, not to either encourage productive speech or 
to enable people to authentically express themselves. 
Accordingly, citizens cannot be forced to be free on the 
anti-domination account. Determining precisely what 
policies the anti-domination approach would ultimately 
recommend in this area would require a more detailed 
analysis than I can provide here.  My point, however, is 
simply to emphasize that the anti-domination view's concern 
with freedom of expression is not narrowly focused on 
negative rights one has against state interference. 
 The anti-domination view also requires the protection 
of freedom of conscience because, in the absence of such a 
right, citizens  will be vulnerable to the undue influence 
of others.  If the state, or some other collective body, 
could unilaterally impose a moral code of conscience on 
other citizens, this would give this agent or collective 
agent a tremendous power advantage over them.  Consider the 
case of religious freedom. Suppose that a religious 
authority were able to use state power to impose certain 
religious standards or practices on other citizens without 
their explicit consent.  This would give this religious 
authority tremendous political power over those in the 
religious minority.  Accordingly, the state has good reason 
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to prohibit the use of its institutions for this end.  
Still, this requirement in and of itself does not guarantee 
religious freedom.  The state could just as successfully 
prevent any one religious group from acquiring too much 
influence by banning religious worship outright without 
discriminating against any one religion, or religions, in 
particular.  Notice, though, that, were such a policy 
permitted, this would give the state itself (or, perhaps 
more accurately, those who occupy positions of power within 
the state) a disproportionate amount of power.  If the 
state were able to prohibit citizens, through force, from 
giving their allegiance to any religious or moral authority 
other than itself, then the state would become enormously 
powerful.  As the only socially recognized authority, the 
state would have virtually unchecked influence in civil 
institutions and social affairs. In order to ensure 
reciprocity then, it is important both that no single 
religion, or group of religions, be able to gain too much 
political influence and that the state not be able to 
suppress the proliferation of a diversity of religious and 
moral outlooks. 
 This is why the protection of religious freedom, and 
freedom of conscience more broadly, requires the state to 
ensure both the non-establishment and free exercise of 
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religion.  It is not sufficient for citizens to just be 
allowed to practice their own chosen religion in private.  
A relatively tolerant theocracy could meet this standard.  
Rather, the state must also neither establish an official 
state religion nor try to suppress religious practice in 
the public sphere.  Were it permitted to do so, it would 
gain a power advantage over ordinary citizens and would 
therefore dominate them no matter how tolerant it was of 
what they did in private.  
 Finally, I want to consider the importance of freedom 
of assembly. Recall that one of the most effective ways in 
which people can increase their power is through collective 
bodies.  For example, as a worker, I am far more powerful 
if I am a member of a union than I would be if I were the 
lone advocate for myself.  Through union membership, the 
power of workers is made more proportional to that of their 
employers.  As a union, workers can strike and seek legal 
recourse not available to them as individuals. As such, 
they are capable of exercising substantial power over their 
employers.  Accordingly, if some citizens were able to form 
collective bodies and others were not, this would afford 
certain groups of citizens with a significant power 
advantage (for example, if the government permitted, or 
even encouraged, the formation of corporations, but 
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restricted the formation of unions).  Freedom of assembly, 
like freedom of expression, is both a negative and positive 
right on the anti-domination account. Were the state able 
to bar individuals from forming collective bodies – such as 
unions, trade associations, civil institutions, and 
advocacy groups – the state would be, in effect, the only 
legally recognized collective agent, thus giving state 
officials disproportionate power over its citizens.  If, 
however, the state does nothing more than permit the 
formation of such associations, this will not be sufficient 
to foster reciprocity of power. It will also be the 
essential that the state imbues some collective bodies, 
like unions for example, with certain legal powers in order 
for these groups to effectively advocate on their members' 
behalf. 
 While I cannot go into too much detail here, it is 
also worth noting that the same rational applies to other 
group rights. In order to ensure reciprocity, it may be 
necessary to afford certain disadvantage or vulnerable 
groups (for example, displaced native peoples) with special 
rights of self-determination.  It might also be necessary 
to grant members of minority or otherwise disadvantaged 
groups with what Will Kymlicka (1995) calls “group-
differentiated rights,” or rights that are afforded to an 
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individual by virtue of the fact that he or she is a member 
of such a group (such as the right of non-native citizens 
to have public documents translated into their native 
language, or the exclusive right of members of a native 
group or tribe to hunt or fish in certain designated 
locations).  To this extent, the anti-domination view is 
concerned not just with individual rights, but with group 
rights as well. 
 
Anti-domination and Democracy  
 
Freedom as anti-domination establishes an essential 
connection between freedom and liberal democracy, a 
connection absent from negative and most positive 
conceptions.  A commitment to negative liberty does not 
necessarily entail a commitment to democracy because a 
benevolent dictator could afford his or her citizens a 
significant degree of negative liberty without in any way 
being subject to their authority.  In fact, as we have 
seen, we can easily imagine cases in which such a 
dictatorship might be more effective at promoting overall 
negative liberty than a liberal democracy.  Berlin readily 
admits as much: “just as a democracy may, in fact, deprive 
the individual citizen of a great many liberties which he 
might have in some other form of society, so it is 
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perfectly conceivable that a liberal-minded despot would 
allow his subjects a large measure of freedom” (Berlin 
2002: 176).  Likewise, as I have argued at length in 
previous chapters, Berlin's concern that positive 
conceptions justify despotism is ultimately well founded 
(this of course is not true of views such as Rousseau's, 
which conceives of freedom as obedience to the general 
will, and Arendt's which conceives of it as active 
participation in civic institutions. But, as we have seen, 
these sorts of views have significant problems of their 
own).   
 Freedom as anti-domination, however, entails a strong 
commitment to democratic procedures and institutions 
because they ensure that political power is distributed 
equally among citizens. As long as citizens each have an 
equal say over which policies the state enacts, no one 
citizen or group of citizens will be able to use the policy 
making power of the state to interfere disproportionally in 
the lives of other citizens. Of course it will also be 
necessary that these procedures be subject to the proper 
anti-majoritarian checks.  For example, it will not be 
permissible, on the anti-domination view, for a state 
policy to violate the basic liberties, as outlined above, 
even if this policy enjoys democratic support. In order to 
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achieve anti-domination for all, it may also be necessary 
to grant minorities with certain additional rights and 
privileges that cannot be revoked by the majority, and to 
institute decision procedures that require a super-majority 
rather than a simple majority when making policy concerning 
certain essential matters (such as constitutional 
amendments).  Without these provisions, democracy would 
reduce to majoritarianism, and it would become an 
instrument of domination to be employed by the majority 
rather than a means of establishing reciprocity. 
 It is also true that, except in communities of 
relatively small size, anything even approaching universal 
participation in public policy making will prove to be an 
impractical ideal. The best larger scale communities will 
be able to achieve is some form of representative 
democracy. A representative democracy, however, is 
perfectly acceptable on the anti-domination ideal as long 
as representatives can be held in check, and reigned in if 
necessary, by the citizens they represent, and 
representative democracies typically employ a variety of 
means to ensure this, such as periodic elections, term 
limits, and a system of checks and balances.   
 This last provision is particularly important on the 
anti-domination view.  Under a representatives system, 
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certain citizens, in their capacity as representatives, 
will necessarily have substantial political powers that 
ordinary citizens lack. This might lead us to worry, that 
even under ideal conditions, a democratic regime will never 
constitute an equal distribution of power strictly 
speaking.  Allen Buchanan expresses this concern as 
follows: “the egalitarian democratic theorist acknowledges, 
as he must, that legislators, administrative officials, 
officers of the court, and the police wield powers that 
ordinary citizens do not. Even in a direct participatory 
democracy in which each citizen has an equal vote on every 
law, government officials will wield powers ordinary 
citizens do not” (Buchanan 2002: 710). This objection, 
however, conflates power understood in the broad sense as 
the ability to make-things-happen with power over 
understood in the narrow sense as the ability to limit the 
options of others.  It is of course true that government 
agents will be able to make-things-happen that ordinary 
citizens cannot, but this need not translate into a greater 
power over provided that there are other state actors who 
are also powerful and capable of counterbalancing influence 
of these state actors.   
 This, I think, is the ideal that Madison has in mind 
in outlining the concept of separation of powers in The 
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Federalist Papers, particularly “Federalist no. 51” where 
he states famously, “the great security against a gradual 
concentration of the several powers in the same department, 
consists in giving to those who administer each department 
the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to 
resist encroachments of the others [….] Ambition must be 
made to counteract ambition” (Madison et al. 1966: 289).  
In a constitutional republic, power is distributed in such 
away that no one party is able to consistently advance its 
agenda over the objection of other parties. Under this 
arrangement, the powers the parties enjoy will off set each 
other preventing any one party from gaining a power 
advantage over others.  Echoing Madison, we might say that 
institutions should be designed so that power is made to 
counteract power.  Under these conditions, even if state 
actors do possess substantial political powers in the broad 
sense, they will not possess disproportionate power over 
others (even over ordinary citizens) provided that other 
state actors are charged with the task of checking the 
power of these actors and vice versa. 
 The kind of democracy freedom as anti-domination 
supports is thus liberal democracy, liberal in the sense 
that democracy is to be constrained by basic liberties, 
protections for minorities, and separation of powers rather 
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than functioning through simple majority rule.  The virtue 
of the anti-domination view is that it can account for the 
essential connection between democracy and freedom without 
evoking a positive conception of liberty and the anti-
liberal conception of democracy that accompanies it. On the 
anti-domination view, democratic rule is not essential to 
freedom because it somehow constitutes the general will – 
in which case minorities would have to submit to the 
majority decision in order to be free – nor because freedom 
consists in active civic participation – in which case 
citizens could be forced to be free when they fail to 
participate. Citizens remain free in terms of anti-
domination even when they outright oppose the majority 
decision and when they have no interest in participating in 
public policy formation whatsoever.  What matters is that 
they have the power do so if they choose. 
 I also want to emphasize a significant contrast 
between the non-domination and anti-domination accounts on 
this score.  The reason why democratically authorized 
instances of state interference do not significantly impact 
the freedom of citizens on the anti-domination view is not 
because this kind of interference is somehow non-arbitrary 
or in accordance with their own interests, but because, 
provided the appropriate procedures and checks are in 
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place, democratically authorized interference will not 
generate a power imbalance between citizens.  Recall that 
freedom as anti-domination does not ensure that citizens 
are never interfered with against their wishes.  What it 
does ensure is that they are never exposed to a 
disproportionate amount of possible interference in 
comparison to other citizens.  So, when citizens find 
themselves on the losing end of a democratic decision, they 
should not regard this result as an infringement of their 
freedom unless the decision somehow strips them of their 
power thereby leaving them at a disadvantage, and this is 
precisely what the checks and balances described above are 
meant to guard against.  This is not to say that citizens' 
negative liberty is not compromised when a democratic 
decisions results in interference, and nothing in the anti-
domination account prevents us from admitting as much.  
Regarding such interference, we can say that it renders 
citizens not free to do x, y, or z, but it does not thereby 
render them unfree in the overall status based sense.      
 With the appropriate safeguards in place, citizens can 
rest assured that, though they have lost out in this 
instance, this in no way entails that they are any more 
likely to loose out on future deliberations.  Accordingly, 
they still stand in a relation of reciprocity with their 
327 
 
fellow citizens, and this is why they remain free despite 
losing some of their negative liberty. If, however, a group 
of citizens find themselves consistently on the loosing end 
of democratic decisions, then this will count as good 
evidence that power is not equally distributed.  These 
citizens will therefore have good reason to think that they 
are subject to domination.
10
  The crucial point to emphasize 
is that, while freedom as anti-domination is consistent 
with some degree of state interference, it is not 
consistent with pervasive unchecked state interference. 
Accordingly, freedom as anti-domination supplies the vital 
connection between democracy and liberty while avoiding the 
troubling implications that plague Pettit's account.  
 
Anti-domination and Equality 
 
In Chapter 2 we discussed Ronald Dworkin's contention that 
protecting negative liberty cannot serve as the central 
                                                 
10
 There are two unproblematic exceptions to this general rule.  The 
first involves citizens who are predisposed to object to any government 
policy regardless of its content.  In this case, they will often, if 
not always, find themselves on the losing end of democratic decisions 
and this will not entail that they are at a power disadvantage.  But 
again this is not problematic provided that they are not in fact at 
such a disadvantage.  I do not think it is too much of a leap, however, 
to assume that this kind of citizen will not be the norm, and, for most 
citizens who do care about the content of public policies, a perpetual 
losing streak will count as evidence that there is an imbalance of 
power at work.  The second case involves citizens who are incredibly 
tolerant of state interference even when it is rather pervasive.  But 
this case is also unproblematic provided that citizens retain the power 
to actively resist this interference even if they choose not to 
exercise it.  Again, I think it is fairly safe to assume this will not 




liberal norm because this goal inevitably conflicts with 
promoting another fundamental liberal value: equality.  On 
the anti-domination view, however, there is no fundamental 
tension between liberty and equality because equality is 
constitutive of liberty.  Because freedom as anti-
domination is a status based account of liberty, certain 
kinds of inequalities – namely inequalities of power – will 
hinder liberty. 
 Liberty and equality are therefore not only consistent 
ideals on the anti-domination account, but they are also 
mutually supportive in two essential respects.  First, 
promoting anti-domination requires promoting a certain 
degree of equality because one can only enjoy anti-
domination if one occupies a position of reciprocity with 
respect to one's fellow citizens.  Second, it is impossible 
to promote anti-domination at the expense of equality. This 
is because any power over that one enjoys over and above 
what is necessary in order to achieve reciprocity does not 
make one any less dominated.  What it does do is make one 
more dominating of others.  So, beyond a certain threshold, 
one cannot increase one's own level of freedom as anti-
domination; one can only decrease the level of others. 
 Accordingly, freedom as anti-domination entails a 
commitment to promoting and preserving political, legal, 
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social, and economic equality. I have already discussed the 
importance of political equality above at length. Regarding 
legal equality, if coercive laws only apply to some 
citizens and not others, or some citizens are able to seek 
legal recourse whereas others cannot, this will lead to 
large disparities in power.  Likewise, freedom as anti-
domination also requires social equality.  If some citizens 
are excluded from opportunities or privileges because they 
are made to suffer social marginalization, they will be 
unable to achieve a relationship of reciprocity with their 
fellow citizens, as citizens who occupy a higher social 
status will be able to turn their standing into a power 
advantage. Finally, freedom as anti-domination also 
requires economic equality, not only in the sense that 
economic opportunities must be open to all, but also in the 
sense that it prohibits any group of people from 
accumulating such a disparate amount of economic wealth 
that they gain a power advantage over their fellow 
citizens.  In particular, the anti-domination view 
prohibits citizens from monopolizing certain basic 
resources – such as education or health care – that would 
in effect allow them to greatly diminish the opportunities 
of their fellow citizens.  Freedom as anti-domination thus 
requires, in addition to equal economic opportunity, equal 
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access to basic resources. 
  It is, however, important to emphasize once again 
that the anti-domination view does not require equality of 
welfare.  That some citizens enjoy greater welfare than 
others does not necessarily mean that these not as well off 
citizens suffer from domination, because it might be the 
case that, given equal opportunities and equal access to 
basic resources, some citizens will choose to pursue 
greater wealth whereas others will opt for a life of 
leisure or focus their energy on non-material goods such as 
family life. The resulting disparity in wealth will not be 
of concern on the anti-domination view provided that the 
wealthy cannot translate it into a power advantage over 
others who are less wealthy.  If their greater wealth 
allows them to purchase bigger houses, take more lavish 
vacations, or install pools in their back yard, this will 
not have an appreciable effect on the power they hold over 
others; possessing these luxuries does not enable them to 
limit other's opportunities whereas buying political 
influence or monopolizing basic resources would. 
 This commitment to equality as reciprocity as opposed 
to equality of welfare is in keeping with basic liberal 
intuitions.  Recall that Dworkin rejects the welfare view 
in favor of the “equal resources” view because, according 
331 
 
to him, liberal equality does not entail strict 
egalitarianism, but a commitment to respect the equal moral 
worth of others (Dworkin 2000). The problem with Dworkin's 
approach, however, is that he tries to show that equality 
of resources somehow entails a commitment to liberty when 
in fact it presupposes it. The anti-domination view takes a 
different position on the relationship between liberty and 
equality by recognizing the primacy of liberty; it holds 
that equality is not valuable as such, but insofar as it is 
constitutive of liberty. The anti-domination view thus 
accords with Elizabeth Anderson's assertion that the “point 
of equality” is “to end oppression,” and it does so not by 
ensuring that “everyone gets what they morally deserve” but 
by creating “a community in which people stand in relations 
of equality to others” (Anderson 1999: 288 – 89).   
  
 




In previous chapters, I have argued that neither negative 
conceptions nor positive conceptions – nor some aggregation 
of the two – are satisfactory on liberal terms.  Throughout 
this chapter, and in the preceding section in particular, I 
have tried to make the case that freedom as anti-domination 
is the conception of freedom proper to liberalism.  I do 
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not wish to imply, however, that negative and positive 
liberty should not be regarded as genuine values in their 
own right.  Negative and positive liberty are no doubt 
goods that most people wish to possess; they just cannot 
serve as the normative basis for a liberal political order. 
 In this final section, I want to make the case that a 
liberal regime committed to promoting freedom as anti-
domination will, by virtue of that fact, also promote 
negative and positive liberty.  The proper way to 
understand the relationship between anti-domination on the 
one hand and negative and positive liberty on the other, is 
that anti-domination is the defining norm that underpins 
liberal institutions and negative and positive liberty are 
valuable goods that tend to flourish under these 
institutions.  In this respect, freedom as anti-domination 
will serve as a “side constraint” (Nozick 1974) on efforts 
to promote negative and positive liberty.  It is not 
permissible, under the anti-domination ideal, to maximize 
negative or positive liberty at the expense of freedom as 
anti-domination; however, it is my contention that this 
constraint entails no great sacrifice because, if citizens 
enjoy freedom as anti-domination, it will be very likely as 
an empirical matter that they will also enjoy a substantial 




Anti-domination and Negative Liberty 
 
Recall that there are essentially two ways in which we can 
increase the degree of anti-domination that someone enjoys.  
First, we can increase that person's power over others by 
giving him greater means to limit the options of others, or 
we can decrease the power that others have over him by 
making him less dependent on them. It is clear how the 
second strategy also fosters negative liberty.  The more 
independent one is, the less others will be able to 
interfere in one's affairs, and consequently the more 
negative liberty one will possess.  
 It is perhaps less clear how the first strategy 
fosters negative liberty, although we have already touched 
upon this matter briefly.  Insofar as Carter (1999) and 
others are right in thinking that negative liberty is a 
quantitative good (say, like money) that people  in general 
wish to amass for themselves, then it is reasonable to make 
two assumptions about the purposes for and extent to which 
people will tend to exercise their power over others.  
First, because negative liberty is a good people desire, 
they are likely to try to use their power over others to 
secure it.  To the extent that they fear that others might 
encroach on their negative liberty, people will attempt to 
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make such encroachments costly by threatening to respond in 
kind; in essence, they will use their power over as a 
deterrent.  Of course nothing on the anti-domination view 
ensures that they will be successful in doing so, and this 
might lead us to worry that, if people make good on their 
threats, this first strategy is likely to make everyone 
worse off on the scale of negative liberty.  This worry, 
however, is alleviated by a second reasonable assumption: 
insofar as people want to preserve the negative liberty 
they already have, they will in general seek to avoid 
incurring their fellow citizens' wrath, as doing so will 
decrease their own enjoyment of negative liberty.  So, 
while using one's power over as a deterrent is not 
guaranteed to be successful, it is empirically likely to be 
successful.  Showing that these assumptions do in fact hold 
would require substantial empirical research which I cannot 
provide here, but I think they are both rather plausible.  
 
Anti-domination and Positive Liberty     
 
In previous chapters we have discussed many different 
variations of positive liberty.  The kind I have in mind 
here is roughly what Berlin (2002) refers to as “self-
mastery,” or what we might call freedom as personal 
autonomy.  There are of course likewise many different 
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conceptions of what constitutes autonomy, but, following 
Christman and Anderson, we can think of autonomy broadly as 
“the idea of being one's own person, directed by 
considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics 
that are not simply imposed externally on one, but are part 
of what can somehow be considered one's authentic self” 
(Christman and Anderson 2005: 3).  
 Domination clearly hinders personal autonomy. The 
slave, the abused spouse, or the destitute wage laborer 
will not be able to live their lives free from conditions 
externally imposed upon them; their lives will not be 
directed by their own desires, needs, or plans, but by the 
desires, needs, and plans of others. To this extent, 
promoting freedom as anti-domination will help foster 
personal autonomy because not being exposed to such 
conditions of near total domination is a necessary 
condition of achieving personal autonomy. 
 Of course achieving freedom as anti-domination is not 
a sufficient condition for achieving personal autonomy, 
and,  as such, one might worry that there will be many 
troubling examples of individuals who suffer from a lack of 
personal autonomy that the anti-domination view will have 
nothing to say about. Recall Christman's example of the 
housewife who perpetually obeys her husband, not because he 
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threatens her should she fail to do so, but because she has 
grown up in a culture that inculcates in women the belief 
that they are somehow inferior to their husbands and should 
therefore always defer to their husband's judgment.  This 
housewife clearly lacks personal autonomy, but it is not 
immediately apparent that she suffers from domination 
because what prevents her from living her life according to 
her own plans and desires is not the threat of physical 
interference but cultural indoctrination.  Because the 
conception of power employed by the anti-domination view is 
both non-evaluative and non-behaviorist, it might seem like 
it cannot offer a critical assessment of this arrangement.  
On the anti-domination understanding of power, the 
husband's power over his wife is determined wholly by his 
ability to physically interfere with her, not how she 
behaves towards him or how he is able to effect her 
interests authentically understood.  
 I do not think this concern is warranted, however.  
What the above account leaves out is exactly how this 
social indoctrination occurs. Let's consider some 
possibilities.  Suppose that the housewife is unfailingly 
obedient because she has simply internalized the physical 
violence, or threat of physical violence, she has been made 
to suffer at the hands of her husband or other male 
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authorities in her life.  It is not just that she is aware 
and afraid of the potential repercussions should she 
disobey, but that she has come to accept, and perhaps even 
endorse, her subjugated status as a direct result of the 
abuse that has been inflicted upon her.  In this case, it 
will no longer be necessary for the husband to actually 
abuse, or even merely threaten, his wife in order to get 
her to do what he wants, but this clearly does not mean 
that she stands in a relationship of reciprocal power with 
him on the anti-domination account.  He in fact has a 
tremendous power advantage over her, and he has been able 
to exercise it in a devastatingly effective manner.  The 
wife clearly suffers from domination in this sort of case, 
and the anti-domination view gives us good reason to be 
critical of the conditions under which this kind of 
relationship is formed.   
 Now, however, let's suppose this housewife has never 
been exposed to violence or even the threat of it.  Let's 
suppose that her husband would never think of abusing her 
and that there are laws prohibiting him from doing so, laws 
that are routinely and effectively enforced.  Let us 
suppose further that the wife is aware of these laws, and 
she would not hesitate to seek legal recourse should her 
husband abuse her or threaten to.  Despite this, she 
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remains steadfastly loyal and obedient to her husband 
because she was taught from an early age that she should 
defer to men and that the only respectable career and life 
plan for a woman is to become a good housewife.  The worry 
in this case is that, absent the threat of physical 
violence lurking in the background, we will have to say 
that the housewife is free in anti-domination terms even 
though she intuitively lacks autonomy.  After all, she has 
not been exposed to the threat of physical violence, and 
further she possesses an effective means of recourse; yet 
the values and goals which she lives by are clearly not her 
own. 
 Again, though, I think we would be mistaken to think 
that the housewife described above genuinely enjoys anti-
domination.  The reason why she accepts her subjugated 
status in this case is because she knows no alternative; 
her options have been limited right from the get go.  Her 
husband need not threaten her in order to make her obedient 
because social conditions are as such that she is left with 
little options she should refuse to obey.  There are few if 
any life plans available to her other than becoming a 
housewife, and, as a result, she has little to no access to 
other social or economic opportunities.  Further, the cost 
of exiting her relationship with her husband is likely very 
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high.  Even if divorce is legal, she will be unable to 
sufficiently support herself without being married.  It is 
clear in this case then, that the housewife is still at a 
severe power disadvantage despite the fact that she is not 
made to suffer physical violence and even has the power to 
repel it.  Outside of this legal power, her husband range 
of opportunities is virtually immune to her influence, 
whereas her prospects depend entirely on him (or at least 
they depend on her being able to find support from another 
husband). 
 The two scenarios sketched above illustrate the 
phenomenon of adaptive preferences in which women come to 
embrace and endorse a social identity that has been imposed 
upon them either by force or by the removal of any genuine 
alternatives (Friedman 2005).  Contrary to the objection 
outlined above, the anti-domination view gives us good 
reason to be concerned about the phenomenon of adaptive 
preferences, not because acting on these preferences as 
opposed to more authentic ones constitutes the essence of 
unfreedom, but because the conditions under which such 
preferences are formed are quite clearly conditions of 
domination.  To that extent, alleviating these conditions 
through the promotion of anti-domination will help limit 




 There will, however, be cases in which one does enjoy 
freedom as anti-domination, but fails to achieve full 
personal autonomy.  Consider now the case of the housewife 
who grew up in a culture that promotes sexual equality with 
equal access to educational, social, and economic 
opportunities.  If she chose to, she could divorce her 
husband and this would in no way hinder her life prospects.  
She could support herself, and, if she has been out of the 
workforce for an extended period while raising her family, 
her husband will be made to support her in the interim. In 
short, she possesses freedom as anti-domination.  Suppose, 
however, that because of her strong religious commitments, 
she believes that women should be obedient to their 
husbands and that divorce is morally disgraceful.  Or 
suppose that she has grown accustomed to a life of luxury 
and ease, and she is willing to defer to her husband in 
order to maintain it.  In either case, we might be correct 
in thinking that the housewife fails to achieve full 
autonomy.  In the first case, her religious beliefs might 
be mistaken or at least based on a gross misrepresentation 
of true religious teaching. In the second, she might suffer 
from laziness, an unhealthy obsession with material wealth, 
or a great need of for physical comfort.  
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  In both cases, it is possible that the housewife's 
prospects for achieving autonomy might be improved with 
forced intervention, but the anti-domination ideal 
prohibits this. If we were in a position to interfere in 
the housewife's life without her explicit consent, we would 
hold a significant power advantage over her, even if we 
only used this power to promote her autonomy.  Again, the 
norm of anti-domination serves as a side constraint on what 
we are permitted to do in these sorts of cases.  We cannot 
promote her autonomy at the expense of stripping her of her 
power by placing her under our command.  Accordingly, the 
anti-domination conception is able to place strict limits 
on the extent to which we can interfere in people's lives 
in the name of their own interests whereas the positive 
conception cannot.  If, under conditions of anti-
domination, citizens still fail to act autonomously, this 
does not permit the state to intervene. While their failure 
to achieve full autonomy might count as evidence that the 
underlying power structures are fundamentally imbalanced, 
it does not in itself justify the use of state coercion.  
On the anti-domination view, the state is charged with 
fostering conditions favorable to promoting autonomy, but 








ANTI-DOMINATION AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ISSUES 
 
Assessing Contemporary Political Controversies 
 
In the preceding chapter, I argued that freedom as anti-
domination is the conception of liberty that liberals 
should endorse.  It is superior to competing conceptions 
insofar as it establishes reflective equilibrium in the 
strong sense. Not only is the ideal of anti-domination 
consistent with the core commitments of liberalism, it also 
entails them.  A liberalism committed to ensuring freedom 
as anti-domination will, for that very reason, also be 
committed to promoting equality, democracy and the 
protection of basic rights.   If my contention is correct, 
then liberalism, rather than representing a series of 
disparate and perhaps even conflicting commitments, can be 
grounded in an appeal to the single value of anti-
domination. This account would therefore go a long way 
towards establishing the coherence and viability of the 
liberal project in general.   
 Still, in order to make this case complete, I need to 
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say something about how the anti-domination account can be 
applied to particular cases.  Recall that, on a reflective 
equilibrium strategy, we move back and forth between our 
considered judgments about particular cases and the theory 
that purportedly guides them by adjusting both our 
judgments and our theory as necessary in order to establish 
the greatest possible coherence between the two.  Having 
outlined the anti-domination conception of liberty in the 
preceding chapter, in this final chapter, I will argue that 
it can be fruitfully applied to some contemporary political 
controversies that have proved particularly vexing for 
liberals.  Specifically, I will focus on the controversies 
among liberals concerning pornography, same-sex marriage, 
and affirmative action.  Because freedom as anti-domination 
is a status based account of liberty, it can offer guidance 
in these controversies where other competing conceptions 
cannot.  If so, this further supports my contention that 
the anti-domination view is able to achieve reflective 
equilibrium in the stronger sense.  It not only shows how 
the core commitments of liberalism hang together, but also 
how certain controversies within liberalism can ultimately 
be resolved. On the anti-domination account, we do not have 
to regard these controversies as the inevitable result of a 
fundamental conflict between liberal commitments. 
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 Before proceeding, I should note that my aim is not so 
much to defend a definite position regarding each of these 
controversies, though I will certainly offer some 
suggestions, but instead to show that freedom as anti-
domination offers us new and helpful ways of thinking about 
them.  Even if more work is required to settle these 
controversies definitively, the anti-domination view still 





The issue of pornography presents a difficult problem for 
liberals because arguments both for allowing and strictly 
prohibiting certain forms of pornography both appeal to 
basic liberal values.  Feminist proponents of prohibiting 
the production or consumption of pornography that 
eroticizes either violence perpetuated against women or the 
subordination of women more generally argue that this kind 
of pornography cause substantial harm to women either by 
directly inciting men to physically and sexually abuse them 
or by contributing to a prevailing cultural attitude that 
women are not proper equals.
1
  Accordingly, state regulation 
of pornography is necessary in order to effectively promote 
                                                 
1
 See for example, Longino (1980), Mackinnon (1988), Dwyer (1995), West 
(2003), and Eaton (2005) 
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gender equality. Liberal opponents of these kinds of 
prohibitons argue, however, that such concerns are not 
sufficient to warrant the restriction of freedom of 
expression, which is a basic liberty. As Joel Feinberg 
stresses, “given that 'communication' is a form of 
expression, and thus has important social value, obviously 
it cannot rightly be made criminal simply on the ground 
that it may led some others on their own to act harmfully” 
(Feinberg 1985: 156).
2
  If such a justification were 
sufficient to permit state interference in this area, 
Feinberg worries that the state's power to restrict 
expression would be virtually limitless.
3
  All the state 
would have to do is show some remote causal connection 
between what someone says and what someone else does in 
order to limit speech rights.   
 This tension has lead some feminists to wonder whether 
liberalism and feminism are ultimately compatible ideals.  
Though she does not herself share it, Caroline West 
summarizes this worry as follows: 
 
Many feminists have claimed that liberalism lacks 
the conceptual resources to adequately address 
feminist issues and concerns – so much so, that it 
is now quite frequently said that one cannot be a 
                                                 
2
 Cf. Dworkin (1985) 
3
 The example Feinberg (1985: 155) uses is prohibitions on employers from 
criticizing their employees on the ground that this might cause their 
employees to become enraged and lash out at others. 
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liberal and a feminist.  The orthodox liberal 
defense of pornography is often held up as a 
classical illustration of some of the central 
respects in which liberalism fails feminists; and 
the liberal conception of equality, subjectivity 
and the public/private distinction, have been 
identified as deeply problematic from a feminist 
point of view. (West 2003: 395)  
 
The controversy surrounding pornography and freedom of 
speech creates a difficult dilemma both for liberals and 
feminists who are otherwise sympathetic to liberalism. If 
warranted, the concern expressed by West should deeply 
trouble liberals. It is not that feminists necessarily 
reject fundamental liberal values, such as freedom and 
equality (though some do), it is that they think that the 
liberal understanding of these values does not properly 
recognize all the ways in which women are rendered unfree 
and unequal. If this is indeed the case, then liberalism is 
deficient on its own terms.  At the same time, if 
Feinberg's criticisms are warranted, then feminists who 
share liberal commitments have good reason to worry that 
any institutional enforcement of feminist ideals risks 
granting the state tremendous unchecked power, thus 
threatening liberty. 
 It is my contention that a liberalism committed to the 
norm of anti-domination goes a long way towards resolving 
this tension. Once we hold anti-domination as the guiding 
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principle, we can justify narrow state regulation of 
certain forms of pornography, provided that certain 
conditions are met, without simultaneously justifying far 
more sweeping restrictions on freedom of expression as 
Feinberg worries.  Rather than asserting that some forms of 
pornography are “harmful” in some vague sense, the key is 
to demonstrate how they contribute to conditions of 
domination. 
 Recall that the anti-domination justification for 
protecting freedom of expression is that doing so is 
necessary in order to ensure reciprocity amongst citizens.  
Were some citizens able to express themselves publicly 
while silencing others, this privileged group would gain 
tremendous influence in economic, social and political 
affairs thus giving them a substantial power advantage over 
their fellow citizens.  This does not mean, however, that 
there are no conditions under which the government might 
regulate speech.  To reference one famous example, the 
freedom to shout “fire” in a crowded theater, when one is 
fully aware that there is in fact no actual fire, is not 
protected under the anti-domination standard because the 
power to incite fear and panic is in no way essential to 
reciprocity.  I am placed at no power disadvantage by my 
fellow citizens if they are able to sanction me for speech 
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that has the potential to substantially harm them in a 
fairly direct sort of way (this sort of direct causal 
connection, where the speaker is aware of the likely 
immediate harmful effects his or her speech will have and 
utters it precisely to achieve this effect, is the kind of 
causal connection that most liberals would agree warrants 
government interference).
4
 To cite another example, it may 
be necessary, in the name of anti-domination, for the state 
to regulate intentionally deceptive advertising in order to 
protect consumers.   Since consumers' primary means of 
recourse against companies that offer defective or harmful 
products is to take their business elsewhere,  they 
accordingly must have access to reliable information in 
order to wield this power effectively.
5
 
 These kinds of regulations, however, are not the sort 
that liberals typically find objectionable.  The question 
is whether the regulation of pornography can be justified 
on similar grounds.  I want to argue that certain forms of 
pornography can limit the power of women in such a way as 
to lessen their freedom on the anti-domination standard. 
                                                 
4
 See Feinberg 1985: 157 for example 
5
 My claim here is not that, if the economic decisions of consumers are 
not fully informed, they are somehow not made freely.  This would make 
the anti-domination account a positive conception of liberty.  My claim 
is rather that, if companies were able to control the information 
available to consumers, they would be able immunize themselves against 
consumer complaints and, overtime, come to effectively control the 
market so as to greatly limit the options of consumers. 
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The kind of pornography I have in mind is what A. W. Eaton 
has called “inegalitarian pornography,” pornography that in 
some way eroticizes the forced subjugation of women (Eaton 
2005). 
 One way in which inegalitarian pornography can limit 
the power of women is by rendering their own speech 
relatively ineffective in certain social and legal 
settings.  This applies to pornography that depicts sexual 
acts forcibly imposed on women -- sometimes even acts that 
could only be characterized as brutally violent rape -- as 
sexually pleasurable for women.  Some feminists charge that 
men who consume this type of pornography somehow 
internalize it so that they interpret attempts by women to 
resist their sexual advances as indication that these women 
find their advances pleasurable and are in fact inviting 
further sexual contact (I should stress that showing that 
this is in fact the case no doubt would require substantial 
empirical evidence).
6
  To illustrate this kind of case, 
Caroline West asks us to consider the unfortunately 
familiar scenario in which a woman attempts to refuse a 
man's sexual advances, but her explicit “no's” are taken to 
mean “yes” (West 2003: 400).  Women in such a scenario 
                                                 
6
 For a detailed discussion of the empirical research involving the 
cultural effects of pornography, see Eaton 2005 
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lack, in some significant sense, control over the meaning 
of their own speech acts.  This is what West calls the 
“scrambling” effect (West 2003: 403).  The consumption of 
pornography can, in certain cases, distort women's speech 
to the extent that they are unable to convey themselves 
effectively in order to ward off unwanted advances.
7
 
  The power of women is curtailed significantly in 
comparison to men under these conditions because the power 
to end or refuse sexual intercourse will lie almost 
entirely with men when such scrambling is in effect. 
Protests on the part of women will have virtually no weight 
of their own because they can be taken to indicate consent. 
I do not mean to suggest that, in the absence of the 
scrambling effect, women somehow possess an uncanny power 
to effectively repel forced sexual contact from men simply 
by uttering the word “no” or otherwise indicating their 
resistance.  Certainly not all cases of rape and sexual 
assault are like the one described above, but it is still 
the case that, under social conditions in which “no” can 
mean “yes,” women are exposed to a disproportionate degree 
of possible interference at the hands of men. 
  Admittedly, however, showing that this is the case 
requires a little bit more explanation because one might 
                                                 
7
 Cf. Langton (1993) 
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object that, under these “no-means-yes” conditions, women 
might be more likely to suffer sexual abuse by men, but 
this does not necessarily entail that they are at a overall 
power disadvantage in comparison to men. According to this 
objection, provided that women have some effective means of 
recourse against men who sexually assault them, they will 
not be dominated even if they do sometimes suffer sexual 
abuse (I should stress that this would not mean that there 
is nothing objectionable about such abuse nor that we 
shouldn't try to prevent it.  It would just mean we 
couldn't justify regulating pornography on the basis that 
it promotes freedom as anti-domination).  Further, women do 
have means of recourse provided that there are laws against 
rape and sexual assault.  Were the anti-domination view to 
fail to recognize this in the case of the relationship 
between pornography and sexual abuse, it would essentially 
collapse the distinction between liberty and security -- a 
criticism I have repeatedly leveled against competing 
conceptions. 
 This objection, however, misses the point.  The 
argument is not simply that inegalitarian pornography makes 
rape and sexual assault causally more likely (as this kind 
of argument would also be vulnerable to Feinberg's 
objection), but that it contributes to conditions under 
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which the assertions and claims made by women lack any real 
force. Under these conditions, even if there are laws 
against rape and sexual assault, they will be considerably 
less effective since men who are prosecuted under them will 
claim, perhaps with some degree of plausibility, that they 
were unaware that their victims had intended to refuse 
their advances, and therefore they have committed no crime.  
Furthermore, the men who are in a position to prosecute or 
adjudicate these offenses may themselves be predisposed to 
be sympathetic to these kinds of defenses, thinking perhaps 
that women are more often than not “asking for it.”  The 
impact of the scarmbling effect therefore goes far beyond 
increasing the likelihood of sexual assault.  As Catherine 
Mackinnon puts it, pornography “strips and divests women of 
credibility, from our accounts of sexual assault to our 
everyday reality of sexual subordination.  We are stripped 
of authority and reduced and devalidated and silenced” 
(Mackinnon 1992: 483). 
 Indeed, the scrambling effect is just one of the ways 
in which inegalitarian pornography disempowers women more 
generally.  As Eaton stresses: 
 
one need not understand pornography's role in 
promoting and sustaining gender inequality in 
active terms.  Sexualizing gender hierarchy can 
also reinforce or exacerbate already existing 
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conditions of inequality, undermine prohibitions 
or other strictures against discriminatory 
behavior, and predispose an audience to 
internalize the psychology of gender 
inequality....pornography need not actively 
solicit rape, for example, in order to be a 
significant force in promoting and sustaining 
gender inequality. (Eaton 2005: 684) 
  
Accordingly, in order to justify state regulation of 
pornography, we do not have to appeal to some remote causal 
connection between certain forms of pornography and 
specific harms to women (nor do we even have to appeal to a 
probabilistic notion of causation as Eaton (2005) 
ultimately does).  Instead we can point to the ways in 
which inegalitarian pornography creates, worsens or 
sustains social and legal conditions in which women are 
rendered less powerful than men.  This is what is unique 
about inegalitarian pornography.  It is not just that it 
encourages harmful acts; it is that it contributes to the 
systemic disempowerment of women.  As such, regulating it 
does not, contra Feinberg, also justify restrictions on 
more innocuous forms speech that bear only a remote causal 
relationship with physically harmful acts. 
 If the above analysis is correct, then freedom as anti-
domination can accommodate feminist concerns about the 
narrowness of liberalism without abandoning a fundamental 
commitment to freedom of speech.  I should, however, 
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highlight two important caveats to this conclusion.  First, 
as I already mentioned briefly, establishing that 
inegalitarian pornography does in fact contribute to the 
conditions described above would require an in depth 
examination of the empirical evidence, and I have not 
provided that here. I do not wish to give the impression 
that this empirical question is not relevant on the anti-
domination view.  Quite the contrary.  If it turns out 
that, as an empirical matter, pornography has very little 
impact on prevailing cultural attitudes and practices, then 
it is unlikely that the anti-domination view would 
recommend in favor of regulating it.  This is just to say 
that more empirical research is likely required before we 
could arrive at a definite policy recommendation from the 
standpoint of anti-domination.  My main point, however, is 
simply that freedom as anti-domination provides a valuable 
conceptual resource by which we might adjudicate this 
controversy, not that it somehow gives us a deductive 
argument in favor of regulating pornography. 
 Second, even if we did establish that inegalitarian 
pornography in someway contributes to female 
disempowerment, this would not necessarily justify outright 
prohibition.  We would first have to determine whether a 
state agency designed to regulate pornographic material 
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could be kept in check and reined in if necessary.  
Otherwise we risk giving such a regulatory body too much 
discretion to abridge speech, rendering it an agent of 
domination.  In addition, there may be ways of combating 
the disempowering effects of inegalitarian pornography that 
are preferable to state imposed prohibition for this very 
reason.  We might, for example, impose very severe 
sanctions on producers and distributors who sell certain 
kinds of pornography to minors. Or, instead of 
criminalizing some forms of pornography, we might permit 
women to sue producers of inegalitarian pornography as 
recommended by Andrea Dworkin and Mackinnon (1997) as well 
as Cass Sunstein (1993).  Finally, we might encourage, or 
perhaps even subsidize, egalitarian pornography, as Eaton 
mentions in passing (Eaton 2005: 693).  Exactly which of 
these strategies or combination of strategies would best 
promote freedom as anti-domination is another empirical 
question we must grapple with before reaching any specific 
policy recommendations. 
 I want to conclude by noting the deficiency of the non-
domination account on this issue.  It is not clear what 
recommendations, if any, the non-domination conception 
could offer regarding this controversy.  Perhaps one could 
argue that inegalitarian pornography somehow increases the 
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range of possible arbitrary interference women are exposed 
to.  I must confess I am not sure how such an account would 
go, but even if it were successful, it would lead to the 
kind of nightmare scenario that Feinberg fears.  If all the 
state had to show is that a speech act increases the 
possibility of interference (not the actuality or even the 
probability) in order to regulate it, then it does seem as 
if the state's power to impinge on freedom of expression 
would be virtually limitless.   
 Perhaps one could argue instead that state regulation 
of some forms of pornography is permitted on the non-
domination account because this amounts to non-arbitrary 
interference.  This assertion, however, is equally 
unpromising.  Certainly, from the point of view of the 
consumers of pornography this interference would fail to 
track their interests.  As Feinberg notes, “works of 
pornography...have an intimate personal value for those who 
use them” (Feinberg 1985: 157).  Accordingly, it is 
difficult to see how these consumers could regard 
pornography censorship as anything but arbitrary, unless 
what makes it non-arbitrary is that it either tracks some 
collective interest or the consumers' own interests in some 
more evaluatively substantive sense.  This sort of 
justification, however, returns us to those features of 
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Pettit's account that seem positive in nature, and it would 
indeed be disturbing if the state could censor someone's 
expression by appeal to the collective interest or true or 





In some respects, the controversy concerning same-sex 
marriage mirrors that of pornography regulation.  
Proponents of extending the scope of legally recognized 
marriages to marriages between same-sex couples often 
appeal to the liberal norm of equality.  If the state is 
going to confer a privilege or a benefit, this argument 
goes, it must do so equally.  A state that recognizes only 
marriages between heterosexuals therefore violates the norm 
of equality.
8
 In turn, opponents of extending marriage 
rights, much like opponents of prohibiting the production 
and consumption of certain forms of pornography, charge 
that requiring the state to recognize same-sex marriage 
conflicts with basic liberty.  At first blush, this 
assertion may not seem as intuitively appealing in the case 
of same-sex marriage as it is in the case of pornography 
censorship.  With regards to the latter issue, there does 
seem to be a fairly obvious, even if ultimately resolvable, 
                                                 
8 For an example of this type of argument, see Wedgewood 2011. 
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tension between censoring pornography and protecting free 
speech, but how does extending marriage benefits likewise 
conflict with liberty? 
 What drives this skepticism, I think, is the intuition 
that, if anything, failing to extend marriage rights to 
same-sex couples is a violation of liberty since it 
prevents these couples from doing something they strongly 
wish to do.  Whether restricting marriage benefits does 
violate liberty, however, depends on the conception of 
liberty we appeal to.  On the negative conception, it is 
not clear that such a restriction is a violation of liberty 
since, in imposing it, the state is not necessarily 
preventing same-sex couples from doing anything in the 
strictly negative sense.  As long as the state does not 
criminalize sexual acts between same-sex couples or prevent 
them from having their own private marriage ceremonies, it 
does not restrict their physical range of opportunities by 
legally only recognizing heterosexual marriages.  One might 
object, however, that the state policy of sanctioning 
heterosexual marriages still coerces non-heterosexual 
couples because this privilege confers certain benefits on 
heterosexual couples that non-heterosexual couples cannot 
receive. This problem, however, can be solved by giving 
same-sex couples the right to form legally recognized 
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civil-unions, which grant them the same legal rights as 
married couples, but are not regarded as true marriages, in 
the fullest sense of the term, by the law. 
 Consider Charles Fried's argument against the assertion 
that heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals all equally have a 
right to marriage (I should note that Fried is not opposed 
to same-sex marriages outright, just the claim that they 
should be granted in opposition to the will of the 
majority): 
 
What can we conclude about the vexed question of 
gay marriage? That, it seems to me, is a matter 
not of liberty, but, if anything, of equality.  If 
the government does not disadvantage gays for what 
they do in bed, I do not think liberty demands it 
go further and celebrate it.  That too is a 
question of liberty.  One does not have to go to 
the wedding (or funeral) of someone whose way of 
life one finds distasteful....Gay marriage – 
unlike civil unions, which allow any two persons 
to make legal arrangements combining their 
property and other material rights – is a kind of 
civil blessing asked of the population as a whole, 
and though people may (and perhaps should) be 
willing to give that blessing to gays as well as 
straights, I balk at the courts forcing them to do 
that. (Fried 2007: 140 – 141) 
 
Jeffrey Jordan (2011) makes the stronger case that the 
state should not recognize same-sex marriages, presumably 
even when the majority is in favor of them, on similar 
grounds.  Jordan argues that a state acts coercively when 
it needlessly takes sides on a controversial issue -- that 
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is, when it makes a proclamation concerning the proper view 
on such an issue when a more accommodating option is 
available. He even goes as far as to assert that, “a state 
which is partial and takes sides in moral disputes via 
declaration, when there is no overriding reason why it 
should, is tyrannical” (Jordan 2011: 88; emphasis added). 
 It might seem as if, in not recognizing same-sex 
marriages, the state is taking sides in a moral dispute.  
Jordan, however, rejects this conclusion, arguing that 
there is a more accommodating option available.  The state 
could, he claims, protect the right of same-sex couples to 
do whatever they wish in private, but just not recognize 
their marital status in the public realm.  This way, the 
freedom of same-sex couples, again in the negative sense, 
is not limited, while simultaneously, citizens who have 
strong moral objections to the practice of homosexuality 
are not forced to publicly recognize the marital status of 
same-sex couples (Jordan 2011: 89). 
 Admittedly, it is not clear what “forced” means in this 
context, and I will return to this issue shortly.  For now, 
I want to consider the problems of a positive-liberty-based 
or a non-domination based defense of same-sex marriage 
rights.  As to the latter, it is seemingly no better off 
than the negative conception.  If not conferring marriage 
361 
 
rights to same-sex couples does not constitute physical 
interference, then it obviously does not constitute 
arbitrary interference.  This point is crucial because what 
the non-domination account must show in order to assert 
that the practice of restricting marriage rights 
contributes to the domination of same-sex couples is not 
simply that it arbitrarily assigns a legal status to one 
group but not another, but that in doing so it somehow 
interferes with this disadvantaged group. 
 The positive conception holds out more promise for 
providing a link between liberty and marriage rights, but, 
as is often the case with positive views, this advantage 
comes at a high price.  On a positive liberty based defense 
of equal marriage rights, one could assert that the 
institution of marriage provides a good that is essential 
for living a full and flourishing life.  Those who are 
barred from participating in this social institution 
because their relationships are not recognized as 
legitimate are consequently prevented from fully realizing 
one of their true and authentic goals or purposes.   
 The problem with this kind of argument, as should now 
be familiar, is that it justifies using state coercion to 
encourage, and perhaps even force, people to get and stay 
married.  If the institution of marriage is essential to 
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living a full and complete human life, then the state has 
good reason to compel its citizens to marry in the name of 
liberty.  To this end, the state could impose penalties on 
people who do not marry by a certain age or deny them 
certain rights conferred to married couples (states do in 
fact already do this.  The worry is that they will be 
justified in doing it to a far greater extent under this 
line of argument).  The state could also make it much more 
difficult to get a divorce in order to discourage citizens 
from exiting their marriages.  As Cheshire Calhoun argues, 
“even if there is something to be said for committed 
relationships, it is hard to see how using the law to keep 
couples together could be justified” (Calhoun 2000: 112).  
She further points out that strict divorce laws have 
historically disadvantaged women by making it difficult for 
them to exit abusive relationships (Calhoun 2000: 112).  
What is worrying about this sort of argument, according to 
Calhoun, is that it puts the state in the position of 
promoting a particular normative conception of the proper 
role and form of the family: “it is a return that requires 
using law and social policy to dissuade individuals from 
pursuing a plurality of conceptions of how intimate 
relationships ought to be organized” (Calhoun 2000: 113). 
 Neither the negative nor positive conception offers an 
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attractive option for those looking to defend equal 
marriage rights on the basis of liberty.  Are critics like 
Fried and Jordan right then to assert that extending 
marriage rights to same-sex couples somehow infringes on 
the liberty of those who oppose same-sex marriage? This is 
not so clear either.  Recall that both Fried and Jordan 
argue that the state coerces citizens if it forces them to 
legally recognize same-sex marriages, but it does not 
impose upon same-sex couples in a like manner as long as it 
allows them to do whatever they wish in the private sphere.  
But this seems inconsistent.  If the state respects the 
freedom of same-sex couples so long as it does not restrict 
their negative liberty, then how does the state, in 
extending marriage benefits, fail to respect the freedom of 
same-sex marriage opponents considering that this policy 
would likewise have no effect on their negative liberty?  
This is why Fried's analogy between being forced to attend 
the wedding or funeral of someone whose life one finds 
distasteful and being forced to recognize the legal status 
of marriages of which one disapproves is deeply misleading 
(Fried 2007: 140 - 141).  There is, in fact, a strong 
disanalogy between these two cases.  Forcing someone to 
attend a ceremony, of whatever nature, against his or her 
will would indeed require substantial physical 
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interference, but requiring only that he or she acknowledge 
the legal standing of someone else's marriage does not.  
Unless the state were to mandate that people attend same-
sex wedding ceremonies, rather than recognize the legal 
status of these marriages after such ceremonies, it does 
not infringe on anyone's negative liberty. 
 Perhaps Fried and Jordan should be taken instead to 
mean that requiring legal recognition of same-sex marriages 
infringes on the positive liberty of those who object to 
same-sex marriages on moral grounds.  This argument would 
go something like the following: because the state is 
supposed to represent the public as a whole, when it grants 
legal recognition to same-sex couples, it is making a 
declaration, in the name of all citizens, that these 
marriages are worthy of equal recognition.  Since some 
citizens have strong moral opposition to same-sex 
marriages, however, in making this declaration the state 
effectively forces them to endorse a moral principle that 
they in fact reject.  As such, the state prevents them from 
living on the basis of their own most fundamental 
convictions.  Neither Fried nor Jordan puts their position 
in positive liberty terms, but it seems like this is what 
they have in mind.   
 Whatever one thinks of this argument on its own (and I 
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offered several arguments as to why we should be suspicious 
of positive-liberty-based approaches in general), it 
creates substantial problems for Fried and Jordan's 
position.  If the state is required to protect and promote 
citizens' positive liberty, then the fact that it does not 
infringe upon the negative liberty of same-sex couples in 
denying them marriage rights is hardly an adequate 
accommodation. In not recognizing the legitimacy of same-
sex marriages, the state would, in effect, be declaring, 
again in the name of all citizens, that same-sex marriages 
are not worthy of equal recognition, and obviously same-sex 
couples who desire to marry would reject this assertion.  
If the state fails to respect the positive liberty of 
opponents of same-sex marriage in extending marriage 
benefits, then it is hard to see how it does not equally 
fail to respect the positive liberty of same-sex couples in 
not extending them.  If anything, not extending benefits is 
worse because, in doing so, the state is not only making a 
public declaration that same-sex couples strongly dispute, 
but is also denying them access to an institution that 
these couples view as necessary to living out their most 
fundamental commitments. 
 Ultimately, I think the argument offered by Fried and 
Jordan rests on an equivocation.  Their assertion that 
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extending marriage rights to same-sex couples infringes on 
liberty while restricting these rights does not is 
plausible only if they are referring to the positive 
liberty of opponents of same-sex marriage, but the negative 
liberty of same-sex couples.  I can see no justification, 
however, for this discrepancy.  Either negative liberty 
should be the measure, or positive liberty should. If it is 
to be negative liberty, then nothing the state does either 
way has any effect on the liberty of those on either side 
of this controversy.  If it is to be positive liberty, then 
no matter what the state does it will infringe on the 
liberty of one group or the other. 
 At this point, we might conclude that the same-sex 
marriage controversy is best described as a dispute 
concerning the norm of equality not liberty.  It is simply 
a mistake to think this debate can be resolved in favor of 
either side by appeal to the norm of liberty.  But this is 
why I think the anti-domination conception is particularly 
helpful regarding this issue.  On the anti-domination view, 
the state arguably does diminish the freedom of same-sex 
couples in a significant respect.  Accordingly, the anti-
domination conception helps us see how state restrictions 
on marriage violate not only the equality of same-sex 
couples, but their freedom as well. 
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 To see this, consider Calhoun's (2000) assessment of 
the harms of such restrictions on gays and lesbians.  
Essentially, her argument is that excluding gays and 
lesbians from participating in this institution contributes 
to their broader exclusion from civil society more 
generally: 
 
Same-sex marriage bars do play an especially 
central role in displacing gays and lesbians to 
the outside of civil society.  In particular, 
being fit for marriage is intimately bound up with 
our cultural conception of what it means to be a 
citizen.  This is because marriage is culturally 
conceived as playing a uniquely foundational role 
in the sustaining civil society.  As a result, 
only those who are fit to enter marital and family 
life deserve full civic status.  Bars on same-sex 
marriage encode and enforce the view that lesbians 
and gays are inessential citizens because they are 
unable to participate in the foundational social 
institution.  Marriage bars thus play a critical 
role in displacing gays and lesbians. (Calhoun 
2000: 108) 
 
If “marriage bars” contribute to the broader exclusion of 
gays and lesbians, then it contributes to their domination 
as I have conceived it.  In being regulated to second class 
status, gays and lesbians will not have access to the same 
resources and opportunities as heterosexuals and will 
accordingly be at a considerable power disadvantage in 
comparison to them. 
 Consider the various ways in which this exclusion 
disempowers gays and lesbians.  If being married, or at 
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least being a possible candidate for marriage, is a 
prerequisite for obtaining positions of power in civil 
society, then gays and lesbians will be unable to achieve 
these positions.  They will have more difficulty than 
heterosexuals, for example, at getting elected to public 
office, becoming chief executives in public corporations, or 
at being appointed to leadership positions in prominent 
civil institutions.  Accordingly, gays and lesbians will 
have considerably less access to various venues of power and 
will therefore, as a group, be exposed to a disproportionate 
amount of possible interference at the hands of others.  
Further, in denying marriage rights to same-sex couples, the 
state signals that sexual orientation is an appropriate 
basis for discrimination.  Accordingly, gays and lesbians 
are likely to have little or no recourse against those who 
discriminate against them on this basis since such 
discrimination has been deemed socially, and in some cases 
legally, acceptable by the state. 
 Because, as Calhoun attests, marriage is regarded as 
such a fundamental social institution, it provides an 
essential avenue to other resources and sources of power.  
In short, as Jeremy Garrett puts it, being married provides 
one with substantial “social currency” (Garrett 2009: 167).  
Restricting access to this institution results in an unequal 
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distribution of this social currency and consequently an 
unequal distribution of power.  In order to promote anti-
domination then, the state must resist the attempt of some 
groups, in this case heterosexuals, to grant themselves 
exclusive access to this privilege.  Therefore, on the anti-
domination view, equal marriage rights is not just a matter 





The final controversy I want to address concerns the debate 
over affirmative action. This debate centers on what steps 
academic institutions, government agencies, and employers 
must take to promote or ensure equality for traditionally 
underrepresented groups: are they required only to remove 
any and all institutional barriers preventing members of 
these groups from gaining admission or employment, or must 
they further take proactive steps to ensure that a certain 
portion of students or employees come from these 
underrepresented groups?  Both sides of this debate base 
their arguments on an appeal to the norm of equality.  
Opponents of affirmative action argue that preferential 
treatment given to underrepresented groups, such as women 
and racial minorities, violates the very principle of 
equality on which it is based.  As Lisa Newton puts it, 
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“just as the previous discrimination did, this reverse 
discrimination violates the public equality which defines 
citizenship” (Newton 1973: 310). Proponents of affirmative 
action, however, charge that, without taking positive steps 
to ensure equal representation, the commitment to equal 
opportunity is hollow. President Lyndon Johnson expressed 
this sentiment in a 1965 speech he gave at Howard University 
prior to signing the Executive Order that put affirmative 
action into practice at the federal level: 
 
You do not take a person who for years who has 
been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him 
up to the starting line of a race and then say, 
“you're free to compete with all others,” and 
still justly believe that you have been completely 
fair.  Thus it is not enough just to open the 
gates of opportunity.  All our citizens must have 
the ability to walk through these gates....We seek 
not...just equality as a a right and a theory but 




Essentially, proponents of affirmative action argue that, 
because traditionally underrepresented groups have suffered 
years of systemic prejudice and exclusion, they are at an 
inherent disadvantage in comparison to their more privileged 
counterparts.  It is therefore unreasonable to think that 
they have a genuine opportunity to achieve equal success 
once institutional barriers have been removed.  
 This quote from President Johnson reveals the sense in 
                                                 
9
 As quoted in Cahn 1995: xii  
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which the affirmative action debate can be seen as a dispute 
over the nature of liberty just as much as equality.  In the 
absence of legal or institutional barriers, either explicit 
or implicit, some opponents of affirmative action argue 
that, because nothing is strictly preventing 
underrepresented groups from achieving success in their 
academic and professional endeavors, they possess full equal 
opportunity.  In other words, once certain obstacles are 
removed, nothing restricts their liberty in the negative 
sense   At the same time, were employers or colleges and 
universities to give underrepresented groups special 
consideration in order to achieve what Johnson calls 
“equality of result,” such preferential treatment would 
constitute a formal barrier for non-underrepresented groups, 
thus in turn diminishing their opportunities.  On a negative 
conception of liberty, affirmative action is thus an 
anathema to equal opportunity according to this argument. 
 On a positive account, however, preferential treatment 
is likely required in order to achieve equal liberty for 
all.  This is because removing formal barriers to education 
or employment is not enough to ensure that underrepresented 
groups have equal life prospects given that these groups 
have historically been deprived of the necessary skills and 
resources needed to compete on an equal footing.  Merely 
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granting them an equal opportunity to achieve their ultimate 
goals and purposes is not valuable absent the ability to 
actually achieve them.  Therefore, positive steps must be 
taken in order to ensure that these underrepresented groups 
possess the necessary resources and develop the appropriate 
talents and skills in order to be successful in their 
endeavors.  In short, this defense of affirmative action 
relies on an exercise as opposed to an opportunity 
conception of liberty.  It strives for equality of result as 
opposed to mere equality of opportunity understood in the 
strictly negative sense. 
 I am not suggesting that the affirmative action debate 
must be cast in these terms.  One could, for example, think 
that the case for affirmative action rests on whether such 
policies are justified as a kind of compensation for past 
injustices or on whether promoting the value of diversity is 
sufficient to justify preferential treatment.  What I do 
want to argue is that, if one does want to make the case 
that affirmative action policies are necessary to securing 
equal freedom for all, then the anti-domination conception 
is a better basis than the positive conception (or even the 
non-domination conception as I will argue in conclusion of 
this section).   
 A positive-liberty-based defense of affirmative action 
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will of course inherit all the problems occasioned by 
positive views in general, but I want to focus on some 
problems regarding affirmative action specifically.  The 
positive-based account is particularly vulnerable to two 
common objections to affirmative action policies. The first 
is the charge that affirmative action stigmatizes those 
groups it is designed to benefit by signaling to the wider 
community that these groups lack the appropriate skills and 
capabilities to compete with white males on their own 
(Steele 1994).  Even if it is true that underrepresented 
groups only need such special assistance because of past 
discrimination and that white males have, in effect, been 
receiving preferential treatment up until now at the expense 
of others, the risk is that affirmative action will 
nevertheless be perceived as kind of crutch. This will be 
especially true if the justification for affirmative action 
is based on a positive account of liberty.  Because the 
rationale for affirmative action on such an account is that 
underrepresented groups are unlikely to be able to achieve 
success in their life's projects without assistance, the 
worry is that their achievements will often be viewed as 
suspect by others.  In other words, their successes will not 
be regarded as properly their own.  Accordingly, even if 
affirmative action programs do promote the positive liberty 
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of underrepresented groups, these groups will still fail to 
achieve equal status with their fellow citizens given the 
social stigma attached to them.  
 The second objection is that affirmative action 
programs constitute a form of assimilation insofar as they 
promote the interests of underrepresented groups based on 
the dominant white-male norm of success. Again, the 
positive-liberty-based defense of affirmative action is 
particularly vulnerable to this objection for the following 
reason: in order to identify which skills and capabilities 
are necessary for success, we have to first determine what 
success consists in. The problem is that, if success is 
understood in terms of getting an education at institutions 
traditionally dominated by white males and then afterward 
securing employment in industries likewise traditionally 
dominated by white males, it will rule out competing 
conceptions. In order to lead truly fulfilling lives, 
underrepresented groups will be told that they must first 
study and master a curriculum designed by the dominant white 
male majority -- a curriculum that likely reflects the 
history and values of this dominant group.  Second, they 
will be told that success is primarily measured in terms of 
material wealth, ruling out alternative conceptions of 
success as personal fulfillment or family and community 
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involvement.    
 Though she does not discuss positive liberty 
specifically, I think this is the kind of worry that Georgia 
Warnke has in mind in criticizing what she calls an 
“integrationist” defense of affirmative action: 
 
The problem with an integrationist ground for 
affirmative action is that it is also 
assimilationist. The vision of the United States 
as a grand melting pot surreptitiously takes 
white, male America as the norm and requires all 
those groups accepted into its public life to 
conform to standards set by the white males who 
once monopolized it. White males constitute the 
standard for the normal employee or citizen and 
others must cut and prune their identities and 
commitments to fit this pre-established norm. 
(Warnke 1998: 98) 
 
Because, for years, white males have set the standard for 
what constitutes success, determined the skills and 
capabilities necessary to achieve it, and designed the 
institutions through which it is to be achieved, giving 
underrepresented groups access to these institutions does 
not so much help them achieve their own goals or purposes 
but those that have been designed by others.  This creates 
a dilemma for the positive-liberty-based defense of 
affirmative action.  We can either assert that the dominant 
white-male norm is the best understanding of what success 
and the good life consist in -- a stipulation that will 
surely be degrading to those who do  not feel represented 
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by that norm -- or we could admit that this norm is 
inherently exclusionary in which case affirmative action 
will be a hindrance, not a means, to helping 
underrepresented groups achieve their own authentic ends.   
 I do not mean to suggest that either stigmatization or 
assimilation are inevitable consequences of any affirmative 
action policy.  Rather, my claim is that a positive-
liberty-based defense of affirmative action makes these 
consequences more likely due to what Thomas Hill Jr. (1995) 
has called “the message of affirmative action.” According 
to Hill, the effects of affirmative action policies depend 
not just on what they do, but also on how they are 
justified, or as he puts it, “what our actions say to 
others, depends largely, though not entirely, upon our 
avowed reason for acting” (Hill 1995: 169).  The worry with 
the positive liberty approach is that it may give the 
message that underrepresented groups are both incapable of 
living successful lives on their own and that the proper 
model of a successful life is the one exalted by the white 
male majority.  In either case, affirmative action 
paradoxically contributes to the extent to which 
underrepresented groups are relegated to a secondary status 
within society. 
 Perhaps there are ways in which the positive-based-
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liberty defense can avoid, or at least mitigate, these 
consequences, but, given the problems of positive accounts 
in general and their specific difficulties regarding 
affirmative action, I think it is worth pursuing an 
alternative strategy.  To this end, I propose that the 
anti-domination account provides a better defense for 
affirmative action, in part, because it sends the right 
kind of message.  Under anti-domination rationale, 
affirmative action is justified insofar as it is necessary 
to promote reciprocity of power.  The extent to which it 
actually does so is an empirical question that I cannot 
fully explore here, but it seems intuitively plausible that 
affirmative action would be justified on this ground.   
Past discrimination has given white males disproportionate 
influence in public life.  They are disproportionately 
represented in powerful political, economic, and social 
institutions, and they have greater representation in the 
schools and universities through which one gains entry into 
these institutions.  As such, white males, as a group, have 
greater power over women and minorities.  They are able to 
expand the opportunities for themselves while at the same 
limiting those of others because they are more likely to 
occupy positions of power. 
 Because white males possess greater power over 
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underrepresented groups due to past discrimination, it is 
unlikely that simply removing formal, institutional and 
legal barriers to progress will alleviate this disparity.  
Even after such barriers have been removed, white males 
will still be in position to use their power to their 
advantage and continue to monopolize access to political, 
economic, and social resources.  Affirmative action 
policies can help rectify this power imbalance by giving 
underrepresented groups greater access to essential 
educational resources and further by ensuring that they 
have equal representation in various political and economic 
institutions.  In addition, the anti-domination 
justification for affirmative action sends the right kind 
of message because it does not somehow signal that 
underrepresented groups are incapable of achieving 
successful or fulfilling lives by their own means or on 
their own standards.  Instead, the anti-domination 
rationale recognizes that past discrimination has left 
underrepresented groups at a substantial power 
disadvantage, and this power disadvantage diminishes their 
liberty by placing them at the mercy of the white male 
majority even if it is the case some of them are 
nonetheless capable of having great success despite this 
disadvantage.  The anti-domination defense thus appeals 
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explicitly to the equal status of underrepresented groups 
rather than placing this status at risk by encouraging a 
message of either stigmatization or assimilation. 
 At this point, it is worth noting that the non-
domination cannot offer a similar defense of affirmative 
action.  In the first place, white males who lose out on 
academic placement or get passed over for employment will 
regard affirmative action policies as entirely arbitrary.  
The interference these policies involve will not track the 
avowed interests of this group.  Members of the white male 
majority can therefore argue, not without plausibility, 
that, on Pettit's standard, affirmative action is not only 
unfair, but constitutes a form of domination.  Perhaps 
Pettit could argue instead that this interference is not 
arbitrary because it furthers a common interest.  I 
explored the problems with this type of response in Chapter 
3, but, even if this were a viable response, it shows at 
best that affirmative action does not itself constitute 
domination.  It does not further show that affirmative 
action is necessary to promote non-domination since it is 
not clear how affirmative action lessens the degree to 
which underrepresented groups are exposed to arbitrary 
interference. 
 Again, I should stress that the soundness of the anti-
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domination justification depends on the empirical evidence 
concerning the harmful effects of past discrimination and 
the effectiveness of particular affirmative action policies 
in correcting them.  It also depends on whether or not 
there are better alternatives available.  I obviously 
cannot resolve either question here, but I hope I have made 
the case that the anti-domination defense of affirmative 
action is both reasonably plausible and potentially 






There is no doubt that more could be said about the anti-
domination stance regarding these and other controversies.  
As I noted in the previous chapter, the account of anti-
domination I have been able to offer here is merely a 
sketch.  Additional work is needed in order to expound upon 
the anti-domination view further and fully draw out its 
implications.  First, a more formalized account of anti-
domination is required than what I have been able to 
develop in the preceding chapter.  We need some way of at 
least coarsely measuring domination in order to assess 
specific political, social and economic arrangements.  In 
particular, we need to be able to analyze more precisely 
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the ways in which multilateral relationships affect the 
power of individual agents, and I have been able to say 
little of much detail about this issue here.   Relatedly, 
further work needs to be done on exactly how different 
institutional arrangements affect the distribution of power 
among agents, which institutions distribute power most 
equally, and what reforms of existing institutions would 
promote the anti-domination ideal.  Finally, substantial 
empirical research is necessary in order to assess the 
effectiveness of the kind of policy proposals I have 
discussed above. 
 Such questions are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  What I hope I have shown is that they are 
worth exploring further.  While the debate over the nature 
and value of liberty is certainly far from settled, I think 
that the anti-domination conception provides an attractive 
candidate, one that has not yet been articulated or 
explored in the contemporary literature.  Whether its 
advantages are ultimately sufficient to garner assent among 
liberals remains to be seen, but the issue certainly 
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